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iABSTRACT
Risk-based regulation has grown rapidly as a component of Government decision making, and
as such, the need for an established evidence-based framework for decisions about risk has
become the new mantra. However, the process of brokering scientific evidence is poorly
understood and there is a need to improve the transparency of this brokering process and
decisions made. This thesis attempts to achieve this by using agent-based simulation to model
the influence that power structures and participating personalities has on the brokering of
evidence and thereby the confidence-building exercise that characterises risk-based regulation.
As a prerequisite to the adoption of agent-based techniques for simulating decisions under
uncertainty, this thesis provides a critical review of the influence power structure and
personality have on the brokering of scientific evidence that informs risk decisions. Three case
studies, each representing a different perspective on risk-based regulation are presented: nuclear
waste disposal, the disposal of avian-influenza infected animal carcases and the reduction of
dietary salt intake. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with an expert from each case
study, and the logical sequence in which decisions were made was mapped out and used to
inform the development of an agent-based simulation model.
The developed agent-based model was designed to capture the character of the brokering
process by transparently setting out how evidence is transmitted from the provider of evidence
to the final decision maker. It comprises of two agents, a recipient and provider of evidence, and
draws upon a historic knowledge base to permit the user to vary components of the interacting
agents and of the decision-making procedure, demonstrating the influence that power structure
and personality has on agent receptivity and the confidence attached to a number of different
lines of evidence. This is a novel step forward because it goes beyond the scope of current risk
management frameworks, for example, permitting the user to explore the influence that
participants have in weighing and strengthening different lines of evidence and the impact this
has on the final decision outcome.
Keywords: Agent-based simulation; power; personality; weight of evidence; risk regulation;
policy development
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1Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Chapter structure
This chapter provides an overview of the research project. Section 1.2 explains the
background to the research; and Section 1.3 introduces the problem.
1.2 Background to the research
Government decision-making is undergoing a revolution in the UK. Proposals for
modernising Government in the 1990s (Cabinet Office, 1999) are now being delivered
through both Government programmes and legislation on ‘better’ and ‘risk-based’
regulation (Hutter, 2005). The premise is that a step change can be delivered, with risk-
based regulation getting smarter, through an increased focus on high risks and decisions
becoming more open to external scrutiny and challenge. Alongside, we observe a
renewed emphasis being placed on the role and use of scientific advice in government
decision making, amid a climate of low public trust in policy decisions. These combined
initiatives challenge our understanding of the technical, political and psychological
features of decision making on risk, particularly in the regulatory, environmental
planning and policy development context.
2In the UK substantive work has been carried out on the handling of risk and uncertainty
to facilitate better risk-based regulation. At a minimum, risk-based regulation consists
of using technical risk-based tools that have emerged out of economics (e.g. Cost
Benefit Analysis) and science (e.g. risk assessment techniques) (Hutter, 2005). In a bid
to secure a level of objectivity and transparency Government departments and agencies
have published risk management frameworks that set out the technocratic processes of
risk assessment, management and options appraisal that each department and agency
undertakes (Strategy Unit, 2002; OXERA, 2000). Together these frameworks explain
how power and responsibility is delegated from central Government to inform
environmental planning and regulatory decisions (Figure 1a) and how information
(robust evidence) is secured, evaluated, utilised and filtered back up, to inform further
policy development (Figure 1b). However, there is a view that these frameworks fail to
account for the complexities and nuances that characterise risk-based decision-making,
despite the apparent objectivity and transparency (OXERA, 2000).
Conventional risk-management frameworks marginalise the transparency of risk
regulation because they struggle to account for the handling of uncertainty and
subjectivity that characterise the brokering of evidence (OXERA, 2000;
These frameworks set out the technocratic processes of risk assessment, management
and options appraisal that each department and agency undertakes (Strategy Unit, 2002;
OXERA, 2000; Cabinet Office
often missing and/or contradictory, requiring practitioners to make value judgements in
the face of manifold uncertainties.
Figure 1: Simplified illustration how power and responsibility are delegated from
central Government to its departments and agencies, (a) and information (robust
evidence) is filtered back up to inform further policy
3
, 1999; ILGRA, 1998). However, scientific ev
development (b).
-based
Powell 1999).
idence is
4Both theoretical models and extensive empirical testing exist to explain how individuals
make decisions under uncertainty. The more recent and sophisticated of these models
(e.g., Cumulative Prospect Theory; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) imbue individuals
with a rich set of psychological traits, which interact in complex ways when
determining the actual choices made, including attitudes to losses versus gains, attitudes
to certain outcomes, and psychological distortions of probability. Similarly, through
behavioural game theory there is a wealth of knowledge on how humans make choices
in strategic environments where the outcomes are affected by the choices of others (e.g.
Camerer, 2003). However, the timing and length of risk-based regulation often means it
is impossible to validate the impact participants have in ‘real time’.
Agent-based modelling and simulation has the potential to go beyond conventional
modelling and to help better understand the influence individuals have on the brokering
of evidence in risk-based regulation. Conventional modelling characterises the
equilibrium of a system, whereas agent-based modelling uses simple rules to generate
complexity and a rationale for the emergence of behaviour. Understanding of individual
agents and the diversity, connectedness and level of interaction between agents can be
used to test how changes in agent behaviour may affect the emergence of a decision
outcome.
This thesis uses the concept of agent-based modelling to capture the different shades
and intricacy of risk-based regulation. It provides further insight into the transparency of
a current real-world policy development (recommendation for a reduction in dietary salt
intake), environmental planning (the disposal of avian influenza infected animal
5carcasses) and regulatory decision (the review of a post-closure safety case for nuclear
waste disposal). A critical review of existing knowledge and in-depth interviews with
experts captures the structure of the case studies decision frameworks, decision
protocols and known power and personality influences. This provides a foundation on
which to develop an agent-based model. Development of such a model promises to
explain the effect that power structure and personality may have on the brokering of
evidence and that confidence building characterises risk-based regulation.
6This page is intentionally blank
7Chapter 2
RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES
2.1 Chapter structure
This chapter sets out the research aim and objectives of this project. This is
complemented by an overview of the thesis structure, followed by an explanation of the
research deliverables.
2.1.1 Research aim
The aim of this research was to provide a richer description of the brokering of
scientific evidence in risk-based regulation by focusing on the social science aspects of
decision-making.
2.1.2 Research Objectives
To achieve this aim the objectives of the research were to:
 Model government risk-based regulation by examining real-world case studies;
 Develop a research framework capable of mapping out the logic of the
brokering process;
 Investigate how agent-based techniques might represent interacting decision
makers;
 Investigate if the decisions reached are stable by assessing their sensitivity to
changes in system parameters;
8 Investigate if the automated decision making system is able to reach the same
decision as those provided in three real-world case studies.
2.2 Thesis structure
This thesis explores the possibility of simulating risk-based regulation by, utilising
agents (people) within a computer simulation environment. To this end, the author has
investigated how power structure and personality may influence the confidence agents
attached to submitted evidence. Explored the dynamics process in which evidence is
brokered in risk-based regulation. Selected three case studies (representing policy
development, environmental planning and regulatory permitting), which characterise the
breadth of conditions under which evidence is brokered. By applying agent-based
techniques, this information formed the foundation of a two-agent simulation
environment. The resulting system resulted in emulating the brokering process that
characterise confidence building in each case study, by calibrating parameters relating
to decision context and attributes of the agents’ character. The following ten chapters
encapsulate this.
Chapter 1: Introduction - presents an overview of the research background and a
rationale for carrying out the research.
Chapter 2: Research Aim and Objectives – presents a statement of the aim and
objectives of the research project.
9Chapter 3: Literature review - offers a critical review of the available literature and a
summary of existing gaps in knowledge.
Chapter 4: Research methodology - provides a rationale for the chosen research
methodology and a specification of the research method.
Chapter 5: Exploratory stage – explains the themes identified by carrying out in-
depth unstructured and semi-structured interviews.
Chapter 6: Descriptive stage - explains the development of the research framework.
Chapter 7: Model development - draws on earlier work carried out, and explains the
development of the agent-based model for illustrating the influence of power and
personality on the brokering process.
Chapter 8: Proof of concept - presents the resulting agent-based model, insights
generated and details about the validation and verification of the developed model.
Chapter 9: Discussion - discusses results and relative success of the research project
focusing specifically on key intellectual insights, by placing them in context of prior-art.
Chapter 10: Conclusion – concludes how well the developed agent-based model met
the research aim and objectives
10
2.3 Research deliverables
The thesis presents the development and application of a two-agent model that is
capable of simulating the influence power structure and personality have on the
brokering of scientific evidence in risk-based regulation. This provides a theoretical
perspective with regards to the influence the brokering of evidence has on confidence
building in risk-based regulation. The value of the model lies in its ability to replicate
real-world decisions. Specifically, it provides a means of simulating real-world two-
person interactions that encapsulate the dynamics of a regulator/applicant relationship.
This is demonstrated in the context of three real-world case studies (policy
development, environmental planning and regulatory decision), which represent the
breadth of conditions under which scientific evidence is brokered in risk-based
regulation.
11
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Chapter 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1 Chapter structure
This chapter provides a critical review of the literature relating to this research project
and a presentation of identified gaps in knowledge. It asserts that there are considerable
gaps in knowledge regarding the influence that decision participants have on risk-based
regulation through their brokering of scientific evidence.
Section 3.2 describes the objective and method used for conducting the literature
review. Section 3.3 describes risk-based regulation and addresses the issue that
regulators face, regarding the disparity and complexity of environmental risk. Section
3.4 introduces the brokering of scientific evidence. Section 3.5 provides a critical
review of the potential influence that power and personality has on the brokering of
evidence. Section 3.6 introduces agent-based modelling and simulation. Section 3.7
explains the scope that existing agent-based models have for modelling the brokering
process and the confidence building exercise that characterises risk-based regulation.
Finally, Section 3.8 provides a summary of the identified gaps in knowledge.
13
3.2 Objective and methods used for conducting the literature
review
The purpose of carrying out a structured critical review of existing literature was to
identify gaps in knowledge regarding the influence social science aspects of decision
making (specifically power and personality) have on risk-based regulation (i.e. policy
development, environmental planning and regulatory decisions).
The initial approach was to carry out a ‘key-word’ search to understand how previous
researchers had positioned themselves in relation to the problem. Relevant research was
abundant, yet poorly synthesized and spread across a number of different disciplines.
Throughout the review, a comprehensive search of both primary and secondary sources
of emerging ideas from published and ‘grey’ literature was carried-out using academic
databases and paper alerts. Databases consulted included: Scopus; Science Direct; Web
of Knowledge; Emerald; and PsycInfo, in addition to a number of authoritative reviews
located on the Internet. After reviewing the output, the author selected the most
appropriate material for in-depth reading. This search strategy allowed the research
perspective to expand into many different fields; for example, the value that different
theoretical and methodological approaches have for describing how individuals make
decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Identified gaps in knowledge were then
placed in context of the current capacity of risk-management frameworks, published by
government departments and agencies.
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3.3 The disparity and complexity of risk-based regulation
This section summarises the issues associated with risk-based regulation and the risk
management frameworks that are used to represent (or model) Government decision
making.
Government departments and agencies have the remit of carrying out environmental
decision making, with the aim of providing an improved resilience against
environmental threats for current and future generations (Pollard et al., 2008).
Environmental decisions are fundamentally about balancing risk and reward; loss versus
gain (Pollard et al., 2008). Decision makers must cope with long gestation periods for
risks (Power and McCarty, 2006), such as contamination exposure and cancer, establish
clear casual relationships (e.g. between greenhouse gases and climate change) and
manage controversies over tradeoffs that require weighing risks and benefits against
each other (e.g. agriculture production and the use of pesticides). In addition, the vast
number of intervening variables, which exist between a cause and effect of
environmental harm subtracts from the amount of available evidence required to
manage risk. This omnipresence of imperfect information means that zero risk is
unobtainable and the need to cope with uncertainties is inevitable (Power and McCarty,
2006).
During the 1980s and 90s, there was a call for Government to acknowledge
uncertainties in their decision-making. The public lost confidence in conventional
regulatory models and called for the adoption of the precautionary principle based on
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the belief that poorly understood risks remained unregulated (Hutter, 2005). This
together with the call for Government to do “more for less” (Hutter, 2005) has rendered
conventional command-and-control regulation (NRC, 1996; Presidential commission,
1997) inappropriate for environmental decision making. Critics claimed conventional
regulation was resource intensive and overly prescriptive (Kirk et al., 2005), potentially
inhibiting innovation and the development of new technologies (Wiener, 2004). In
addition, Hampton (2005) claimed conventional regulation created an unfair
competitive advantage by paying inconsistent attention toward regions and areas,
reducing the benefit regulatory resources can bring by increasing administrative burdens
needlessly. The Government’s response to such criticism has been a strong
deregulatory rhetoric, centring on alleged overregulation, legalism, inflexibility and an
alleged absence of attention being paid toward the cost of regulation (Hutter, 2005).
Regulators are responsible for administering regulation by implementing it through a
framework of due process and legislative documents (acts, regulations, annexes,
statutory guidance). Within Europe, European Community (EC) institutions set the
framework of Council legislation upon its Member States. Directives are the chosen
legal instrument in the environmental arena because of the greater flexibility they offer,
allowing more room for interpretation (Bell and McGillivray, 2000). Acts of Parliament
(primary legislation) and delegated legislation (secondary legislation) transpose
Directives into national law (Bell and McGillivray, 2000) and regulation acts as
administrative arms of the state. Government departments and agencies responsible for
administering regulation, supervise the regulated community through performance
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measures and feedback provides Government with market signals of acceptable
behaviour (Blackman, 1998).
Today, proposals for modernising Government in the 1990s (Cabinet Office, 1999) are
now being delivered through Government programmes of work and legislation on
‘better’ and ‘risk-based’ regulation (Strategy Unit, 2002; Hampton, 2005; Hutter, 2005;
Pollard et al., 2008). The premise is that there can be a step change in decision quality
from the regulation of occupational and public safety risks, to the safety of the food
chain and the environment by allocating regulatory resources in proportion to the risk
and interventions they require (BRC, 2006; Environment Agency, 2005; Hutter, 2005).
Essentially this entails focusing on higher risks with decisions being more open to
external scrutiny and challenge. This promises improvements but at the cost of
interventions requiring controversial tradeoffs involving conflicting and competing
objectives (Long and Fischhoff, 2000). To account for this, there has been a renewed
emphasis placed on the value of scientific evidence in Government decision making, set
within a historic climate of low public trust (Powell, 1999; House of Lords, 2000;
House of Lords, 2006). Combined, these initiatives require an understanding of the
technical, social, political and psychological features of decision making, which in
practice is a highly complex issue, fraught with uncertainty.
The primary source of uncertainty in risk-based regulation is the absence of evidence
and/or the presence of contradictory evidence (Hutter, 2005; Powell, 1999). In an
attempt to better understand uncertainty, scholars have developed a number of
typologies (e.g. Morgan and Henrion, 1999; Smithson, 1989). Stirling (1999; 2003), for
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example, defines risk in terms of probabilities and consequences, divides uncertainty
into stochastic uncertainty (good knowledge of both probabilities and consequences),
ambiguity (good knowledge of probabilities and poor knowledge of consequences),
classical uncertainty (poor knowledge of probabilities and good knowledge of
consequences) and ignorance (poor knowledge of both probabilities and consequences).
In the context of risk-based regulation, Stirling’s typology of uncertainty has the
potential to explain spurious precision, controversy over interpretations of expert
findings, difficulty in planning and the occurrences of unwanted surprises, respectively
(Andrews et al., 2004). From a less technical perspective, however, Morgan and
Henrion (1999) suggest more attention should be paid towards expert uncertainty and
linguistic imprecision. In addition, Boholm (2003), assuming uncertainty is the part of
risk that cannot be calculated, suggests that practitioners wishing to manage risk should
think of uncertainty in terms of coping strategies, such as faith, precaution and
avoidance. Hence, suggesting that uncertainty is not just a product of absent and/or
contradictory evidence but also of subjective value judgements being made regarding
the direction, strength and weight of evidence that supports the assessment and
management of risk.
The UK Government has carried out substantive work on the handling of risk and
uncertainty (e.g. OXERA, 2000; Strategy Unit, 2002, POST, 2004). Much of this work
has placed an emphasis on the value and construct of scientific evidence (Science
Advisory Council, 2006; Bradshaw and Borchers, 2000). Her Majesty’s Government,
for example, have published guidance emphasising the need to secure a wide range of
advice from the best sources, whilst recognising that the correct balance of
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interdisciplinary advice will depend on the issue in question (HM Government, 2005).
Moreover, it sets out the importance of making the use of evidence transparent, so that
decisions can withstand the challenges of credibility, reliability and objectivity.
In an attempt to provide a measure of transparency and objectivity, Government
departments and agencies have published risk management frameworks. These
frameworks set out clearly an agency’s or department’s approach toward their
assessment and management of risk and option appraisal. Current frameworks
successfully provide a technical schematic of information flows and accountabilities.
They act as a guide for onlookers, demonstrating the procedure followed to assess and
manage risk. The risk management framework published by DETR (2000), for example,
clearly sets out the importance of addressing the issue of “risk of what to whom?”
(Figure 2). It emphasises the need to continually revisit the risk and ask whether there is
need to allocate more learning resources, by advocating a tiered approach (the
screening, prioritisation and qualitative treatment of risk in advance of quantitative
treatment of risk). It also demonstrates the importance of assessing environmental risk
alongside economic, social, technical and management issues. Hence, risk management
frameworks transparently set out the technocratic processes of ensuring regulatory
resources are targeted and proportionally allocated (Strategy Unit, 2002). However, risk
management frameworks do not account for the influence that personal or
organisational features play in these decisions.
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Risk management frameworks published by Government departments and agencies pay
little homage to the fact that decisions made are acted upon by people. As such, there
remains a view that current risk management frameworks and processes fail to capture
fully the complexities and nuances of decision making in risk-based regulation (RCEP,
1998; Powell, 1999; Slater et al., 2006).
Incomplete evidence, emphasises the influence practitioners have on the final decision
outcome, and the amount of resources that should be spent to assess and manage the
risk. As it stands, current frameworks suggest that risk management decisions are one
dimensional, which of course is not true. Decision makers are often required to engage
in extensive dialogue with decision-participants, spread across a number of different
Figure 2: Risk management framework (After DETR et al., 2000)
Risk Prioritisation Hazard identification
Exposure assessment
Risk estimation
Risk characterisation
* Stages with each tier of
risk assessment
Economics Technology
Social Issues Management
Risk Management
Collect data, iterate processes & monitor
Tier 1 Risk Screening *
Tier 2 Generic Quantitative
Risk Assessment *
Tier 3 Site-Specific
Risk Assessment *
Options Appraisal
Problem Formulation
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domains. There are a vast number of personal and organisational features that are
known to influence decisions on risk. Figure 3 illustrates the type of personal and
organisational features that are known to influence risk decisions.
In summary, the handling of risk and uncertainty is an important issue, one that has
received much attention in recent history. It still remains an issue for modern regulation.
This section has summarised the issues associated with risk-based regulation and the
transparency of current risk-management frameworks used to represent Government
decision making. Risk-management frameworks have been developed to represent how
governments make decisions under conditions of risk and uncertainty. Departmental
Figure 3: Personal and organizational features that influence risk-based decisions
(After Johnson, 1992; Content, 2005).
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risk-management frameworks explain how the delegation of authority and the elicitation
(and use) of scientific evidence and knowledge informs policy development,
environmental planning and regulatory decisions. They explain how Government
departments and agencies manage the risks to the delivery of strategic objectives. They
set out the framework in which participants collaborate and summarise how science is
incorporated (NAO, 2000). Yet, there remains a view that current frameworks fail to
capture the complexities, realities and nuances of decision-making beyond a technical
schematic of information flows and accountabilities (Powell, 1999; OXERA, 2000).
The following section discusses the brokering of the scientific evidence that support
decisions on risk in risk-based regulation.
3.4 The brokering of scientific evidence in risk-based regulation
Risk characterisation (a statement on the significance of a risk and its attending
uncertainties) has been described as the most fundamental aspect of risk management,
allowing the development of feasible options for abating risk (Deisler, 1988). What can
meaningfully be said about the significance of a risk fundamentally depends on the
extent and quality of the scientific evidence that underpins the analysis, and ones’
confidence in it. In practice, scientific evidence is brokered between many actors (or
‘agents’), in the decision. That is, research is often:
 procured or elicited from the research base;
 used alongside targeted, site-, or policy-specific studies;
 used to develop new lines of evidence that may support or contradict an existing
line of reasoning;
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 applied to develop an overall weight of evidence about a risk decision – for
example, whether or not to extend an environmental permit, for an integrated
petroleum refinery; and
 used to produce guidance, for example on the consumption of alcohol within
certain ‘safe’ limits.
Figure 4 is a generalised summary of the key actors involved in the regulatory review of
a post-closure safety case used to support the decision on whether (or not) to reauthorize
disposals at a pre-existing radioactive waste repository in the UK (after Yearsley et al.,
2001). In practice, this decision involves inputs from fundamental and applied
scientists, scientific consultants, highly specified domain experts, advisory committees,
expert referees, various publics with local or specialist knowledge, industry sector
specialists with their scientific advisors, technical policy development specialists and
others. These actors interact and share evidence and knowledge, forming various lines
of evidence about the risk in question.
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Lines of evidence informing environmental decisions rarely point in the same direction
(i.e. are rarely universally supportive of a particular hypothesis), come in various
strengths (of evidence), and thus require synthesis so an overall weight of evidence can
be applied to the characterisation (significance and confidence) of the risk (e.g. Lowell
et al., 2000; Pollard et al., 2008). Moving from the bottom to the top, Figure 5
Applicant
Assessment issuesRegulatory issues
Operations
Division
Policy
Function
Legal
Division
Assessment
Project Manager
Information
Management
System
Technical
Programme
Environment Agency
Agency
Expert
Reviewers
External
Expert
Reviewers
Specialist
Working
Groups
Review Project
Manager
Contractor (If used)
Figure 4: An example structure of the institutional sub-components involved in the
decision on reviewing post-closure safety cases. Individual boxes are often populated by
an array of domain experts. In this case, representatives of the regulator’s policy
function make recommendations to the Government Department and ultimately the
Secretary of State regarding the re-authorisation of a facility (adapted from Yearsley et
al., 2001).
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illustrates how different sources of primary scientific evidence (e.g. experimental or
field data) inform related sources of knowledge (e.g. the predicted future behaviour of
contaminants once discharged to an aquatic environment) on a specific issue (e.g. the
risk of harm to a specific ecosystem). These are presented, in concert and through a
sequence of individual transactions between agents (people), to an ultimate decision
maker for an assessment of the significance of the risk and consequently a decision
whether to accept the risk or not and how to manage it.
The brokering of scientific evidence and knowledge in support of risk assessments is
inherently uncertain due to information gaps, the existence of competing theories and
the presence of manifold uncertainty (Powell, 1999). Risk-informed decision-making is
value-laden, not least because decision participants (agents) make value judgements
regarding the sufficiency and credibility of available information. Moreover,
Figure 5: A conceptual simplification of the brokering of evidence and knowledge.
= scientific knowledge = decision maker= scientific evidence
= lines of evidence = lines of dependence
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individuals do not make stable decisions under uncertainty, as all decisions made are to
some degree biased by participants’ perceptions of the decision environment (Slovic et
al., 1982; Slovic, 2000). Furthermore, risk characterisation itself requires a discussion of
values with a pre-requisite discussion of risk appetite (Tuler et al., 2005). Under these
conditions, unfettered assessments of the direction, strength and weight of evidence that
constitute a view of the risks, may not be possible. Current technocratic risk-
management frameworks fail to account fully for this and so may compromise the level
of openness and transparency that they attempt to infer.
The discussion that follows attempts to provide a richer description of this brokering of
scientific evidence and knowledge in risk-based regulation. Evidence is referred to as
‘raw data’ and knowledge as ‘interpretations’ that inform an assessment of the
significance of the collective evidence in the context of the risk question being posed.
For example, environmental regulatory officials must frequently evaluate the risks
posed by a new operational plant or changes to plant design and/or layout. A regulatory
officer may need to decide, for example, on the reliable performance of an in-plant
wastewater treatment plant for the biological treatment of pharmaceutical residues in
process streams. Often the operator and their professional advisors (environmental
consultants, say) will supply this data and the risk assessment, in support of a
modification to the plant. The regulator must process the evidence on the treatment
performance of the individual unit, for example, to evaluate the risk of exceeding
environmental quality standards, and then use it to establish compliance criteria in
consultation with the operator.
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Figure 6 illustrates a typical process associated with the brokering of evidence and
knowledge. Here, nodes represent an individual agent in the decision. Agents must
receive (●), process (■), and pass-on (▲) evidence and knowledge. If the two nodes at 
the bottom represent an operator and a consultant, the square dotted arrows can
represent the evidence they gather. If the node at the top of this figure represents a
regulatory officer (decision maker), the solid arrows can represent the scientific
knowledge and evidence presented to the regulator, after the operator and consultant has
placed the evidence in context of the risk question being asked. The round dotted arrows
represent the outcome, i.e. the confidence the regulator has in approving, for example,
the authorisation of an environmental permit.
Figure 6: The receiving, processing and passing-on of evidence and knowledge.
Confidence in permit approval
= scientific evidence = scientific knowledge
= ‘receive’ = ‘process’ = ‘pass-on’
Each node
represents a
decision maker
= decision outcome
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To facilitate the division of expertise and responsibilities, government have often
assumed they can handle uncertainties in decisions in the vacuum of science (Mayo and
Hollander, 1994). However, this is an unrealistic perspective because real world
decisions are subject to both fraud and mistakes (e.g. Mayo and Hollander, 1994). In
reality, decision makers must determine how sufficient evidence and knowledge is for
answering a pertinent question. Sufficient options are those whose outcomes have an
“acceptable” value (Mayo and Hollander, 1994). Of course, this requires the ability to
determine the level of acceptability, which is not easy for a regulatory officer faced with
a high degree of decision uncertainty.
Figure 6 sets out the logic of approach but not the reality that at each step a recipient
may wish to reject the scientific evidence and knowledge provided. It does not illustrate
how the lack of evidence and/or the presence of contradictory evidence can increase
decision uncertainty and the level of subjectivity required to make decisions. It does not
illustrate the extent that value judgements made by the recipient can determine the
sufficiency and dependency of different sources of scientific evidence and knowledge.
To address this, later sections of this thesis critically assess how a decision maker’s
personality and position within a power structure may determine whether an agent will
engage in dialogue and whether this is likely to be conducive to the resolution of
decision uncertainty and confidence that there is sufficient evidence to support (or
refute) the risk question being posed.
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3.5 Power & personality
Scholars have already reported on how individuals make decisions under uncertainty,
through both theoretical models and extensive empirical testing. This section discusses
the potential influence that power and personality have on the brokering of scientific
evidence and knowledge; the confidence building exercise that characterises risk-based
regulation.
3.5.1 Influence of power
Power is the ability to control one’s environment and the behaviour of those within it
(Dahl, 1957; French and Raven, 1959; Kanter, 1979). In the context of brokering
evidence and knowledge, power is realised by an individual’s capacity to include or
exclude information, contingent on their view of its validity and relevance to the
decision being considered. The distribution of power can be perceived as a power
structure embodying the influences people have by reference to their status and the
period in which they hold power.
Substantial literature exists on the dynamics of power (e.g. French and Raven, 1959;
Morgan, 1986; Paton, 1984; Stephenson, 1985; Liao, 2008a; 2008b). French and Raven
(1959) advanced a taxonomy of five forms of power (legitimate power, referent power,
expert/informational power, reward power and coercive power). These describe the
sources of power that a participant may have access to, and the influences they hold
within a power structure (Belaya et al., 2008). French and Raven’s (1959) five forms of
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power can be considered to relate to a decision participant’s ability to receive, process
and pass-on scientific evidence and knowledge, as demonstrated in Figure 7.
This taxonomy plays out in authentic policy, environmental planning and regulatory
decisions as the various agents in the decision exchange sort and validate evidence in
support of risk characterisation. The first aspect of an agent’s power to influence the
brokering process is their ability to ‘receive’ scientific evidence and knowledge, and
relates to their legitimate power. Legitimate power, usually equated with authority,
refers to an individual’s position within a power structure (Handy, 1999). The power
resides with the position held, rather than with the individual (Belaya et al., 2008).
Here, the recipient agent has a legitimate right to influence and oblige others to comply
with a course of action. For example, a regulatory inspector is legally empowered to
Figure 7: French and Raven’s (1959) five forms of power related to the brokering of
evidence and knowledge in risk-based regulation.
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inspect and gather environmental compliance data. Legitimate power, however, is only
as strong as it is supported, and additional ‘guaranteeing’ sources of power can reinforce
it. For example, providing site inspectors with access to reward power, coercive power
and referent power will strengthen their legitimate power.
Reward power is relevant to an individual’s ability to offer an incentive (Belaya et al.,
2008) and may be obvious in the case of an inspecting officer’s ability to encourage the
submission of compliance data. Less obvious might be the rewards offered for the
delivery of timely information.
Coercive power is relevant to an individual’s ability to punish those who do not comply.
Although this may provide a regulator with short-term gains, it may also prove to be
ineffectual in the long run (Rahim et al., 2001). In general, the expression of coercive
power may result in resentment and resistance because it is fuelled by the respondent’s
desire for the reward and the fear of having it withheld (Molm, 1997). The mere
perception that a recipient agent has coercive power may be sufficient to yield
information. However, if abused coercive power can evoke conflict, resulting in a
regulator being reprimanded, for example, via judicial review.
Referent power will also aid a recipient agent’s capacity to receive evidence and
knowledge. Referent power helps build compliance and in contrast to legitimate power,
resides with the personality of the individual. It takes time to establish. For example,
an inspecting officer that maintains a long-standing relationship with an operator will
find it easier when they are required to communicate a sufficiently convincing reason
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why the operator should comply with a specific request. If the officer is successful in
establishing this relationship, they can be considered to hold a degree of referent power,
thereby facilitating access to evidence and knowledge in support of a decision.
However, if the relationship between an operator and an officer is brief and the officer
has only a small window of opportunity to establish referent power, this opportunity
may be lost. Hence, referent power is only as effective as the extent to which recipients
become exposed to it.
The second aspect of an agent’s power to influence the brokering of evidence and
knowledge is their ability to ‘process’ it. Again, legitimate power is the first point of
call. An individual’s influence will depend on the extent their role allows, or expects
them to partake in the gathering, processing, analysis, or third party review of evidence
and knowledge. French and Raven’s (1959) other four forms of power have minimal
impact on a participant’s ability to influence the processing of scientific evidence and
knowledge.
3.5.2
3.5.3
The final aspect is an agent’s ability to ‘pass-on’ the evidence and knowledge provided
to them. The recipient agent becomes the provider as they ‘receive and accept’
information and pass it on to other agents in the decision process, usually labelled with
some statement of its validity and/or their confidence in it. The ability to pass-on
evidence is intertwined with the ability to receive it because power operates both
relationally and reciprocally. For example, a recipient’s legitimate power may allow
them to reject information but whether this happens depends on whether they perceive
the provider to have expert and/or referent power. Expert power, for example, can only
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be inferred upon agents by those on whom it will be exercised, and must be explicitly
and implicitly recognised to exist. As such, expert power is said to be the most socially
acceptable form of power (Handy, 1999). Hence, placing this in the context of the
brokering process, if a provider has expert power then it can be assumed that the
recipients will be receptive to the scientific evidence and knowledge provided.
However, if for any reason the recipient becomes aware of ‘credibility gaps’ associated
with the evidence and knowledge provided to them, the provider’s expert power can
become discredited (Handy, 1999). When expert power is no longer perceived to exist
in the providing agent, the recipient agent may reject the evidence and knowledge
provided they have legitimate power in which to do so. Hence, a provider’s ability to
pass-on scientific evidence and knowledge will depend on whether the recipient is
receptive.
In summary, the brokering of evidence and knowledge can be viewed as being mediated
through a power structure, whereby agents with a range of interests have varying
degrees of authority to determine the flow, acceptance and transfer of information to
inform decisions on risk. The power relationships are designed to ensure the right
people are best placed to exercise the correct level of power at the appropriate time.
However, power requires a balance between parties, it operates relationally and
reciprocally and it is subjective. It is not only dependent on whether the agent is in a
position to have power, but also on whether they have sufficient personality, for
example, to exercise referent power.
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3.5.2 Influence of Personality
Personality research is concerned with the psychology of the whole person (Epstein,
1996). Insights from this field explain the influences that personality has on the
brokering of evidence and knowledge, and on an agent’s ability to uphold certain
responsibilities for the processing of information under conditions of uncertainty and
the required levels of interpersonal communication, especially trust.
One of the most popular measures of interpersonal processes has been the five-factor
model of personality (Costa and McCrae, 1992). This has been accepted by scholars
(Including Barrick et al., 1998; Denissen and Penke, 2008; Digman, 1990; Goldberg,
1990; Hong et al., 2008; John, 1990; John and Srivastava, 1999) and is said to
encompass the most significant variations of human personality (Ivancevich and
Matteson, 1999; Robbins, 2003). The model measures personality by reference to five
personality traits (neuroticism, extroversion, openness to experience, agreeableness and
conscientiousness); referred to as the ‘big five’ dimensions of personality. These are
said to represent the characteristics of an individual that are reasonably stable over time
(Costa and McCrae, 1992; Johnson, 1999), providing an aggregate descriptor of a
person’s typical behaviour.
Extensive studies have demonstrated how the big five traits relate to an individual’s
typical behaviour; for example in the workplace (e.g. Back et al., 2006; Berry et al.,
2007; Burke and Witt, 2004; Flaherty and Moss, 2007; Lee et al., 2005). Personality
traits differ from individual level states. Traits assess how a person is generally,
whereas states refer to how a person is in the moment (Cattell et al., 1947; Fridhandler,
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1986; Nesselroade, 1988; Schutte et al., 2003; Ten Berge and De Raad, 1999). In
recognition of this, scholars such as Mischel (1968) have questioned the validity of
focusing only on traits alone, suggesting that a greater emphasis should also be placed
on the role that situational forces have on the emergence of behaviour (Mischel, 1968;
Mischel, 1999; Shoda, 1999). These authors argue for characterising personalities by
stable patterns of behaviour, and by distinct and stable patterns of situation-behaviour
relations (Shoda et al., 2002). This combined ‘if… then…’ approach has allowed
researchers to create so called ‘behavioural signatures’ that are predictive of patterns of
variability across different situations (Mischel, 1999; Mischel and Shoda,, 1995; Shoda,
1999; Shoda et al., 2002). This allows researchers to specify how traits play out with
increasing precision under different situations (Ten Berg and De Raad, 1999). This
person-by-situation approach has been the source of much debate (e.g. Bem, 1983;
Blass, 1991; Bowers, 1973; Endler, 1984; Eysenck and Eysenck, 1980; Johnson, 1999;
Reynolds and Karraker, 2003; Saucier et al., 2007; Shoda, 1999; Ten Berge and De
Raad, 1999; Ten Berge and De Raad, 2002), with some questioning how valid and
novel it really is (e.g. Funder, 1996; Johnson, 1999). That said, it has become
increasingly popular within modern personality research, and scholars generally agree
in the value of its approach (e.g. Borkenau et al., 2006; Fleeson, 2007; Graziano et al.,
2007; Kammrath et al., 2005; Withey et al., 2005).
The aim of this work is to describe how distinct if… then… behavioural signatures
might explain the influence personality has on the brokering of evidence and knowledge
within risk-based decisions. To achieve this, the influence specific factors of the ‘big
five’ have on the brokering process will be drawn upon, as it is referred to elsewhere in
35
the context of knowledge sharing (e.g. Bakker et al., 2006; Liu, 2008; Mooradian et al.,
2006). Bakker et al. (2006) separate knowledge sharing into the phases of exploration
and exploitation. The former describes the point at which agents discuss and work
together to solve a problem; the latter describes the phase in which knowledge is
integrated (Bakker et al., 2006). Analogously, the exploitation phase is referred to as
the act of ‘receiving and accepting’ and the exploration phase as the act of ‘engaging in
dialogue’.
Research informs us of many factors that influence participants during the act of
“receiving and accepting” and the act of “engaging in dialogue”. For example, the
numerous factors that affect knowledge sharing include: (i) the properties of knowledge
(e.g. the degree of articulation and aggregation; Blacker, 1995; Nonaka and Takeuchi,
1995; Spender, 1996); (ii) organisational culture (Wasko and Faraj, 2005); and (iii)
interpersonal relationships (Hansen, 1999; Levin and Cross, 2004).
The most common property referred to is the influence of trust (e.g. Abrams et al.,
2003; Levin et al., 2006; Mayer et al., 1995; McEvily et al., 2003). Trust is indicative
of a person’s willingness to engage in sharing knowledge (e.g. Davenport and Prusak,
1998; Uzzi, 1997). Rotter (1971) defined trust as “the generalized expectancy held by
an individual that the word, promise, oral or written statement of another individual or
group can be relied upon”. In its literal sense, trust is referred to as a recipient agent’s
belief that the evidence and knowledge provided is reliable and sufficient. Mayer et al.
(1995) posited the “higher a trustor’s propensity to trust, the higher the trust for the
trustee prior to availability of information about the trustee”, inferring that the
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likelihood a recipient will ‘receive and accept’ evidence and knowledge will, in part,
depend on the recipient’s propensity to trust. However, propensity to trust is related to
dispositional trust - the general willingness to trust others (Mayer et al., 1995), which is
neither focused on specific others nor dependent on specific contexts (Mooradian et al.,
2006).
Interpersonal trust, on the other hand, is a measure of how trustworthy participants
perceive others to be. It is determined by the situation and is multi-dimensional (e.g.
McAllister, 1995; Rempel et al., 1985; Abrams et al., 2003). Abrams et al. (2003)
generally define interpersonal trust as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable”
(Dirks and Ferrin, 2001; Gambetta, 1988; Kramer and Tyler, 1996; Mayer et al., 1995),
suggesting that participants display more interpersonal trust and knowledge sharing
behaviour when they are more willing to accept vulnerability. In this regard, Evans and
Revelle (2008) describe vulnerability as a ratio of costs (e.g. betrayal) and benefits (e.g.
reciprocity) where the uncertainty over gains or losses motivates (or discourages)
trusting behaviour. These authors also suggest that those with a propensity to trust are
more inclined to establish interpersonal trust and engage in knowledge brokering and
networking (Becerra and Gupta, 2003; Evans and Revelle, 2008; Swan et al., 2002 ref
by Mooradian et al., 2006). Mooradian et al. (2006), for example, empirically linked
propensity to trust to interpersonal trust ‘down stream’ in reports of knowledge sharing
behaviour.
Studies have linked measures of the big five personality traits to trust and knowledge
sharing (e.g. Evans and Revelle, 2008; Martins, 2002; Mooradian et al., 2006). Evans
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and Revelle (2008) demonstrated that trust, rather than trustworthiness, predicted
whether a recipient would return money in the standard economic investment game.
They demonstrate that the tendency to ‘trust’ was positively correlated with
extroversion and negatively with neuroticism, and that ‘trustworthiness’ was positively
correlated with agreeableness and conscientiousness. Only agreeableness was related to
the amount of money invested, with more money being invested under the send-only
condition compared to the simultaneous condition. It was suggested that agreeableness
motivated more interpersonal trust under greater levels of risk and uncertainty (Evans
and Revelle, 2008), possibly motivated by the opportunity to cooperate rather than
compete (Liao and Chuang, 2004). Hence, although propensity to trust may translate as
a propensity to engage in interpersonal trust this will depend on whether the situational
context motivates agents to do so.
Scholars explain that the uncertainty associated with the information being brokered
will account for a large proportion of an agent’s motivation. Hodson and Sorrentino
(1999), for example, explain that uncertainty orientation (UO), and certainty orientation
(CO), is based on a composite measure of a person’s approach to uncertainty (need to
master uncertainty; Sorrentino et al., 1992) and certainty (acquiescence-free measure of
authoritarianism; Cherry and Byrne, 1977), allowing the person to deal with the
complexities of information-processing. They suggest that individuals engage in more
achievement related behaviour and systematically process information more when the
situational uncertainty is low for CO and high for UO, and conversely engage in less
achievement related behaviour and systematically process information less when
situational uncertainty is high for CO and low for UO individuals. Investigating the
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relationship with the big five personality traits, only openness to experience was found
to be positively related to being uncertainty orientated. Therefore, suggesting that not
only is a high openness to experience indicative of a person not fazed by uncertainty,
but that given the choice, they are more likely to approach uncertainty in the hope of
resolving it (Hodson and Sorrentino, 1999).
These studies suggest that it is possible to predict whether a recipient agent would be
unwilling to “receive and accept” scientific evidence and knowledge without first
engaging in dialogue by knowing whether:
 the level of uncertainty associated with the scientific evidence and knowledge
motivates them to do so;
 they have prior knowledge that causes them to believe that the provider is
trustworthy (e.g. having sufficient expert power); or
 they lack prior knowledge and have the propensity to trust.
Failing this, and assuming a recipient has sufficient legitimate power, an exploration
phase would proceed the exploitation phase. During the exploration phase, propensity
to trust, interpersonal trust, and willingness to engage in knowledge sharing behaviour
will play a role. For risk-based decisions, the most enduring characteristic being
brokered is the level of uncertainty associated with the evidence and knowledge.
Personality research suggests that an agent’s uncertainty orientation will in part
determine whether they will be motivated to process information systematically and
carefully. Cheung (unpublished) explains that recipients and providers should have
opposite orientations if the aim is to share knowledge. In the context of the study
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presented in this thesis, the recipient agent must determine whether they agree with the
providing agent over the sufficiency of the evidence and knowledge. Unlimited time
and resources might permit success to be measured in terms of how conducive this
dialogue is to the resolution of uncertainty. However, limited time and resources may
inhibit this from ever happening.
The literature presented in this section demonstrates how power and personality may
affect risk-based regulation by participant’s involvement in the brokering of scientific
evidence and knowledge. That said, the contributions of power and personality, in
psychological studies of group decision making are challenging to isolate in a real-
world context. Construction of a virtual decision making environment, using the
concept of “automated decision makers”, however, permits scenarios to be simulated
and explored, offering insights that are not practically possible by studying real time
behaviour (e.g. North and Macal, 2007; Zhang and Zhang, 2007). In particular, agent-
based techniques make it possible to model the complex interaction of effects that
influence humans making decisions under uncertainty, whilst taking account of the
behaviour of others.
3.6 Agent-based modelling and simulation
Agent-based modelling and simulation is currently providing new ways to view,
understand and anticipate the likely effects of decision-making. Scholars have defined
agent-based modelling as “the simulation of actions and interactions of autonomous
individuals with a view to assessing their effects on the system as a whole” (North and
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Macal, 2007). Agent-based modelling essentially consists of an artificial society where
the coding of individual elements of that society makes it possible to simulate complex
scenarios.
Agent-based modelling builds on techniques such as discrete event simulation and
object orientated programming (Brailsford and Schnidt, 2003). Discrete event
simulation provides an established mechanism for the coordination and interaction of
individual components within a model (e.g. North and Macal, 2007; Wang and Wsky,
2008; Gonzalez, 2009). Object orientated programming, on the other hand, provides a
well-tested framework for organising agents according to their behaviours (North and
Macal, 2007). However, scholars explain that agent-based modelling should not be
confused with “mobile agents” and “artificial intelligence” that emphasise the
development of artefacts that may appear to be human (Thomsen and Thomsen, 1997),
Conversely, agent-based modelling emphasises the reproduction of critical features of
complex systems using component level rules (North and Macal, 2007). As such, agent-
based modelling is said to be an exciting development for researchers wishing to
simulate social science insights, permitting scholars to provide a richer perspective of
real-world decision making (e.g. Millington et al., 2008; Tabara et al., 2008; Richetin et
al., 2010; Smajgl et al., 2009; Bone and Dragicevic, 2010).
There are a number of differences between conventional computer modelling and agent-
based modelling. Conventional methods use differential equations and generally assume
a well-mixed population with no particular diversity between groups (Jansen, 2005;
North and Macal, 2007). Agent-based modelling on the other hand, emphasises the
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reproduction of critical features of complex systems, using component level rules. The
value of the latter is the opportunity it provides to determine the effect that a particular
phenomenon can have on a system as a whole. Regularities can be “grown” to explain
the dynamic conditions that led to their existence (Epstein, 1999). This goes beyond
conventional computer simulation by generating a rationale for the explanation rather
than simply simulating an explanation (North and Macal, 2007). Hence, an agent-based
simulation has value for modelling the influence participants have on the confidence
building-exercise that characterises risk-based regulation, because it finds solutions that
are more robust by capturing the behaviour of a system from the ground up.
An agent-based model is developed by defining behavioural rules – converting
knowledge of individual behaviour into an understanding of the overall system – linking
individual level actions to negative and positive outcomes (e.g. Epstein, 2006; North
and Macal, 2007). ‘Behavioural signatures’ can be allocated to individual agents (e.g.
representing attitudes towards colleagues, co-workers, prior-knowledge, degrees of
power and others). Using these rules, an agent can look around its environment,
recognise elements and make decisions based on its perception of these elements. In the
context of risk-based regulation, a typical decision that an agent may have to make is
whether a neighbouring agent, wanting to share knowledge, is trustworthy; for example,
to determine whether they wish to grant an application for a waste-management license.
After modelling all the agents in such a group decision-making dynamic, the researcher
can programme the agents to interact with each other sequentially, in a predetermined
order, simultaneously, or in a random order. Calibrating the feedback from running, the
model can then illuminate the relative significance of these individual elements to the
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overall system, and potentially be used to predict future events and scenarios (North and
Macal, 2007).
An agent-based approach can help regulators, environmental planners and policy
developers make decisions regarding potential containment options (e.g. Guzy et al.,
2008). Behavioural signatures can incorporate spatial and temporal elements to connect
all the dots, and helping regulators to understand fully the implications of scientific
evidence and/or knowledge, thereby facilitating better decision making than classically
inspired optimisation models (Beecham and Engelhard, 2007). In the case of modelling
a disease outbreak, an agent world might be set up to reflect a mixed population of
known levels of diversity (e.g. regarding the susceptibility of infected and recovered
groups). By representing more of the complexity that is known to characterise the real-
world phenomena, the modeller can gain a better, more accurate, picture of how a
disease outbreak, say, might unfold and what avenues offer the best hope for
containment. Hence, agent-based modelling can offer a greater social richness and
behavioural realism that is difficult to capture in conventional methods, such as
technocratic, one dimensional, risk-management frameworks.
Agent-based modelling has the potential to facilitate governments to explore the
influence participants have on risk-based regulation. Governments must manage
systems as they grow in complexity. For example, the UK Government currently faces
marginal access to regulatory resources because of the increased number of possible
outcomes they must consider (e.g. due to EU legislation and regulation). Government
departments and agencies have addressed this by trying to make more informed risk-
43
based decisions, by drawing upon the growing mass of scientific evidence and
knowledge. Yet conventional frameworks offer little insight into the influence
participant’s play. Heroic assumptions often accompany conventional tools for
assessing and managing risk (e.g. that employees act according to strict organisational
structures or business processes; Paul et al., 1999). This has allowed researchers to gain
insight into long run market outcomes, but this offers little insight into the reason why
such phenomena occurs (North and Macal, 2007). An agent-based approach, on the
other hand, has the capacity to draw upon the growing mass of fine-grained, peer-
reviewed, data. Social science literature, for example, explains how people experience
different levels of susceptibility to their environmental conditions (e.g. Lauriola and
Levin, 2001). Scholars have demonstrated the value agent-based modelling has for
incorporating such insights. By taking a more sympathetic approach requiring less
assumptions, agent-based modelling offers greater insight into the reasons why future
scenarios may occur, making it possible to convert previous experience into visions
about the potential future (North and Macal, 2007).
The autonomous nature of an agent-based model alone makes it a good candidate for
exploring strategic decision-making. Scholars characterise strategic decision-making as
“the consideration of high levels of uncertainty, potential synergies between different
options, long term consequences, and the need of key stakeholders to engage in
significant psychological and social negotiation about the strategic decision under
consideration” (Montibeller and Franco, 2009). Agent-based modelling facilitates this
through the generation of behavioural signatures’ and the growth of regularities, that
explain the affect key factors have on alternate outcomes. Hence, agent-based modelling
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offers insight in to the day-to-day tactical decisions required to meet a strategic goal.
For example, scholars demonstrate how agent-based simulation can facilitate
governments to contend with strategic issues, such as:
 river basin land use and waste management (Izquierdo et al., 2003);
 decision support systems for forest ecosystem management (Nute et al., 2004);
 planning for the impact of climate change (Berman et al., 2004);
 modelling the dynamic nature of international greenhouse gas emissions trading
(Mizuta and Yamagata, 2001);
 predicting the impact of catastrophic events (Courts et al., 2004);
 the integration of science and policy (McIntosh et al., 2005); and
 the significance of a number of other policy issues (e.g. Brown et al., 2004;
Monticino et al., 2007; Perez and Dragicevic, 2009).
These studies emphasise the influence human behaviour has for policy decisions (e.g.
Henesey et al., 2006; Mendonca, 2008), clearly demonstrating the advantage of
incorporating multiple agents with temporal and spatial elements.
Multi-agent systems can produce powerful results but they can also be difficult to
develop. A multi-agent system permits the modeller to exhibit emergent phenomena or
generation of unforeseen patterns of spatial aggregation or global behaviour.
Essentially, multiple agents are logically interacting entities, motivated by internal
states. They use active entities of the original phenomena as actors in the model (Klugl,
2001). However, the absence of a unified formal framework means that modellers often
must deal with the complexity of developing an agent-based system rather on their own.
Development can therefore be effort consuming and the modeller should consider
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whether the advantages justify the additional time and knowledge required. In cases
where the development of a multi-agent system cannot be justified the simpler two-
agent model may be the solution. An agent-based model that only consists of two agents
can offer a modeller the opportunity of obtaining the depth of knowledge required to
develop a multi-agent system, should the modeller require a broader knowledge of the
phenomena. There are numerous examples in literature that explain the advantages of
developing a two-agent model before embarking on the development of a fully-fledged
multi-agent model. The following section explains the value of adopting such an
approach for modelling the confidence building exercise that is risk-based regulation.
3.7 Agent-based model for simulating the brokering of evidence in
risk-based regulation
This subsection discusses the novel development of an agent-based model for risk-based
regulation, which accounts for the influence power and personality have on confidence
building. In risk-based regulation, confidence is gained through the brokering of
scientific evidence. This brokering process is characterised by peer-to-peer (agent-to-
agent) communication. Previous sections of this thesis explain that this consists of
agents that receive process and pass-on evidence. Agents take it in turns to act as
recipients and providers of evidence as it is passed up toward the final decision maker
(or makers). Different agents have variable amounts of power to decide and influence
the amount of confidence that is attached to submitted evidence. However, the role is
essentially the same; agents adopt subordinates’ beliefs according to the confidence they
place in the evidence and those providing it.
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Agent-based techniques have the capacity to go beyond existing decision-support tools
by accommodating the influence participants have on the brokering of scientific
evidence. Conventional risk-management frameworks set out the logic of information
flows and accountabilities, but they fail to accommodate the uncertainty surrounding the
influence of personal and organisational features. Others draw upon mathematical
theory (such as Multi-attribute Theory, Slovic et al., 1977; French et al., 2005, and
Dempster–Shafer’s Evidence Theory, Dempster, 1967; Shafer, 1976) to explain how
uncertainties, inherent in trade-off decisions, can be accommodated. The latter approach
overcomes the limitations of classical probability theory that takes a “closed world”
perspective. The advantage of such an approach is its ability to identify uncertainty that
has the greatest impact on the overall confidence, potentially informing the deployment
of limited resources (Bowden, 2004). However, these methods and frameworks fail to
account for the influence personal and organisational features (e.g. personality and
power) have on the value judgements participants make regarding sufficiency of
submitted evidence and the confidence they attached to it.
Considering the dynamics of the brokering process (as explained earlier in this thesis), it
is the belief of the author that the logical framework set by evidence-support logic can
be used to form the basis of an agent-based model. Evidence-support logic permits the
user to break down a single decision into a number of supporting “child” and “parent”
hypothesis until a number of hypotheses with available evidence are identified. When it
is used within existing software (e.g. TESLA, developed by risk specialists Quintessa,
http://www.quintessa-online.com/TESLA™/), experts come together to assign weights
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(ranging from 0 to 1) to reflect how sufficient, dependent and necessary each “child”
hypothesis is for answering its corresponding “parent” hypothesis. Then using interval
probability theory, beliefs “for” and “against” are propagated from sources of evidence
to the central hypothesis and lack of evidence or contradictory belief is reflected as
“uncommitted” belief using three-value logic (e.g. Hall et al., 1998). This mimics the
way evidence passes through a regulatory framework in risk-based regulation. Evidence
supporting risk-based regulation must also undergo the scrutiny of answering a number
of queries before it can inform the overall decision. For example, a typical decision
might be, does a waste management facility pose an unreasonable risk to its
environment? This would be broken down into a number of supporting queries, such as:
What risk does it pose to the nearby residence? For a landfill site, this begs the
questions; Does it have a clay lining? What is the surrounding geology? Do local
residences have cellars? And so on. Once mapped out, this soon represents lines of
evidence consisting of consecutive chains of supporting “parent” and “child” query,
similar to the chain of hypotheses fould in evidenve-support logic. However, the
obvious difference being that each query set out in risk-based regulation represents a
participant’s role. Participants must make value judgements about how sufficient,
dependent and necessary each subordinate query is for answering their query. Decisions
may be informed collectively through government guidance, say, but essentially, they
are a result of the participant’s perception of credibility regarding the evidence and
those providing it. If evidence-support logic is to be used as the framework for an agent-
based model for risk-based regulation, however, there is a need to demonstrate that each
agent can mimic their human counterpart.
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There are a number of models that could contribute toward the development of an
agent-based model for risk-based regulation. Multi-agent systems, clearly have the
capacity to address the influence power structures and communication networks might
have on the flow of information within a regulatory framework, or the influence agents
attending an expert elicitation panel, say, might have based on the actions of
neighbouring agents. For example, scholars demonstrate how multi-agent systems can
account for the influence social networks within a society might have on the diffusion
of word-of-mouth communication and social value emergence (Kijima and Hirata,
2005). Heterogeneous self-strengthening communication networks have been shown to
inhibit leaders passing messages down toward subordinate groups (Liu, 2007). And it
has been demonstrated how agents can take action based on the actions of neighbouring
agents (e.g. using a multi-agent system, such as FEARLUS, Gotts and Polhill, 2009, to
demonstrate the implications that actions of neighbouring agents and aspiration levels
had on land mangers decisions). Yet, there is a need to establish whether it is possible to
model the peer-to-peer (agent-to-agent) communication, characterising the brokering
process, before a fully-fledged multi-agent system can be developed for risk-based
regulation.
Development of a two-agent model, representing the dynamic of the brokering process,
must attempt to answer whether agents can be equally equipped to cope with
negotiations and trade-off decisions in the same way as their human counter parts.
Initially this may seem impossible but the logical way in which agents interact is not
dissimilar to the logic of the brokering process. Gratch et al. (2008) for example,
illustrates how agent-based modelling can be used to show the influence that agents,
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focusing on cognitive tasks, had on the perception of portraying positive affect, which
in turn promoted cognitive relational processes with the interacting agent. The model
reflects how it might be shown that recipients that engage in intelligible conversations
with an agent providing evidence (about the sufficiency of evidence say) might have a
better chance of imparting knowledge to the providing agent. Hence, possibly
explaining how recipients might promote receptivity, and thereby transparency
regarding the relative value placed on the submission of different types of evidence, by
allowing providers greater access to their internal states.
During the brokering process, recipients and providers come together to negotiate
whether or not they agree on the sufficiency of the submitted evidence. Modellers have
demonstrated a vast number of personal features that could be accounted for when
simulating the outcome of agent-to-agent negotiation. Bonnevay et al. (2005) for
example, draws on Cooperative Game Theory to demonstrate the relative influence
rational perspectives have on negotiations and the formation of alliances. From this, it is
possible to conceive how an agent-based model might be developed to account for the
influence personal and organisational features have on the dynamics of a group
decision. The model itself was used to explore the influence of rational choice, but
conceptually it could be used for the selection of different strategies, justifying why a
site inspectors, say, might choose to engage in dialogue over the sufficiency of
submitted evidence.
Kawakami et al. (2006) provides another example of how agents might choose to react.
The author modelled agents that made decisions based on their desire to balance their
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needs with the needs of the interacting agent. The author accounted for the influence
participants have on a “proposal-voting process” by permitting agents to make decisions
based on their desire to satisfy “physiologically fixed needs” and “social context needs”.
Similar phenomena can be found in risk-based regulation; for example, when an agent
(e.g. a site inspector) chooses to ignore the intentions of another when issuing of a waste
management license, say. During the brokering process agents come together to
negotiate over the sufficiency of evidence. The outcomes depend on the decisions
agents make. Providers must decide what to submit, and recipients must determine the
relative sufficiency of the submitted evidence. This requires a balance. Recipients are in
the position of wanting to make the right decision and as such want to get as much
substantial evidence as they can, to give them confidence that they are not making an
error in judgement. However, recipients have to balance this desire with the knowledge
that providers do not have unlimited resources and therefore are limited by how much
evidence they can submit. Providers, on the other hand, make decisions regarding what
evidence to submit. Usually the recipient will instruct them on this. But in real-world
decision making the possibility of this happening will depend on the context of the
decision (e.g. whether it is appropriate for recipients to do so) and agent receptivity (e.g.
how transparent recipients are about what they want, and the likelihood provider will
grasp what recipients tell them).
An added advantage of using agents to mimic the brokering process is the natural way
they lend themselves toward the sharing of information. The many agents communicate
with each other to perform tasks and performance is strongly related to inter-node
message-passing. Scholars have demonstrated the value agent-based modelling has for
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simulating the effectiveness of trading agents (e.g. Haddawy et al., 2004). For example,
scholars have reported on its use for investigating the effectiveness of auctions (e.g.
Mizuta and Steiglitz, 2000; Mizuta and Yamagata, 2001; Bohte et al., 2001) buyer
coalition schemes (e.g. Yamamoto and Sycara, 2001) and trade brokering (e.g.
Alkemade et al., 2003). In models of financial trade, agents are conceived as buyers and
sellers of commodity. Incorporating influences, such as motivational feedback, has been
instrumental in securing effective price consensus (Mizuta and Steiglitz, 2000).
Successful trades are considered those that demonstrate small fluctuations over time.
Applying this to risk-based regulation, recipients providing positive feedback might
increase the provider’s receptivity and thereby understanding of what is expected of
them, resulting in fewer fluctuations in the recipient’s perception of sufficiency.
The logic set out in an agent-based model of finance and trade lends itself toward
modelling the brokering of evidence in risk-based regulation. Scholars that model
trading agents within a financial market conceptualise agents as buyers and sellers.
Buyers and sellers come together to negotiate the price of a commodity. This
commodity has an intrinsic value attached to it for which buyers are willing to pay and
sellers are willing to accept. It can be assumed that buyers desire to buy the commodity
for a price that is of lesser value than they place in it. Sellers, on the other hand, desire
to sell it for more than they value it. Essentially both desire to make a bargain and retain
as much money as possible. Success essentially depends on the strategies they employ
and their ability to carry these out. However, the commodity may have a greater
intrinsic value to either of the agents making successful purchases or sales subjective.
Drawing parallels with this process to the brokering of evidence in risk-based
52
regulation, it is conceivable to view recipients as sellers and providers as buyers of
sufficiency.
During the brokering process recipients and providers come together to negotiate over
the sufficiency of submitted evidence. In this regard, the commodity that agents barter
over is sufficiency. Recipients have it and providers desire it. Again, sufficiency, acting
as the commodity, has an intrinsic value attached to it. However, instead of paying for
the commodity in pounds and pence (e.g. in money as in the barter of stocks and shares)
sufficiency is paid for through the provision of scientific evidence. Again, it can be
assumed that providers (as buyers) desire to buy the sufficiency for less than the value
they place in it. Recipients (as sellers) on the other hand, wish to sell it for more than
they value it. Again, it can be conceived that both want to make a bargain. The
provision of evidence comes at a cost to the provider so they want to keep this cost to a
minimum. On the other hand, evidence gives the seller confidence, so they want to
maximise the amount they get for the measure of sufficiency they attribute toward the
providers belief and again success essentially depends on the strategies they employ and
their ability to carry them out. Hence, emphasising the need to accounting for the
influence personal and organisational features has to account for the confidence gained
through the brokering of evidence.
Giving agents personal features (e.g. memory, emotions and personality) gives them a
greater measure of intelligence, improving their capacity to mimic human decision-
makers. For example, scholars have demonstrated the use of feelings, attitudes and
beliefs (Notsu et al., 2006) and other (e.g. Marreiros et al., 2006) have demonstrated
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how emotional factors play a role in hypothetical arguments between participants in a
multi-agent system. Marreiros et al. (2006) reported that agents in a good mood were
more risk averse than agents in a bad mood, who wanted to make agreements quickly in
order to achieve a good mood. On the other hand, scholars such as Izquierdo et al.
(2007) have demonstrated how memory can give an agent the capacity to learn from
those around them, and thereby avoid unsatisfactory experiences. The influence this
may conceivably have on the brokering of evidence is demonstrated by Xu and Griffiths
(2010). Building on Bartletts’ (1932) theoretical explanation of "serial reproduction",
Xu and Griffiths reported that the memory (and the biases retained within it) resulted in
disturbances to the transmission of information. By combining these mechanisms agents
with emotions and memory have the potential to show how different events and
scenarios may impact the brokering of evidence. However, simply accounting for the
influence of emotions and memory is insufficient for explaining how an agent might
make decisions in the same way as participants engage in the brokering of evidence.
Personality can rationalise the link between perceptions, emotions and behaviour.
Psychologists consider personality to be a coherent pattern of different kinds of
behaviours and interactions within their environment (Page, 1983; Pervin, 1987). As
such, attributing agents with personality is considered one of the most fundamental
ways of replicating human decision-making; by making agents more human-like and
flexible by attributing them with thoughts, desires, and emotions, typical of a real world
decision maker (Rizzo et al., 1997).
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Once incorporated within an agent-based model, scholars explain that personality
“traits” can be varied to map out the influence they have on different behaviour. Nassiri-
Mofakham et al. (2009) for example, gave agents personality by adopting a heuristic
semi-dynamic approach toward bargaining. In so doing, the author was able to
demonstrate the effectiveness of enhancing the realism of rational bargaining behaviour
by using more human-like agents. Personality-based agents were more flexibility,
permitting the author to investigate the effectiveness of future negotiations by focusing
on the preservation and resolution of conflict. Moreover, agents with dynamic
personality gave the agent the capacity to update their personality knowledge (e.g.
according to changes in personality facets Ghasem-Aghaee and Ören, 2003; 2007).
Scholars illustrate how this can be done by matching the importance of facets to the
situation. For example, permitting by determine agent’s openness to experience, by
matching the availability of facets the cognitive complexity required to successfully
engage in problem solving. To achieve this, Ghasem-Aghaee and Ören (2003; 2007)
permitted the dominant facet (e.g. fantasy, aesthetics, feelings, ideas or values) to
determine what value of openness to experience to give the agent. This allows changes
in decision context to affect the modelled cognitive complexity of the individual and
their ability to function.
Agent-based models that incorporate measures of personality have the potential of
offering greater insight into the influence participants have on the brokering of
evidence. For example, scholars have illustrated how personality can be used to
represent agents functioning in the face of uncertain information (Neuberg and Bertels,
2003; Wojcik, 2004) and the influence relative levels of risk aversion may have on the
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decisions they make (Neuberg and Bertels, 2003). However, the most inspirational use
of personality for the development of an agent-based model for risk-based regulation is
the study by Dimuro et al. (2006) who demonstrated the value of incorporating
personality to investigate the regulation of social exchange. The model had a supervisor
agent whose role it was to pass messages between personality-based agents to maintain
a social equilibrium. The model was not intended to represent group decision making
per se but its logic clearly lends towards modelling the brokering process. The
supervisor agent, for example, is representative of evidence being passed between
recipients and providers. Personality gave the agent the capacity to regulate the
supervisor’s access to their internal state, hence, demonstrating how personality could
be used to reflect the impact of simulating transparent and opaque agents.
Transparency is an important aspect that must be accounted for. Site inspectors, for
example, play a different role compared with a project manager of a Post-Closure Safety
Case for nuclear waste disposal. A site inspector’s role is to be very prescriptive as they
instruct the operator on what evidence to submit. On the other hand, a project manager’s
role is not to instruct but to advise. They advise the operator on what type of evidence
might be expected but essentially the onus lies with the operator to decide what to
submit. An agent playing the role of a project manger therefore would have a rationale
for being less transparent about the value they place on different types of evidence;
compared to the site inspector who should be completely transparent.
This subsection has discussed the novel development of an agent-based model for risk-
based regulation that accounts for the influence power and personality have on
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confidence building. Existing decision-support tools fail to account for the fact that
confidence building is carried out through the brokering of scientific evidence.
However, a number of scholars have demonstrated the ability to incorporate social-
science theory within an agent-based model. In particular, scholars explain some of the
advantages of allowing agents to have relative amounts of power to decide, and how it
is possible to incorporate aspects of transparency by giving an agent personality. Of
particular interest to this thesis is the framework set out within evidence-support logic.
By mapping out lines of evidence as consecutive chains of supporting “parent” and
“child” hypothesis, it provides a suitable structure on which to model risk-based
regulation. Each hypothesis can represent a query characterising a participant’s role in
the group decision, conceived to either be in a position of wanting to sell or buy units of
sufficiency, dependency and necessity. Following on from the logic of financial trade,
recipients can be conceived as sellers and providers as buyers of sufficiency. Then
weights can be added to reflect the relative influence power and personality has on
confidence building in risk-based regulation.
3.8 Chapter summary and conclusions
This chapter has provided a critical review of the literature relating to this research
project and a presentation of identified gaps in knowledge. It is asserted that agent-
based modelling has the capacity to fill these gaps in knowledge that exist regarding the
influence that social science aspects of decision making (specifically power and
personality) have on the brokering of scientific evidence in risk-based regulation.
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Section 3.3 explained how Government departments and agencies, in the UK, have the
remit of carrying out environmental decision making. However, environmental decision
making is fraught with uncertainty, primarily because of the absence of evidence and/or
the presence of contradictory evidence. In an attempt to account for this, Government
departments and agencies have published risk-management frameworks that set out a
summary of the key actors involved. However, they pay little homage to the fact that
decisions-made are acted upon by people, and as such, fail to account for the influence
value judgments have in determining whether a risk is perceived to exist, and to what
level.
Risk characterisation (a statement on the significance of a risk and its attending
uncertainties) has been described in Section 3.4 as the most fundamental aspect of risk
management, allowing the development of feasible options for abating risk. To facilitate
the division of expertise and responsibilities, government have often assumed they can
handle uncertainties in the relevant science. Lines of evidence informing environmental
decisions, however, rarely point in the same direction (i.e. are rarely universally
supportive of a particular query), come in various strengths (of evidence), and thus
require synthesis so an overall weight of evidence can be applied to the characterisation
(significance and confidence) of the risk. Hence, the process in which evidence is
brokered is also inherently uncertain due to information gaps, the existence of
competing theories and the presence of manifold uncertainty.
Section 3.5 sets out those that have already reported on how individuals make decisions
under uncertainty, through both theoretical models and extensive empirical testing. In
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this regard, power is explained to be an individual’s ability to control ones environment
and the behaviour of those within it. Personality, on the other hand, is explained to be
one of the most powerful measures of interpersonal processes. Substantial literature
exists on the dynamics of power and personality. This section explains how French and
Raven’s (1959) five forms of power, and the Big Five measure of personality (Costa
and McCrae, 1992) relates to this brokering process. Moreover, how their combined
influence can be captured in distinct if… then… behavioural signatures, to explain the
influence they have on agent receptivity/confidence regarding the sufficiency of the
submitted evidence.
Section 3.6 and 3.7 explain how agent-based modelling has the capacity to address the
influence participants have on the brokering of evidence in risk-based regulation. A
number of examples are presented to illustrate this and explain how an agent-based
model is developed by defining behavioural rules – converting knowledge of individual
behaviour into an understanding of the overall system – linking individual level actions
to negative and positive outcomes. This is suggested to have the potential to explain
how and why participants might make decisions. The autonomous nature of an agent-
based model alone makes it a good candidate for exploring power structure and
personality influences. It is explained that even a simple two-agent model can provide
valuable insight that would not otherwise be obtainable through static analysis. An
added advantage is the natural way agents lend themselves toward the sharing of
information. Also, the capacity they have to mimic human behaviour by expressing a
measure of intelligence after being endowed with personable features (e.g. memory,
emotions and personality). Therefore, for this work, a simple two-agent based model
59
was selected. The development of this model is shown in Chapter 7 whilst the
validation and application of the model to case studies is given in chapter 8.
Development of such a model would be a novel for risk-based regulation, and a step
toward a fully-fledged multi-agent system.
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Chapter 4
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
4.1 Chapter Structure
This chapter sets out the potential method options that could have been used to address
the research question set out in chapter 2 along with the selection of the most
appropriate method.
4.2 Description of options for methodological choice
There are two fundamental methods of reasoning: deductive and inductive research. The
extent to which research adheres toward either of these two methods of reasoning will
define the research approach. Generally, inductive reasoning is the most socially based,
focusing on the human factor and making sense of the variability and unreliability that
characterises these systems. Deductive research, on the other hand, moves from the
general to the more specific, and is often referred to as the traditional way of reasoning
when it comes to scientific research.
The approach adopted in this thesis was neither purely deductive nor purely inductive. It
is inductive in so far that it attempts to draw broad generalisations from specific
observations (made by the author and others) about the manner in which participants
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influence risk-based regulation, specifically through their involvement in the brokering
of scientific evidence. The research is also deductive in its approach (moving from the
specific to the general), as it tries to draw conclusions from the developed agent-based
simulation model.
Looking beyond the research approach, there were a number of potential strategies
available to address the research question stated in Chapter 2 (e.g. Creswell, 1994).
Each research strategy has a distinct way of collecting and analysing empirical
evidence, each with its own advantage. For the purposes of this thesis, the research
question had to address “how” and “why” participants affect the brokering of evidence
in risk-based regulation. Research strategies, such as case studies, surveys, experiments
and historical analysis, are well suited for addressing the “how” and “why” research
question (Yin, 1984). However, the goal was to investigate phenomena with a real-life
context, where the boundaries between phenomena and context are not evident,
requiring multiple sources of evidence to be drawn upon. Therefore, the research
strategy selected was the ‘case study’, as through these decisions can be considered and
analysed for why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result
(Schramm, 1971). The alternative strategies would have struggled to achieve this.
Experiments divorce phenomena from context; historical analysis, which although it
deals with the entanglement of phenomena and context, is limited to dealing with non-
contemporary events; and surveys, able to address the interplay between phenomena
and context, are limited in the breadth of context they are able to investigate to the
number of variables and questions they can practically incorporate (Yin, 1984). Hence,
the most appropriate research strategy for this thesis was the ‘case study’ because it
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permitted the investigation of the influence participants have on risk-based regulation
by focusing specifically on the dynamics of the brokering of scientific evidence in risk-
based regulation.
This body of research considers three types of case study: the live, the constructed and
the available type of case study. The latter proving most suitable due to its provision of
instant access to information regarding decision protocol and decision outcomes. This
information was readily available within peer reviewed journal articles and government
guidance, specifically concerning risk-based regulation. The live and constructed types
of case study did promise a greater insight into the role participants played in actual
decisions. However, there was little likelihood of gaining access to participants because
of the contentious nature associated with many regulatory decisions. Moreover, the
period associated with the real-world regulatory decisions meant that the live and
constructed type case study could only provide a snapshot in time of the influence that
participants have on decision outcomes. In addition to this, extensive knowledge already
exists to tell of how participants and groups of individuals influence decision outcomes,
specifically concerning the role that power structures and personalities play.
Having selected a research strategy the next step was to choose a method of data
collection. Scholars generally categorise research methods as either being qualitative or
quantitative in nature (e.g. Lee, 1992; Bryman, 1988; Berg, 1995). Selection of the
research method required a determination as to whether applying it to the target
population was possible. Sample size can be an important factor in establishing a
measure of reliability, validity and credibility (DePaulo, 2000). However, given the
64
contentious nature of each of the selected case studies it was not possible to sit-in on the
actual regulatory decisions and, as a result, each case study had to be investigated
(modelled) offline. To overcome this, and to ensure a measure of feasibility, the initial
phase of the research placed an emphasis on in-depth interviews. Such interviews are
useful when the people involved in a phenomenon have insights that are not otherwise
available (Wainwright, 1997). In line with this, a greater emphasis was placed on the
quality of insights rather than on the number of respondents sharing it.
Agent-based simulation was the chosen method for modelling risk-based regulation.
There are a number of alternatives that could have been used, but as it will be explained,
these are limited in scope. An alternative to using agent-based modelling and simulation
was the option to use a decision-support method or technique. A vast number of
decision analysis tools exist to cope with the complexities that characterise decisions
under risk and uncertainty. Conventional methods, however, lack the transparency and
explanatory power that agent-based modelling can offer. In particular, the influence
social science insights have on the confidence-building exercise that characterises risk-
based regulation. Issues that generally affect risk-based decisions include; clarity of
problem definition, gathering of evidence, structuring of arguments, brokering of
evidence, peer review and defensible decisions.
The value of decision analysis lies in its ability to identify areas of conflict between
stakeholders. The conventional approach has been to provide a more complete
understanding of the values held by stakeholders. To this end, scholars have been
applying methods such as Multi-attribute Analysis, Analytical Hierarchical Process
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(AHP) and a number of outranking methods (e.g. ELECTRA and PROMTHEE) and
statistical/probabilistic methods (e.g. Bayesian Belief Networks). Over the years, these
methods have helped decision makers cope with the type of complexities and nuances
that characterise risk-based regulation. Decision analysis uses mathematical theory to
address the complexities of decision making under risk and uncertainty. At their core,
they provide a structured way of balancing trade-offs and exploring policy options. The
inherent complexity of environmental decision-making dictates that problems can be
decomposed into sub-problems to show how they individually affect the overall
problem. However, the complexity characterising risk-based regulation that requires
different solutions for different problems has given these a limited applicability.
Government risk-based regulation is inherently characterised by a high conflict
potential. The sheer number of issues that must be accounted for means that evidence is
lacking and levels of uncertainty are high. Decision-support tools used in economics
(e.g. cost benefit analysis (CBA) and cost effectiveness analysis (CEA)) have a history
of facilitating government to explore the implications (cost and benefit) of alternative
actions. This facilitates decisions under uncertainty (Farmani et al., 2009). Cost benefit
analysis, for example, has been used extensively to model the impact socio-economic
costs, say, have on options appraisal and the distribution of limited resources.
However, critics claim that CBA, like many other economic models of human
behaviour, struggle to translate insights gained from quantitative analysis into
meaningful expressions of confidence without neglecting qualitative aspects of
supporting evidence, in the final analyses.
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Multi Criteria Analysis (MCA) is said to overcome the shortcomings of economic
decision-support tools by permitting the use of qualitative criteria in the analyses. For
complex decisions under uncertainty, MCA can incorporate multiple (conflicting)
criteria and preferences about present and future impacts. AHP, for example, is among
the most widely used and fastest growing MCA techniques, currently being used in a
number of disciplines, including environment and resource planning and management
(Bello-Dambatta et al., 2009). AHP permits the user to mimic the structure of real-
world risk-based decisions, providing a framework of information flows and
accountabilities. By breaking down problems into smaller ones, it has the potential to
facilitate communication of issues, making them more transparent and understandable
to lay people. Representing the structure of decisions provides greater clarity over trade-
offs between different objectives and interests. However, as they stand, such methods
can imbue the user with a false sense of security by presenting an oversimplified
perspective of alternatives. Elghali (2002) for example explains how the unequivocal or
impartial approach of life-cycle analysis (LCA) can result in credibility results and
problems in public policy debates. Repeatability is also an issue, even with experienced
practitioners. Moreover, the reliance that MCA techniques place on gaining access to
high quality data about information and uncertainties poses a problem for their use
within risk-based regulation, characterised by high ambiguity and uncertainty.
Uncertainty that pertains to human behaviour is a major contributor and an
essential element of successful environmental decision-making, however, conventional
methods fail to account for its influence. Scholars have tried to address the issue
through the adoption of hybrid decision-support tools, for example,
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by integrating Bayesian Belief Networks (BNN) and Evolutionary Multi-objective
Optimisation (EMO). These maximise on the strengths and have the potential to
overcome limitations inherent in conventional hierarchical models. Using design
variables (e.g. perception of vulnerability, removal of point source pollution and non-
point pesticide application), they have the potential to evaluate and weigh the pros and
cons of each action in order to help obtain fairer more balanced perspective of the
decision (Farmani et al., 2009). Of significance to risk-based regulation is the potential
they have to account for the impact that inputs from multiple decision makers can have
on decision outcomes, potentially resulting in a large number of high quality non-
dominated policy options (Farmani et al., 2009).
Non-dominated policy options characterise those options that are not dominated by a
single person or group within the policy process, offering a well balanced perspective of
the views and opinions of those involved. In the past, information and power
imbalances has meant that those positioned with superior knowledge and resources were
able to dominate the framing of issues and shapping of conclusions (e.g. such as in the
BSE crisis; Rothstien, 2003). Non-dominated policy options acknowledge that risk-
based regulation is not value free (Munton, 2003) and that it must draw upon a sources
of knowledge outside the conventional regulatory structure to reduce the chance of
policy error (e.g. Majone, 1989; Funtowitz and Ravertz, 1996). Conventional
approaches, however, struggle to achieve this because they fail to acknowledge that in
practice institutional factors shape the decision-making process.
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Hybrid approaches have the potential to facilitate the bringing together, and combining
of insights, in a way that could help regulators and policy developers make better
decisions that are more informed. However, they are inherently limited to
deterministically modelling the way knowledge informs decisions made. Agent-based
modelling and simulation, on the other hand provides a greater versatility, allowing
component level rules to be combined to generate macro-level complexity. In the
context of risk-based regulation, this can be used to explore the complexities and
nuances (e.g. power structure and personality influences) that characterise the brokering
of evidence. It has the capacity to take a retrospective view of risk-based regulation and
use this insight to generate potential futures that can facilitate regulators, policy
developers and environmental planners to better understand the implications of their
decisions. The alternatives to agent-based modelling, mentioned here, would not have
been able to deliver this.
Agent-based modelling and simulation enabled the empirical modelling of the influence
that individual personalities and power structures have on confidence building,
overcoming what otherwise would have been an extensive timeframe to investigate
these issues in real-time. By simulating qualitative insights, abstracted from interviews
and contained in published literature, agent-based modelling helped to draw broader
conclusions regarding the influence participants may have had on the brokering of
evidence in risk-based regulation.
In summary, the research methodology presented in this chapter is a product of much
exploration, carried out in the three distinct phases. Phase 1 is addressed in Chapter 5
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and considers the dynamics of the brokering process and selection of case studies that
represent this process across risk-based regulation, generally. Phase 2 is addressed in
Chapter 6 and addresses the brokering process within each case study and the
development of the framework that could facilitate this. Finally, Phase 3 is addressed in
Chapter 7 and 8. Chapter 7 sets out the development of an agent-based model for
brokering evidence generally, and Chapter 8 demonstrates this within the context of
each case study.
The remainder of this section explains that each phase consists of two parts. The former
part of Phase 1 explains how in-depth unstructured interviews were carried out to
explore the dynamic that characterises the brokering of evidence in risk-based
regulation. The latter part of Phase 1 consisted of rationally selecting the three case
studies (nuclear waste disposal, the disposal of avian influenza infected animal carcases
and dietary salt intake), and mapping out the logical flow of the brokering process in
each case study. The former part of Phase 2 explains how knowledge gained in Phase 1
was used to carry out in-depth semi-structured interviews to understand better the
dynamics characterising the brokering of evidence and knowledge. The latter part of
Phase 2 explains how knowledge of the dynamic way evidence is brokered in risk-based
regulation and known power and personality influences, informed the development of a
research framework. The former part of Phase 3 explains how the research framework
was used to develop an agent-based model that could incorporate known influences of
power structure and personality together with lessons learnt regarding the dynamics of
the brokering process in risk-based regulation. The latter part of Phase 3 explains how
permitting components of the decision-making environment and the agents to be varied
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facilitates simulation of real-world two-person interactions that characterise the
regulator/applicant relationship in the context of the three selected case studies selected
in the latter part of Phase 1.
4.3 Phase 1
The objective of Phase 1 was to explore the dynamics that characterised the brokering
of evidence and select three real-world case studies that represented the breadth of
conditions under which scientific evidence was brokered in risk-based regulation.
4.3.1 In-depth unstructure interviews to explore the dynamics of the brokering
of evidence in risk-based regulation
A series of five in-depth face-to-face unstructured interviews were carried out with
current and former Environment Agency (EA) regulators. The purpose of these
interviews was to ‘get a feel’ for the issues that characterise the brokering of evidence in
risk-based regulation. A number of authors have reported on the value of carrying out
in-depth unstructured interviews (e.g. Burgess, 1984; Minichiello et al., 1990; Berry,
1999; Broom, 2005; Dawson; 2007). Unstructured interviews provided means of
obtaining insight into the dynamics of the brokering process otherwise inaccessible
through conventional methods.
During the in-depth unstructured interviews, the interviewer (Gareth Davies) only had a
brief topic guide; i.e. “What was the participant personal role in group risk-based
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regulatory decision-making; and what role did the brokering of scientific evidence and
knowledge have to play?” This allowed considerable freedom for the interviewee to
explore different topics within the context of the brokering process. In line with others,
these interviews took the form of conversations permitting access to historical
information (Berry, 1999; Bryman, 2001; Dawson, 2007), regarding participant’s
involvement in the brokering of scientific evidence and knowledge. The interviewer had
the task of establishing rapport; building trust to gain access to intimate detail regarding
respondent’s rationale for participants receiving, processing and passing on (or not)
evidence and knowledge. To facilitate this, the interviewer made a conscious effort to
keep their input to a minimum whilst remaining alert. This ensured the brokering
process was characterised by the respondent’s own perspective. In-depth interviews thus
provided a way of entering into the respondent’s world; exploring their understandings
of the brokering process and gaining insight into how scientific evidence and
knowledge was valued, constructed and negotiated within the context of group risk-
based regulation.
The interviewer gained access to each of the respondent via mutual contacts, with some
respondents acting as gatekeepers to other. Each interview followed a common agenda.
The interviewer began by introducing the research topic; explaining the purpose for the
interview and the expected duration. Next, the interviewee was assured confidentiality
of personal details before being asked for permission to use a Dictaphone to record the
interview. Then, by asking respondents to explain their role in group risk-based
regulatory decisions and the brokering process, the interviewer probed respondents (at
opportune times) to expand on the significance that scientific evidence and knowledge
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had to play in decision outcomes. The interviewer wrote-up field notes after each
interview to capture insights that could inform the development of the semi-structured
interview schedule and then transcribed (verbatim) a two-hour interview to facilitate in
the development of the initial agent-based model.
4.3.2 Selection of three real-world case studies characterising the breadth of
conditions under which scientific evidence is brokered in risk-based regulation
The latter part of Phase 1 consisted of selecting three real-world case studies that
represented the breadth of conditions in which scientific evidence is brokered in risk-
based regulation. To this end, a systematic review of available literature was carried out
to understand the type of issues that Government departments and agencies must
contend with, including:
 novelty;
 scientific uncertainty;
 bureaucracy;
 environmental planning;
 policy development;
 technical/regulation;
 public dread;
 flexibility of the decision framework;
 emergency response; and
 geographical dispersion.
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Three case studies were required to represent the breadth of conditions under which
scientific evidence is brokered in risk-based regulation. To this end, this list of
attributes, common to all of the issues investigated, provided the author with a means of
selecting three case studies that could represent a broad perspective of risk-based
regulation (Table 1).
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1. Risk associated with the
disposal of avian influenza
infected animal carcasses
X X X
2. Risk associated with the
dietary salt intake
X X X
3. Risk associated with nuclear
waste disposal
X X X X
4. Risk associated with an
outbreak of blue-tongue
disease
X X X X
5. Risk associated with
seasonal flooding
X X X
6. Risk associated with the
disposal of hazardous waste
to landfill
X X X
Table 1: Case studies considered as potential candidates
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Available regulatory frameworks were then compared against the common attributes
and used to identify three case studies that could represent the brokering of evidence
generally in risk-based regulation. The three case studies selected included the
regulatory review of a post-closure safety case for nuclear waste disposal (a regulatory
decision), the disposal of avian influenza infected animal carcasses (an environmental
planning decision) and the proposal to reduce levels of dietary salt intake (a policy
development decision). The three case studies were also selected based on the breadth
of motivational factors known to characterise group decision-making (e.g. Pfeffer and
Sutton, 1999; Hanf, 2006; Scholten et al., 2007; Figure 8), which included the
following:
 known and hidden hierarchical structures;
 variability between individuals at the same level in the decision hierarchy;
 dominant factors such as individual interests and pay-offs (e.g. political aspects,
such as the implications of getting it right); and
 transparent and opaque (hidden and public) features.
Figure 8: Matrix used to assess the identified case studies.
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Having identified three case studies, the next task was to map out the brokering process
within each decision. Then, a systematic review of the available literature was carried
out, explaining the directional flow of evidence and accountabilities that characterised
each framework. Figure 9 illustrates the process followed to carry out a review of
regulatory frameworks published by Government departments and agencies in the UK.
Because information regarding the brokering of evidence within governmental
regulatory framework is generally spread across a number of different documents, the
information was mapped out using “Mind-Manger Pro”. These maps were too large to
be practically used within the planned semi-structured interviews, therefore the general
flow of information and relative accountabilities were mapped out using a methodology
set out by OXERA (2000). Figure 10 illustrates the methodology set out by OXERA
(2000). It explains how the logical flow characterising the brokering of evidence and the
different actor’s involved can be mapped-out.
Figure 9: Illustrating the process used to carry out a review of the different regulatory
frameworks published by Government departments and agencies in the UK.
Information obtained from the Internet
and via personal communication
Regulatory framework
How decisions are made
OXERA (2000) developed this methodology specifically for investigating the advisory
process in policymaking. This thesis applies the same logic to policy development,
environmental planning and regulatory decisions. The methodology helped clarify
functions and contributions, avoiding ambiguity and uncertainty regarding the brokering
process. Then during the in
useful means of validating the interviewer
Figure 10: Model of a process for acquiring and securing scientific
OXERA (2000).
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-depth semi-structured interviews, these maps provided a
’s understanding of the process with experts.
data (Adapted from
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4.4 Phase 2
The individual objectives of Phase 2 were to carry out semi-structured interviews and
develop a research framework in order to model the brokering of evidence in risk-based
regulation. Interviews permitted the dynamics of the brokering of evidence to be
mapped-out in each case study. Development of the research framework, on the other
hand, enabled the illustration of the logic of the brokering process that characterised
each case study.
4.4.1 In-depth semi-structured interviews to describe the dynamics brokering of
evidence in the three selected case studies
To fulfil the first objective; semi-structured interviews were carried out with an expert
from each case study. The purpose was to validate the interviewer’s understanding
regarding the directional flow of evidence and the relative accountability participants
had in each case study.
Interviews were used because the goal was to gain an understanding of the respondent’s
social reality regarding the brokering of evidence. The semi-structured interview is the
most common type of interview used in qualitative social research (Dawson, 2007).
Numerous scholars have reported on the value of this approach (e.g. Patton, 1990;
Dawson, 2007; Fontana and Frey, 2005). For this thesis, they provided the means to
repeat the same questions in each case study, whist allowing respondents the flexibility
to respond in a variety of ways and raise issues pertinent to the research. Phase 1 of this
78
research project, was used to develop an understanding of the issues that the respondent
might cover, but it was essential that this knowledge was validated. In addition, it was
necessary to gain a connected account of the brokering process that could explain how
people got involved and had an influence. Semi-structured interviews represented the
best means of gaining access to this type of information.
The design of an interview schedule (see Appendix) facilitated the consistency
necessary for a comparative study. This ensured that the questions were asked in the
same way for each decision. Interviews were guided but flexible to allow clarification of
important connections between elements of narratives. The interview schedule had three
distinct stages, moving from the general to the specific and back again (Figure 11). The
primary objective was to validate who got involved; the role these people played; and
the context in which they had to make decisions. Inspiration for the design came
primarily from Powell (1999) who carried out a study into the use of science at the
EPA, and numerous other scholars that offered advice on how to design and carry out
an in-depth semi-structured interview (e.g. Wisker, 2001; Yin, 1984; Fontana and Frey,
2005).
Before the interview began, the interviewer introduced the research topic and asked
respondent’s permission to use a Dictaphone to record the interview. During the
‘mapping exercise’, the respondents
process and asked whether they agreed with its logic. This encouraged respondent to
talk generally about the brokering process and the role scientific evidence and
knowledge played. The respondent
information within this brokering process by asking a series of questions regarding the
external process, points of entry, internal process and the actual decision made.
The next stage aimed to delve deeper int
process. This stage, entitled ‘personal role’, required respondents to break the decision
Figure 11: Interview Schedule, where the change in the horizontal distance between the
directional arrows illustrates how the focus of
specific and back again.
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were presented with the map of the brokering
was then directed to elaborate on the flow of
o the respondent’s knowledge of the brokering
decisions moved from the general, to the
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down into three or more phases using a time line. In each of the identified phases, the
respondent was asked a series of questions characterising: their involvement; the
evidence and knowledge brokered; and the actions participants had to carry out.
Drawing on the content of the unstructured interviews and descriptions of the advisory
process contained in Powell (1999) and OXERA (2000), the respondent was required to
rate the extent to which evidence and knowledge could be characterised as being
qualitative, quantitative, political, social, technical and costly. Finally, in the latter stage
of the interview schedule the respondent was asked a general question regarding the
role they perceived risk-based approaches to play in past, current and future regulatory
decision-making. The aim was to give respondents the opportunity to talk more
generally in the hope that this would spark further discussion about the importance of
risk-based regulation and the brokering of evidence and knowledge.
These interviews were limited in the sense that it was possible to gain access to only
one respondent within each case study. This reflected the contentious nature of the
research topic and general unavailability of the target population. The interviewer was
given access to willing respondents via a research colleague who had personal contacts
in the relevant organisations. Before each interview, respondents were sent formal
notification, explaining the purpose of the interview, reasons why they were chosen, the
expected duration of the interview and how information would be recorded and kept
confidential. This information was re-explained to respondents who consented (via
email and telephone) and the time and place to carry out the interview was agreed. In
each case, the interviewer met with the respondent at their place of work, which for
those respondents who worked from home, was their place of residence. After each
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interview, the interviewer transcribed (verbatim) the audio files, read the transcripts in
depth and abstracted content relating to the brokering process (i.e. the receiving,
processing and passing on (or not) of scientific evidence).
4.4.2 Development of a research framework capable of capturing the logic of the
brokering of evidence in risk-based regulation
The latter part of Phase 2 required the development of a research framework that had
the capacity to capture the logic of the brokering of evidence in risk-based regulation.
This was achieved by identifying an existing framework capable of representing how a
number of different lines of evidence inform policy development, environmental
planning and regulatory decisions. This framework was expanded upon by
incorporating influences of power structure and personality, allowing the exploration of
the relative influence participants have in determining the sufficiency of scientific
evidence supporting a group decision.
To develop a research framework, the logic set out within TESLA, software developed
by risk specialists Quintessa (http://www.quintessa-online.com/TESLA/) was used as
source material. TESLA uses evidence-support logic (ESL), based on interval
probability theory (IPT), to represents how different lines of evidence inform a group
decision. It starts by breaking down a group decision into a number of supporting
‘parent’ and ‘child’ hypotheses. Next it applies weights to reflect how sufficient and
necessary each ‘child’ hypothesis is for answering its ‘parent’ hypothesis; and how
dependent two or more ‘child’ hypothesis are for answering a corresponding ‘parent’
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hypothesis. Then by using IPT, ESL propagates up degrees of belief ‘for’ and ‘against’
and represents uncommitted belief as missing and contradictory evidence. Building on
this logic, the author integrated known power structure and personality influences, to
develop a research framework capable of mapping out the logical way that scientific
evidence supports decisions within risk-based regulation.
Known power structure and personality influences were incorporated within the
identified framework by developing a model that could calculate a weight (between 0
and 1), reflecting the recipient-agent’s receptivity toward a providing-agent’s belief.
Known influences were arranged in a hierarchical fashion, relative to the influence they
had on the receiving, processing and consultation stage. Then, an overall receptivity
value was obtained by assigned weights (ranging between zero and one) to each factor
to reflect the ‘relative’ influence each had on agent receptivity within each stage. Low,
medium or high weights, assigned to each bottom level factor within each stage was
propagated up the hierarchy. An overall weight reflecting agent receptivity within the
brokering process was then derived by taking the average weight across all relevant
stages. Agent receptivity within the receiving stage and the processing stage was always
considered relevant, but agent receptivity within the consultation stage was only
considered relevant if the recipient agent had motivation and legitimate power to engage
in consultation. If the former was true then the overall receptivity was the average of the
total receptivity calculated for each stage, but if the latter was true, it was only the
average of the total receptivity calculated for the receiving and processing stage.
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Agent receptivity (ranging between 0 and 1) was incorporated within the research
framework by multiplying it together with the relevant weight reflecting sufficiency of
the provider’s belief. The receptivity and sufficiency weight each ranged between zero
and one, representing zero and one hundred percent respectively. Multiplication was
used to combine these two weights. In turn, anything other than one hundred percent
sufficiency would result in less than one hundred percent of the provider’s belief ‘for’
and ‘against’ a query being taken onboard by the recipient agent. Hence, permitting the
framework to incorporate power structure and personality influences. However, this
framework did not show the influence dialogue between agents would have on recipient
receptivity and thereby sufficiency. This is addressed in Chapter 7 through the
development of an agent-based simulation model.
4.5 Phase 3
Phase 3 adressess the third, fourth and fifth research objective by developing an agent-
based model that could simulate the influence power and personality had on the
brokering of evidence (and thereby confidence building) in risk-based regulation. The
model is described in Chapter 7 and investigates the possibility of developing an agent-
based simulation model for representing interacting decision makers. Chapter 8
demonstrates how stable decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence are susceptible
to changes in system parameters and the extent to which the automated decision making
system is able to reach the same decisions as those described in the three real-world
case studies.
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The influence participants had on the brokering of scientific evidence was modelled
within a two-agent simulation model.
The model was programmed within Microsoft Excel Visual Basic Editor, using Visual
Basic Application (VBA) code. VBA is easier to use than other more sophisticated
programming languages (e.g. C++), thus allowing rapid development of the agent-
based model.
The two-agent model evolved from the logic set out with the developed research
framework. This initial attempt was limited and could not account for the dynamics
nature of the consultation stage. This version of the model was not dynamic and
therefore oversimplified the brokering process. The next version did account for the
dynamic nature that characterises recipients and providers of evidence that come
together to negotiate over the sufficiency of submitted evidence. This was achieved by
developing a number of object models in VBA and determining the one that best
represented the brokering process.
The general logic was to use a numbers of “Loops” within VBA to update agents’
personal information relating to:
 propensity to trust,
 trustworthiness,
 positive and negative prior knowledge, and thereby their willingness to approve,
 motivation to process evidence systematically and carefully,
 motivation to share knowledge with the interacting agent,
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 referent power.
Each of these were updated according to the logic abstracted from the interviews and
peer reviewed literature.
Chapter 7, described how the logic set out in the developed research framework was
used to design an agent-based simulation model. The objective was to develop a model
that was capable of representing actors as ‘nodes’, coded to illustrate the relative impact
interacting agents had on decision outcomes (e.g. by representing how motivations,
functions, characters and protocols influence decision outcomes). Figure 12 summarises
how this objective was met. Information regarding the position of individuals within a
decision hierarchy and the directional flow of evidence between participants shown in
the figure was abstracted from Government guidance and confirmed by carrying out in-
depth semi-structured interviews with experts. This, together with existing knowledge
regarding the influence personality and power has on motivations, functions, characters
and protocols, was coded within Excel Visual Basic Editor resulting in an agent-based
model. The developed model was capable of exploring the role that power and
personality has on group risk-based decisions.
The developed agent-based model is not a typical agent
based models include multiple agents that focus on how complex dynamics and
outcomes can rely on the network of interactions among the agents. In this regard, the
developed agent model is quite simple compared to more conventional multi
systems. The model only con
8 demonstrates that it is able to produce interesting results regarding the relationship
that can exist between a regulator and an applicant, say. The actual
two-person interactions that the model is intended to illuminate is
Figure 12: General processes by which the author investigated the brokering of
evidence in risk-based regulation. Representing how formal roles (
Government guidance and the directional flow of information (
within Microsoft Excel to create a two
86
-based model. Generally,
tained two agents. However, despite its simplicity Chapter
range of real
outlined in Chapter 7.
-agent simulation model.
agent-
-agent
-world
) set out in
) were coded
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The development of the agent-based model permitted representation of dialogue
between agents could affect their variable influence in determining the sufficiency of
scientific evidence and knowledge. This was achieved by defining agents that receive
and agents that pass-on scientific evidence and knowledge, as sellers and buyers
respectively. Recipients had units of sufficiency to sell and providers had access to
scientific evidence and knowledge to exchange for these units of sufficiency. However,
the extent to which providers were successful depended on how much confidence each
submission of evidence gave recipients. This depended on how the evidence and
knowledge was characterised by different types of information (social, political,
technical, qualitative and quantitative aspects). If the relative weight assigned to each
type of information matched a recipient’s pre-existing idea of how much weight should
be assigned to each type of information, the evidence and knowledge was assumed to be
successful in imbuing the recipient with confidence.
Published findings (e.g. Powell, 1999; OXERA, 2000) and insights contained within the
in-depth unstructured and semi-structured interviews were used to determine
information type and individual relative weight in each case study. In the developed
agent-based model, the recipient’s receptivity weight was used to determine whether the
provider knows or will have to guess how the recipient values the different types of
information.
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4.5.1 Simulating the effect power structure and personality have on the
brokering of evidence in risk-based regulation
The second objective of Phase 3, was addressed by abstracting scenarios (from the in-
depth semi-structured interviews) influencing recipient’s receptivity in the receiving,
processing and consultation stage. Secondly, each scenario was ranked as either having
a low, medium or high influence on recipient’s receptivity and given a score to reflect
the magnitude of its effect. Then, during each interaction, the agent-based model
randomly selected a scenario known to influence recipient’s receptivity, relevant to each
stage of the brokering process, and incorporated this influence into the overall
recipient’s receptivity weight. Hence, the model provided a means of exploring a
decision’s stability as well as its sensitivity to changes in system parameters. Moreover,
this permitted the assessment of the quality of the decisions and exploration of what
interactions could lead to specific decision outcomes.
Chapter 8 presents the initial sensitivity analyses carried out on the two-agent model. It
is presented as the first step in a process toward gaining insights into which probabilities
require high accuracy and which do not. Kala and Kala (2009) explain that there are two
types of sensitivity analyses; the deterministic and the stochastic sensitivity analyses.
Deterministic (otherwise referred to “design sensitivity”) entails carrying out a
parametric study by investigating a number of “What-if” scenarios. Organising these as
a sequences of calculations with gradual variation of input parameters in each
calculation makes it possible to discover the influence each parameter has on the
measured response. Stochastic sensitivity analyses, on the other hand, offer a more in-
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depth quantified insight into the influence of parameters. Stochastic methods go beyond
deterministic approaches providing insights into differential sensitivity values for
estimating the influence parameters have on measured outputs (Irving, 1992). The
process is similar to the deterministic approach, with changes to parameters being used
to investigate how their effect manifests itself on the output variable. However, the
stochastic methods require a number of assumptions to be made based on the modellers
knowledge of parameter distributions. The level of detailed knowledge regarding
parameter distributions was not available at the time of analysis. Therefore,
deterministic sensitivity analysis of the influence model parameters had on agent’s
receptivity and confidence was carried out in this thesis. Hence, whilst the sensitivity
analysis presented in Chapter 8 lacks sophistication it does help to focus future
elicitation effort to be placed on more critical probabilities of agent’s receptivity and
confidence building.
The link between interactions and specific decision outcomes was considered by
looking at a number of “what if” scenarios. These scenarios were characterised by
narratives taken from in-depth semi-structured interviews. Outputs from the model were
then triangulated with insights abstracted from the in-depth semi-structured interviews,
and peer-reviewed literature (Figure 13) to provide a measure of rigour. Rigour is
generally understood as an essential component for carrying out quality research (e.g.
Morse et al., 2002; Golafshani, 2003). The triangulation, attempted to ensure results
could be generalised to a wider population than that of the sample group.
4.6 Chapter summary and conclusions
This chapter has provided an overview of the selected
justification for the selected methodology is given, followed by an explanation of the
method employed to carry out each of the three phases of this research project; the
exploratory phase (Phase 1), the descriptive phase (Phase 2
and proof of concept phase (Phase 3).
Figure 13: Methodology used to triangulate insights. Where, each angle
triangle represents one case
how insights regarding the brokering of evidence were gathered.
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research methodology. A
) and the model development
study and each angle of the smaller triangles represents
of the large
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Chapter 5
EXPLORATORY STAGE
5.1. Chapter structure
This chapter presents the results from the first stage of the investigation; insights gained
by carrying out in-depth unstructured interviews and the process of selecting three real-
world decisions characterising risk-based regulation. The objective of the exploratory
stage was to model government decision-making by examining real-world case studies.
To this end, this chapter has carried out in-depth unstructured interviews to explore the
dynamics that characterise the brokering of evidence. Thereafter, it has selected three
real-world case studies that provide a broad perspective of risk-based regulation and the
conditions under which scientific evidence is brokered.
5.2. In-depth unstructured interviews carried out to explore the dynamics of
the brokering of evidence in risk-based regulation
In-depth unstructured interviews (otherwise referred to as informal conversational
interviews e.g. Patton, 1987; Fontana and Frey, 2005; Minichello et al., 1990), were
carried out with experienced regulators. The primary purpose of carrying out these
interviews was to gain some insights that would serve as the foundation for in-depth
semi structured interviews (presented in Chapter 6).
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These interviews were successful in providing a better understanding of the type of
contextual issues that characterise the brokering process. The advantage of adopting an
unstructured approach was the freedom that it gave the respondents to explore various
scenarios. Moreover, scholars generally agree in the need to undergo training before
carrying out in-depth interviews (e.g. Burgess, 1984; Dawson; 2007). In this sense,
these interviews acted as a training ground on which to prepare for carrying out the
semi-structured interviews.
In total 5 regulators were interviewed. All of these respondents were either former or
current employees of the Environment Agency and had first-hand experience of
brokering evidence in risk-based regulation. These included one licensing officer and
three environment officers. Figure 14 provides a connected account of the process in
which interviews were carried out and analysed. This illustrates the process from
contacting the respondents to processing and analysing the interview transcripts. As
explained in Chapter 4 respondents acted as gate keepers to other respondents. During
each interview, respondents talked through their experiences of making (and informing)
risk-based regulatory decisions and explained the role evidence and knowledge had to
play. These interviews were recorded and transcribed. Then transcripts were read and
reread to search for common themes (and items) that characterised the process by which
evidence was brokered in real-world government risk-based decisions.
Each interview contributed towards building an understanding of
that characterised the brokering of evidence
following observations were made
 The participants engaged in the brokering of evidence in risk
played one of two roles; they either play
provider of evidence.
roles during the brokering p
 The agents (people) that go
receiving, processing and passing
Figure 14: Connected account of how
recorded and how transcripts were processed and analysed.
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the dynamic process
. From the interviews conducted, the
:
-based regulation
ed the role of a recipient or the role of a
Each person, however, would at some point play both
rocess; and
t involved, passed through three distinct stages: the
-on stage.
respondents were identified, interviews were
These three processes are shown in F
the centre show the cross over of information between the receiving stage to the
processing stage and from the processing stage to the passing
dashed arrow at the bottom of the figure illustrates that this is not a deterministic
process. There is often a feedback whereby information coming from the receiving
stage may increase the resis
stage. It was explained during the i
entering the receiving stage
issue the waste management license, say, a
Figure 15: Items categorised under the three main themes of the brokering process in
risk-based regulation; the receiving stage, the processing stage and the passing
stage.
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igure 15. The two prominent directional arrows in
-on stage. However, the
tance permitting the transfer of evidence to the passing
nterviews that this often occurred when the evidence
was highly contentious, making the decisions whether to
political one.
-on
-on
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In each of the circles illustrated in Figure 15 there are a number of items that appeared
to characterise each theme (the receiving, processing and passing-on of evidence). This
is not an exhaustive list (see Appendix), but it does refer to those that were mentioned
specifically with regards to the brokering of evidence.
The receiving stage essentially determined what information was made available to the
recipient. Factors that contextualised the receiving stage were related to the recipient’s
access to internal and external networks. During the receiving stage, evidence became
available to the recipient at a rate that was dependent on two aspects; the recipient’s
tenacity to seek out evidence and the number of voluntary submissions made by the
applicant and/or any number of onlookers, such as statutory consultees. The former was
said to be influenced by the recipient’s personal information. Willingness, for example,
was described as being based on the recipient’s positive and negative prior knowledge.
This was suggested to influence whether the recipient was likely to accept what the
provider was telling them, and whether they would decide to seek out new sources of
evidence. On the other hand, voluntary submissions were suggested to be a consequence
of the context of the decision being made. For example, decisions that were considered
to affect a greater number of stakeholder groups were believed to be the type of
decisions that would attract a greater number of voluntary submissions of evidence.
The evidence the recipient reviewed was also explained to be linked to recipient’s
knowledge (e.g. whether they knew what was required and where to find it). This was
illustrated by a respondent explaining the importance that both informal and formal
lines of communication played in decision outcomes. For example, in the context of
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obtaining scientific advice, one respondent explained that this was greatly helped by
knowing who to talk to:
“I know who to ring in policy and process it would actually give me an answer
on the day rather than having to go through a more formalized route…”
Passing through the formal route was said to be a long drawn out process that could
restrict them from gaining vital knowledge in time to make their value judgements.
Referring to the formal route of gaining advice from the policy team was said to be
inaccessible because of the time it took to get a response,
“essentially you write your query that then goes to another person who then
sends it to head office and then about twelve years later you get your answer”
Hence, it also was the character of the regulator that determined whether the lines of
evidence were likely to be available to them in the receiving stage. Given that the
regulatory waste licensing officers only get 28 days to consult on a licence, it was not
difficult to understand that relying on formal lines of communication severely restricted
the regulators’ access to important information regarding the type of evidence they
would receive. Using this same example, the respondent explained that it was their
experience and knowledge of who to talk to that determine whether they would have
gained access to particular types of evidence.
“over time you get to learn who is likely to answer their phone or if you drop
them an e-mail who might come back because sometimes you cannot reach
someone”
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In the processing stage, recipients had the task of assessing how sufficient the submitted
evidence was for answering a pertinent question (e.g. whether a waste management
license should be issued). At the top of the list characterising, this stage (seen in Figure
15) is “time”. Time in the context of the brokering process is referred to as a recipient’s
authority (otherwise known as a legitimate power). A recipient was said to be restricted
to making their decision regarding the sufficiency of submitted evidence within this
given period. However, in the context of issuing a waste management license, the
licensing officers acting as recipients did have the discretionary power to decide to
accept the submitted evidence before this time period has elapsed, if they felt that
sufficient evidence had been submitted. As such, decisions made within this stage were
said to be made based on the recipients’ perception of how credible and reliable the
evidence and those providing it were.
During the processing stage the recipients (e.g. regulators) process the different
submissions of evidence based on the information he/she receives, e.g. regarding how
credible or reliable the evidence is. This could be influenced by the regulator’s view of
the operator in terms of credibility as well as the scientific evidence provided. The
outcome determines what information the regulator would pass on.
In this regard, respondents generally referred to three types of operator; the good, the
bad and the ugly, which they trusted successively less. The environment health officers
were more explicit about this, probably because of the nature of their role to inspect
compare to the licensing officer’s role to assess. However, all the respondents referred
99
to a number of different types of operator that could be generally categorised under
these three headings.
Respondents explained that sometimes they “just knew” that an operator would
knowingly pollute the environment. This was explained as the ugly type of operator.
They were said to be fully aware of what they ought to do, had the capacity to do it, but
were just unwilling to comply. Believing this was the case, regulators mentioned how
they would constantly ask the operator to submit evidence that could refute the
regulator’s concerns, but they reported that they constantly met with resistance from the
operator. For example, one environment health officer mentioned that a particular site
was known to be polluting but nothing could be done to stop them until they obtained
the necessary evidence. The full extent of the regulator’s coercive power was exercised
but in the case mentioned the regulator explained that the required evidence probably
would not appear unless the operator was taken to court.
The bad type of operator did not knowingly pollute the environment but lacked the skill
base (and sometimes understanding) to comply with some of the regulators requests for
evidence. These were “bad” in the sense that the regulator did not have the supporting
evidence that the regulator required to not fine them, say, but they were not considered
to “ugly” in the sense that they would not knowingly pollute the environment and try to
hide it by refusing to submit evidence. In the processing of this type of evidence,
respondents explained that they would give the operator as much time as possible. Often
the “bad” operators were referred to as the “friendly farmers” who had an excellent
track record but lacked the skill base required to prepare a management plan. The good
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type of operator, on the other hand, was those that were in contrast to the ugly type of
operator. These were described as knowing what to submit, had the resources to do so
and were openly motivated to do so.
The passing-on stage involved transferring the processed information to other personnel
(such as a boss or a team leader) who were responsible for further decision making. The
passing-on stage consisted of answering whether the regulator had sufficient evidence to
support their claim. If it was a political decision and the supporting evidence lacked
legitimacy, it was said that the result would likely be that the regulator would not be
permitted to pass-on the evidence. This may result in the regulator returning back to the
processing or even the receiving stage to review what is being passed on, for example,
requiring the regulator to engage in dialogue with the operators’ consultant.
An important element that interlinked the processing and passing-on stage was trust
held between participants. This was said to have a substantial influence on participants’
ability to process and pass-on evidence. For example, on one occasion it was explained
how the ability to pass-on evidence was facilitated by the regulator’s boss having trust
in their ability to make good judgements.
“...your boss has to sign it because he actually has the power to sign the form...
but [I did] all the work and to be honest I think normally your boss doesn’t
normally go through the documents in a huge amount of detail partly again
because we talked about the site lots”
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Another example of how a contextual issue influenced the passing-on of evidence was
political pressure. For example, in the context of issuing a license that received public
attention one respondent explained:
“it … appeared in the paper 4 weeks in a row on the front page ….the area
manager the environment manager got involved everyone started to get a lot
more concerned which they always do when it goes public”
By going public, it meant that the respondent engaged in more consultation with the
provider of information. In addition, it meant that the respondent increased their
demand for particular types of information. The respondent explained:
“awful lot more people all got involved than…. probably a lot hotter on odour
than I would normally…. I did get them to do a lot more work… did have a five
to six revisions of their area management plan which we really shouldn’t have
done”
In summary, the in-depth unstructured interviews served as a useful means of preparing
the author for carrying out the in-depth semi-structured interviews. They demonstrated
the complexity that characterised the brokering of evidence. This demonstrated that
non-scientific contextual issues were also important and must be considered to
understand the dynamic behaviour of participants engaged in the brokering of evidence.
One outcome from these interviews was the understanding that between the primary
source of evidence and the final decision maker (the “top” and “bottom” agent), at any
given time during the brokering process there must exist an agent that receives and an
agent that provides evidence. Also, each of these agents must play both roles at some
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point and must pass through three stages; the receiving, processing and passing-on
stage. The themes and items presented in this section are heuristic codes that broadly
represent the dynamic of the brokering process.
Essentially, throughout the process, there are interactions between two individuals
participating in the brokering process – a recipient and a provider. This interaction is
seen between the operator and the regulator, the regulator and his peers/team leader and
(possibly) between regulators and consultants with the possibility of roles reversing.
The individuals play various roles in this process, similar to the work described by
OXERA (2000). The recipient receives information and depending on his/her role
places a value on the information received before passing it on with this value attached
to it. The next section introduces the three case studies being investigated in this thesis.
5.3. Selection of three real-world case studies that characterise risk-
based regulation
The three case studies were selected to provide a relatively broad perspective of the
conditions under which scientific evidence was brokered. These included the regulatory
review of a post-closure safety case for nuclear waste disposal, the disposal of avian
influenza infected animal carcasses, and the recommendation for the reduction of
dietary salt intake. Each issue drew on a complex evidence base to inform a regulatory,
policy development and environmental planning decision, respectively.
Figure 16 provides a connected account of the process followed to review available
regulatory frameworks. Common attributes were identified and three decisions
representing a relatively broad perspective of risk
scientific evidence were selected. The decision making process was mapped out with
Mind Manager Pro and distilled into three fl
evidence and relative roles different actors played, using a methodology developed by
OXERA (2000).
Each case study was characterised by relative levels of scientific uncertainty, public
dread, accountability, and inflexibility of the regulatory framework in which decisions
have to be made (Figure 1
That is, Government managed the increased level of public dread and scientific
Figure 16: Connected account of how three case studies representing the breadth of
risk-based regulation were selected.
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-based regulation and the brokering of
ow charts depict the directional flow of
7). The former two characteristics necessitate the latter two.
uncertainty associated with each risk by requiring a greater level of accountability, and a
rigid regulatory framework.
The first case study (the risk associated with dietary salt intake) was well known
characterised by a relatively low level of public
risk was not high on the public agenda and the Food Standard Agency (FSA) did not
have the legal power to coerce food manufactures, for example, to comply to exacting
standards. As such, the risk was being managed in
framework.
Figure 17: illustrates how the three selected case studies (
of avian influenza animal carcasses, and nuclear waste disposal) range in the extent to
which they are characterised by
accountability and inflexibility of the regulatory framework
made.
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dread and scientific uncertainty. The
a relatively flexible risk management
dietary salt intake, disposal
relative levels of public dread, scientific uncertainty,
s from which decisions are
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The Food Standards Agency (FSA) was responsible for carrying out the salt intake
decision. Set up in 2000 the FSA is an independent Government Department without a
Minister. Its purpose is to protect the interests of consumers in relation to food and
drink issues. Their primary concern is making sure consumers can buy safe food and
that they can make informed choices about the food their buying and its nutritional
content. High concentrations of dietary salt have been reported to result in a significant
increase in high blood pressure, which was linked to coronary heart disease (Korhonen
et al., 1999). Reducing salt intake was reported to reduce average blood pressure levels
in a clinical dietary control, in both sexes (Sacks et al., 2001). In the UK, the Food
Standards Agency (FSA), an enforcement authority in their own right, set voluntary
targets for reducing the average salt intake for adults to 6g per day, based on
recommendations made by the Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition (SACN).
Because these targets were voluntary their primarily aim was to encourage retailers and
manufactures to reduce the concentration of salt in their food products. As an incentive,
the FSA published league tables based on attempts made by organisations to meet this
target. The FSA also ran major public health campaigns, with other organisations,
aimed at reducing the amount of salt in ‘social cooking’. They also recruited and trained
local peer facilitators to work with minority ethnic groups, and make the public more
aware, generally, of the large amounts of salt that was added to their food.
The second case study, the risk associated with coordinating the disposal of diseased
animal carcases, was characterised by a relatively medium level of scientific
uncertainty. The risk that the regulator had to contend with was better known than that
associated with nuclear waste disposal, but not as well known as the one associated with
106
dietary salt intake. As such, the risk associated with the disposal of avian influenza
infected animal carcasses still warranted a greater level of accountability than that of
dietary salt intake. This case study was therefore characterised by a relatively medium
level of scientific uncertainty.
In the UK, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) is
responsible for coordinating disposal of infected animal carcasses. This represented a
decision that was characterised by emergency response and where the timeframe was
short. This required Defra to have a good working knowledge of all the potential
pathways that could lead to exposure. This required participants to maintain good
working relationships so that expert advice could be sought quickly. A certain amount
of trust is essential because everything needs to fall into place quickly. Therefore, much
of the risk assessment work was carried out ahead of time. Evidence and knowledge
was then disseminated within Government guidance to operational staff in the form of a
generic contingency plan. In the event of a disease outbreak, Defra used this
information in collaboration with expert advice from a number of different parties (e.g.
health departments and their agencies, veterinary officials, environment agencies,
emergency planners and other professional partners) to inform their decisions on the
most appropriate suite of disposal options.
Finally, the review associated with the post-closure safety case for nuclear waste
disposal is characterised by a relatively high level of scientific uncertainty. This
required that the Environment Agency assess and manage risk within a relatively rigid
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and inflexible regulatory framework, reflecting the need to establish accountability and
address a relatively high level of public dread.
The Environment Agency (EA) is responsible for the authorisation of radioactive waste
disposal in England and Wales (under the Radioactive Substances Act 1993, as
amended). British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL) was the operator authorised to carry out
the disposal of solid low-level radioactive waste located near the village of Drigg on the
Cumbrian coast, in northwest England (Duerden et al., 2003; El-Ghonemy et al., 2005).
In accordance with public policy, repository operators underwent a periodic review of
their status by preparing a post-closure safety case for the regulator. The goal was that
the post-closure safety case would contain sufficient evidence to give the Agency
confidence that the operator was managing the risks associated with the disposal of
nuclear waste appropriately. In preparation of this safety-case, the operator was required
to make good use of scientific evidence and knowledge. Yet, the assessment and
management of future risks, given the longevity of radioactivity, posed a considerable
intellectual challenge in terms of the availability and reliability of scientific evidence
and knowledge. This placed a substantive burden of proof on the operator to evaluate
future risks up to 100,000 years forward in time. To accommodate this, the
Environment Agency required the operator to draw upon reasoned argument, future
scenarios, and structured approaches to the ‘evolution’ of the repository over time. This
was encouraged alongside the use of quantitative field and modelled data in support of
the operator’s post-closure safety case. After the formal submission of the safety-case
and consultation with all relevant parties was complete, the inspecting officer had to
make a recommendation for authorisation, or re-authorisation for existing facilities, to
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the Secretary of State, based on the evidence and knowledge provided. Moreover, this
case study took approximately four years to play out characterised by a relatively high
level of consultation thereby providing the author with the opportunity to investigate the
impact dialogue had on decision outcomes.
Having selected three case studies that characterise the scope of decisions made in risk-
based regulation, the next task was to map out the directional flow of evidence and roles
different actors had in brokering the evidence. To do this, the methodology set out by
OXERA (2000) was used. The methodology was intended to be used by government
departments to facilitate mapping out their policy process. These served as a useful
discussion point in the semi-structured interviews (presented in the proceeding chapter).
The logic set out in Figures 18, 19, & 20, regarding the directional flow of evidence and
the relative roles played by decision-takers, policy-makers, scientific advisers, and
stakeholder representatives were mapped out using information available on the internet
and validated within the semi-structured interviews in Chapter 6.
Figure 18: Decision making process related to the Food Standards
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Agency’s development of the 6 gram per day salt intake guideline.
Figure 19: Decision making process related to the Department of Environment and Rural Affairs coordinated effort for the disposal of
avian influenza infected animal carcasses.
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Figure 20: Decision making process related to the Environment Agency’s assessment of a post
111
-closure safety assessment.
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Mapping out each decision using the methodology set out by OXERA (2000) was
successful in capturing some key differences of the brokering process within each case
study. However, the mapping out of the brokering process in this way was limited to the
extent that it could show participants’ influence.
Scientific advice, for example, is seen to play a different role in the nuclear waste case
study compared to the salt intake and avian influenza case study. Scientific advice in the
salt intake and the avian influenza case study is the first link in the chain of events. It
also serves as a fundamental link, later in the process, between the policy makers and
decision takers acting as a gatekeeper to the decision-taker. Figure 18 illustrates that if
the science did not exist in the salt intake case study, for example, then it could be
assumed that this would render the brokering process void. Hence, capturing the fact
that the risk associated with salt intake is a risk of exposure and the risk associated with
the nuclear waste disposal case study is a risk of an initiating event.
The other fundamental difference between the three case studies is the role played by
stakeholder representatives. In the nuclear waste case study, stakeholders are not
consulted until later in the brokering process (Figure 20). In the avian influenza case it
was the opposite situation (Figure 19). In the salt intake case study, stakeholder
representation is present throughout the brokering process (Figure 18). This depicts the
fundamental difference in focus. In the former, the regulator had to build a case for
support before it could be evaluated. In the avian influenza case, much of the work
involving stakeholder consultation, was carried out ahead of a disease outbreak. In both
of these case studies stakeholders were used as a quality control, but in the salt intake
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stakeholder representation played more of a strategic role, increasing the chance of
developing a policy that could successfully encourage food manufacturers to comply to
voluntary standards.
In summary, the exploratory stage was successful in the selection of three case studies,
mapping-out of the flow of information within each case study and establishing an
understanding of the dynamics of the brokering process. The brokering process was
found to consists of three stages; the receiving stage, the processing stage, and the
passing-on stage. To achieve this, a comprehensive review of government reports, peer
reviewed journal articles and grey literature found on the Internet was carried out.
Using an existing methodology developed by OXERA (2000), a map representing the
flow of evidence was created for each case study. The value of carrying out the
exploratory stage was the insight this provided for conducting the semi-structured
interviews and developing the research framework presented in the proceding chapter.
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Chapter 6
DESCRIPTIVE STAGE
6.1. Chapter structure
This chapter presents the second stage of the data collection and builds on the insights
gained by mapping out the logic behind the brokering of scientific evidence and its use
for group risk-based decision-making. This addresses the first and second research
objective. It models government risk-based regulation by carrying out semi-structured
interviews to investigate three real-world case studies and develops a research
framework capable of mapping out the logic of the brokering process. It is explained
how the developed research framework is capable of exploring the influence
participants have on the brokering of evidence.
6.2. In-depth semi-structured interviews
This section sets out the results obtained from carrying out semi-structured interviews.
Figure 21 provides a connected account of the process by which insights abstracted
from the exploratory stage informed the development of an interview schedules. These
were used to carry out semi-structured interviews with one expert from each case study
(i.e. the reduction of dietary salt intake, disposal of avian influenza infected animal
carcasses, and the development of a post
Interviews were recorded, transcribed
codes that facilitated mapping out the process by which evidence was brokered within
each case study. Heuristic code words
primarily as flags or signposts in the data and
transcripts. Query identified were
characterising each decision.
The remainder of this section presents the results from carrying out the semi
interviews. This opens with a description of the flow of evidence in each decision as it
was explained by the expert. This is
Figure 21: Connected account of the p
interview schedule, record, transcribe and abstract heuristic codes
process evidence in brokered in each case study.
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-closure safety case for nuclear waste disposal).
verbatim, read, and reread to abstract
(as apposed to objective codes)
helped to identify quer
cross-referenced with decision documents
complemented with the results obtained by asking
rocess followed to develop a semi
representing the
heuristic
were used
ies from the
-structured
-structured
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experts to map out theirs (and other) role in the brokering process. Finally, the queries
abstracted from the interview transcripts are presented.
Respondents gave valuable insight into the flow of information; external process, points
of entry, internal process, and actual decision. Talking generally about the brokering
process they gave a comprehensive description of the flow of information and how it
mattered different amounts within each case study, reflecting the difference that the
brokering of evidence has to play for policy development, environmental planning and
regulatory decision-making.
The external flow of information mattered most for the Environment Agency. Their role
was to supervise the operator and ensure that the operator could demonstrate that
sufficient evidence and knowledge was being taking into account for the
characterisation, assessment, and management of risk. The regulator’s role was to
engage in dialogue with the operator and device the best means of obtaining the
required evidence. Having said this, the regulator was not in a position to tell the
operator what evidence to submit. This required the Agency to engage in dialogue with
the operator to come up with an agreeable means of obtaining the required information.
Keeping submissions of information confidential was an important requirement for the
operator. The respondent explained that:
“... after a long dialogue eventually we said okay, we’ll agree to a programme
of submissions informally under this draft interim work in progress, which they
said would allow them to be more open and honest about what they were giving
us.”
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During this period of informal submissions, the operator (and their consultant) would
submit evidence and knowledge. A relevant review group (containing Agency staff and
their consultants) would then assess each submission and produce a number of issue
resolution forms, outlining to the operator what outstanding issues needed to be
resolved. The Agency required the operator to be open and honest about what they
knew. However, the Agency also required the operator to understand what type of
information was required of them. For example, one issue that was persistent during this
dialogue was the issue of carrying out an independent peer-review before submitting
evidence and knowledge. The operator did eventually get around to doing this but it
came too late in the day to have any real affect on imbuing the Agency with any real
confidence. In this respect, the respondent explained:
“it was really too late for it to have been any use to us. Again, that was one
argument, one comment that we continued to give them right from the 1997
stage was we really recommend you carry out an independent peer.”
Hence, the Agency had the opportunity to engage in consultation with the operator but
this did not guarantee that submissions of evidence and knowledge would come in the
correct shape and form.
In addition, during this period of informal submissions, the Agency had the struggle of
maintaining the correct balance. The Agency role was only to advise the operator of
what issues the operator had not covered and possibly should address. Hence, the
Agency had an idea of what the evidence would look like but because of the level of
uncertainty surrounding risks being assessed it was imperative that the regulator keep a
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reasonable distance and avoid biasing what evidence eventually got submitted. At times,
however, this was misunderstood. For example, the respondent explained:
“I think they were almost using us as an independent peer reviewer and – they
actually said but you’re doing the peer review and we say no we’re not, we’re
undertaking a regulatory review which is very different.”
As a result, the Agency (to overcome misunderstandings) would become frustrated with
the operator always getting it wrong. On one occasion, the respondent explained that
this required talking to someone with more power, because eventually if the regulator
said too much they began to determine what evidence they would receive.
“You can’t be holding the operator’s hand in a way unless we really had a
concern…
Having said this, the regulator was also willing to direct the operator if the situation
arose, but this was said to only apply if it was absolutely necessary.
“There were a few lines that we were absolutely fed up of keep reiterating
ourselves and at the end of the day we did call a meeting at a more senior level
and literally just sat around and spelt it out … he could see our point
immediately”
What the Agency eventually did with the info before formally processing it:
If you can imagine what we had from the project was a huge amount of
documentation from these review groups so key scientific experts on our side
giving their opinion on scientific knowledge that they’d been presented with but
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not all that was equally relevant. It’s there and all the issue assessment forms
are there, there’s a lot of detail in those but what we did was distil those into key
lines, key issues which we pooled into that overview report.
This required the Agency to eventually change the requirement to a formal submission
of an overview report. This also presented the Agency with the issue of receiving the
type of information that they were able to cope with.
Yet in reality, allowing the operator greater flexibility resulted in misunderstandings
over the type of information that was required. Referring to this period of informal
submissions, the respondent explained:
“the programme dragged on, things were changed, the goalposts moved, we
were working with the costs of the changing programme”
The respondent explained further that eventually this all came to an end and the
requirement for a submission of a PCSC changed from an informal to a formal
submission.
However, the respondent explained that it was not their position to tell the operator what
evidence and knowledge they should submit. Yet, it was their role to improve the
chances that eventual submissions of evidence and knowledge would be of sufficient
quality to imbue the Agency with confidence, the interviewee explained;
They said that if things done under the authorisation had to be public it would
be more difficult to present the warts and all”
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Initially, the Agency agreed to a series of informal submissions to allow the operator to
be open and honest. Encouraging respondents to talk more specifically about the
complexities and nuances that characterised the brokering of evidence, respondents
were asked to split the decision into three distinct stages along a time line (Figure 22, 23
& 24). Referring specifically to this time line respondents were asked to explain in as
much detail as they were capable on what occasions were they personally, or others,
involved in the brokering of evidence. Then, to account for the influence different types
of evidence had, as it passed through the stages of the decision, respondents were asked
to score the weight political, social, cost, technical, qualitative and quantitative evidence
would have. The relative influence each type of evidence had at different stages of the
decision is illustrated in Figure 22.
Next, the “personal role” of those involved in the brokering process was investigated in
greater depth. Respondents were asked to explain what role different participants had,
what type of evidence they brokered, what weight these different types of evidence had
(Figure 22, 23 & 24). In each identified phase the author asked the respondent a series
of questions characterising: participants’ involvement; the evidence and knowledge
brokered; and the actions participants had to carry out.
Finally, in the latter stage of the interview the author asked a general question regarding
the role they perceived risk-based approaches had to play in past, current and future
regulatory decision-making. The aim was to give respondents the opportunity to talk
more generally in the hope that this would spark further discussion about the importance
of risk-based regulation and the brokering of evidence and knowledge.
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The following figures illustrate the stages that the experts split the decision into. It can
be seen that there are no values assigned to the types of evidence in the salt intake case
study. This was a consequence of the respondent not having first hand experience of
brokering evidence.
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Figure 22: Different stages of the brokering process characterising the dietary salt intake case study
Evidence gathering ImplementationDecision and implementationDecision implementation
 FSA responsible for
gathering evidence
and knowledge
 High scientific
knowledge is the
trigger
 Evaluation of
technical information

 Cost Benefit Analysis
(CBA)

 Political check and
balance – going to
ministers and
explaining what is
intended to be done
 FSA board  Most costly
(internally) requiring:
o Advertising campaigns
(very costly)
o Meeting with the fast
food industry to
persuade them to
reformulate (less costly)
o Consumer awareness
o Social modelling (e.g.
vulnerable and sensitive
people)
 Feeding back into the
evidence gathering
stage
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Figure 23: Different stages of the Environment Agency’s regulatory decision whether to continue Driggs license to dispose of nuclear
waste.
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Figure 24: Different stages of the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs disposal of diseased animal carcasses case study.
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As a means of identifying what actions were available to the provider and the recipient
in each stage of the brokering process in each case study, the scores set out in Table 2 &
3 were provided by the expert from the avian influenza and the salt intake case study.
However, the expert from the nuclear waste case study felt that they did not have
sufficient knowledge to provide this information.
Table 2 illustrates the regulatory actions that were said to be available to the regulator
within the avian influenza case study. This is in contrast to the actions at the regulators
disposal in the nuclear waste case study. In the nuclear waste case study, the regulator
had the role of supervising the operator and what evidence they might submit. In the
avian influenza case study, on the other hand, the regulator made specific requests on
what types of evidence the regulator should submit and had coercive power to ensure
this would happen.
Table 2: Applicable actions for the Defra receiving and passing-on of evidence and
knowledge at each stage of the decision, as described by the respondent
Actions:
Amber (pre
confirmation)
Red (disease
confirmation)
Field operations Ramp down
R P R P R P R P
no action X X
Inform X X X X X X X X
Educate X X X X X
Advice X X X X X X
Guide X X X X X X
Influence X X X X
Encourage X X X
Persuade X X X
Instruct X X X X X X
Direct X X X X X X
Warn X X X X
Threaten X X X
Sanction X X
Enforce X X X
Prosecute X X
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Actions:
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 3
R P r P R P R P
no action
Inform
Educate
Advice
Guide X X X X
Influence X X X X X X X X
Encourage X X X X X X X X
Persuade X X X X X X X X
Instruct X X X X
Direct
Warn
Threaten
Sanction
Enforce
Prosecute
During these follow-up interviews, experts were asked to validate the logical way in
which queries were laid out. Then experts were asked to assign a weight (between 0 and
1) to reflect how sufficient each “child” query was for answering its corresponding
“parent” query (referred to in greater detail in the proceeding section).
This illustrates how the each decision, characterising each case study, can be broken
down into consecutive chains of supporting “child” and “parent” queries. Each
consecutive string of queries represents a single line of evidence supporting the central
decision being made in each case study.
Each case study takes on a different form. The nuclear waste case study is the most
technical and has the structure of an audit. The salt intake case, however, takes on a
Table 3: Applicable actions for the FSA receiving and passing-on of evidence and
knowledge at each stage of the decision, as described by the respondent
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much more intricate framework than the others. The lines of evidence are far stretching
and involve a large number of separate groups. The lines of consecutive queries are not
as structured as in the nuclear waste or the avian influenza case study. The avian
influenza case study again is more rigid than the salt intake but less than the nuclear
waste case study.
After carrying out semi-structured interviews with experts, the author abstracted
narratives regarding participants’ involvement in the brokering of scientific evidence
and knowledge. These narratives provided insights into personal features that influence
participants’ evaluation of evidence and knowledge. These factors included the
existence of informal communication networks, the impact of positive and negative
prior knowledge, the impact a participant’s attitude toward those providing the
information had on their evaluation of its sufficiency etc. Moreover, placing these in the
context of the brokering of scientific evidence and knowledge, respondents discussed
the relative influence economical, political, social and technical factors had on the
receiving, processing and passing on of information. Hence, the content of these
narratives provided insights that were not accessible through Government reports or
peer reviewed literature. Therefore, despite the limited access to experts, conducting in-
depth interviews provided the author with access to valuable insights regarding the
dynamics of the brokering process that supports real world risk-based group decisions.
Chapter 3 critically assessed the current state of knowledge regarding the influence
power structures and personalities have on group decision making, and specifically how
participants influence decision outcomes through the act of knowledge sharing. To
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achieve this, the author mapped out the hierarchical relationship representing the
manner in which power structure and personality traits influence the receiving,
processing and passing on of evidence and knowledge
.
This section has presented the results from carrying out the semi-structured interviews.
The semi-structured interviews were successful at obtaining the depth of information
required to describe the nuances characterising the brokering process. Access to
respondents was limited to carrying out a one hour interview with each expert. Mock
interviews were carried out to prepare for this. However, these interviews took longer to
administer than was expected. Moreover, the expert consulting on the salt intake case
study had not been directly involved in the decision making process and therefore was
not able to provide the level of detail that the expert from the other two studies were.
However, the expert did have extensive knowledge of the directional flow of evidence,
relative accountabilities and was able to offer general insights into the influence
participants play in the brokering process.
A number of differences exist between the case studies. It was shown how the brokering
process characterising each case study varied by the amount of time spent on the
brokering of evidence. The nuclear waste case study, for example, took up to four years
to play out. The regulator underwent extensive dialogue with the operator, passing
through a period of voluntary submissions followed by a formal review. Conversely, the
avian influenza case study was characterised by emergency response, and as such had
very little time to engage in dialogue with the operator. The regulator had to rely on the
prior knowledge they had regarding the operator and act quickly in response to any new
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negative knowledge they received. The salt intake case gave the regulator a greater level
of discretion to engage in dialogue with the operator compared to the avian influenza
case, but their ability to pass-on their belief was severely restricted by their lack of
legitimate, coercive and reward power.
6.3. Development of the research framework
This section explains how an existing framework was developed to model the influence
participants had on the brokering of evidence.
Evidence-support logic (ESL) was used to map out how a number of lines of evidence
that informed a group decision. Conventionally, this framework has been used to model
the influence relative degrees of uncertainty have for informing an overall measure of
confidence. It breaks down a central hypothesis into consecutive chains of supporting
“parent” and “child” hypotheses. Building upon interval probability theory developed
by researchers at Bristol University (UK), ESL propagates beliefs “for” and “against”
from a supporting child hypothesis to a corresponding parent hypothesis (Feller, 1971;
Cui and Blackley, 1990; Hall et.al 1998). It does this by taking the sum of belief for and
against and subtracting them from the value of one ((i.e. ݌൅ ݍ൅ ݑ ൌ ͳǢͲ൑ ݌ǡݍ൑
ͳܽ݊݀െ ͳ൑ ݑ൑ ͳ), where p = belief for, q = belief against and u = uncommitted
belief). The result is a triple measure of probability that can account for the influence of
uncertainty as a measure of uncommitted belief.
Figure 25 illustrates how this logic has been mapped out within TESLA, an existing
software developed by risk specialists Quintessa. It can be seen that the measure of
uncertainty characterising a belief is sometimes represented as a negative value and
sometimes represented as a positive value. Positive values represent the degree of
absent belief and negative values represent the degree of conflicting beliefs. Either way,
for the purposes of mapping out the brokering process in this thesis, uncommitted belief
is taken to be a direct measure of uncertainty characterising the submitted evidence.
Figure 26 presents the math supporting the aggregation of beliefs. In sho
states that parent hypotheses are assigned weights (between 0 and 1) to reflect how
Figure 25: TESLA™’s use of evidence support logic (ESL) to
of lines of evidence (LOE) inform a group risk
online.com/TESLA™/).
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represent how a number
-based decision (http://www.quintessa
rt, the logic
-
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sufficient, dependent and necessary each subordinate child hypothesis is for answering
its hypothesis. These weights are multiplied against subordinate beliefs “for” and
“against” as they are propagated. Weights reflecting necessity reflect that the absence of
a belief being formed for a necessary child hypotheses is reflected by the parent
hypothesis failing to form a belief. Weights reflecting dependence, on the other hand,
state how dependent two or more child hypotheses are for forming the parent
hypothesis. This is calculated by multiplying the minimum of the two beliefs “for” or
“against” and subtracting the end product from the greater of the two. Sufficiency, on
the other hand, reflects the proportion that the child hypothesis can address the parent
hypothesis.
Figure 26: Maths behind evidence support logic (Li, Unpublished)
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Using this logic set out in ESL, TESLA has been able to provide an audit trail of beliefs
in the sufficiency of supporting evidence. As such, it has gained a history of being used
to map out the logic of risk-based decision-making (Foley et al., 1997; Hall et al.,
1998). Such examples have shown the value it has for demonstrating the implication
that different sources of evidence can have for informing an overall belief. Moreover, it
gives the user the capacity to carry out sensitivity analysis to show which lines of
reasoning (with their relative values of sufficiency, necessity and dependency) are
particularly susceptible to changes in uncommitted beliefs assigned to bottom level
hypotheses.
To date it has provided support for a number of regulatory decisions such as the long
term geological storage of carbon dioxide (Benbow, 2006) and the disposal of radio
active waste (Seo et al., 2004). In this context, TESLA provided a means of
transparently divulging the weights to supporting a central hypothesis, representing how
the evidences fitted together and the relative influence measures of uncomitted belief
had on the relative measure of confidence that could be assigned to a central hypothesis.
TESLA’s use of ESL offer the user a means of improving the transparency of risk-based
decisions by recording the structure, sufficiency, dependency and necessity of
supporting lines of evidence. It has been reported to have a number of advantages in this
regard, building confidence and facilitating the communication of logic supporting risk-
based decisions.
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However, as it stood, the use of TESLA assumed that weights reflecting sufficiency,
dependency and necessity were universally set out. That is, these relative weights were
the end product of experts reaching a concensus. In a similar fashion, weights assigned
to each query in the research framework were assumed to be informed by government
guidance. However, these were merely used as a reference point that could be updated
as the decision went live, and practitioners made value judgements regarding the
sufficiency of submitted evidence.
It is suggested the framework set out in evidence-support logic could be applied to
modeling the influence participants have on the brokering of evidence by the extent that
they would modify the values of sufficiency.
Chapter 6 illustrates how queries were identified from narratives captured in the semi-
structured interviews. The author mapped out the series of questions representing the
group decisions for each case study and explained how follow-up interviews were
carried out with experts. Here it is explained how the research framework assumes that
sufficiency starts off as a pre-determined value (set out in guidance, for example) but is
modified by participant’s power and personality as agents (people) interact. Then
through the follow-up interview with each expert, the author gained access to
predetermined values of sufficiency. Through the development of a power and
personality model, an additional weighting factor multiplied to the pertinent value of
sufficiency represents the influence participants have in determining the weight
different lines of evidence will have on the group decision outcome.
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During the interviews experts were asked to validated the logical sequence of queries
and attributed weights (between 0 and 1) to reflect how sufficient each “child” query
was for answering its corresponding “parent” query. Experts also gave a proportional
value that reflected the amount of belief that they would normally be expected to be
available for answering each bottom-level query (otherwise referred to as a “leaf”
hypothesis). All this was mapped out within the research framework and explained how
it would be possible to add weight to reflect the influence that power and personality
has on recipient’s receptivity, by taking account of known power and personality
influences.
Aforementioned, TESLA™ assumed that a single expert, or group of experts, reached a
consensus on how sufficient, dependent and necessary each ‘child’ hypothesis was for
addressing its corresponding ‘parent’ hypothesis. This was not the case in this thesis.
This thesis assumed that each hypothesis represented a query characterising a decision
participant’s role. As such, a weight reflecting the sufficiency of a ‘child’ query for
answering a ‘parent’ query depended on how receptive they were to the participant
passing-on the evidence and knowledge. To account for this, the author created the
following hierarchical model of agent’s receptivity that could complement evidence-
support logic to account for the influence of the individual, where known power
structure and personality factors were organised (Figure 27).
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Next, conditional weights were assigned to each factor within the hierarchy set out in
Figure 27. Then propagation of values (reflecting a low, medium or high presence of
each bottom level factor) through the hierarchy, gave an overall value between zero and
one, reflecting the recipient’s receptivity (Figure 28). It was assumed that recipient’s
receptivity was a product of all three stages unless the recipient lacked legitimate power
to engage in consultation, in which case, recipient’s receptivity was only a product of
the receiving and processing stage.
Figure 27: Logic supporting the influence power structure and personality has on the
brokering process (the receiving, processing and passing-on of scientific evidence and
knowledge.
Receiving stage:
• Recipient’s propensity to
trust
- Extroversion
- Neuroticism
- Agreeableness
• Recipient’s willingness to
engage in interpersonal trust
- Positive prior knowledge
- Negative prior
knowledge
Processing stage:
• Recipient’s legitimate power
- Permissible consultation period
• Recipients motivation to
systematically and carefully process
information
- Openness to experience
- Level of uncertainty
 Indeterminacy and/or
ignorance.
Consultation stage:
• Provider’s motivation to
systematically and carefully process
information carefully
- Level of uncertainty
 Indeterminacy and/or
ignorance
- Openness to experience
• Provider’s trust worthiness
- Agreeableness
- Conscientiousness
• Provider’s propensity to trust
- Extroversion
- Neuroticism
- Agreeableness
• Recipient’s trustworthiness
- Agreeableness
- Conscientiousness
•Provider’s willingness to engage in
interpersonal trust
- Positive prior knowledge
- Negative prior knowledge
Calculating a recipient’s receptivity weight permitted the evidence
framework to be developed to
decision. Weights reflecting recipient’s receptivity were multiplied against weights
reflecting sufficiency (Figure 29).
Figure 28: The logic set out to calculate recipient receptivity.
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reflect the influence participants had on the group
-support logic
Having come up with a way of developing the existing evidence
framework the semi-structured interviews transcripts were analysed by breaking down
the central decision, representing
queries (Figure 30, 31 & 32).The author then carried out a follow
each expert. During these interviews experts were asked to validate (and where
necessary elaborate) on the logic of each
to allocate a weight (between 0 & 1) to reflect how sufficient and necessary each child
query was for answering its corresponding parent
state what proportion of evidence t
bottom level child query.
Figure 29: Logic behind incorporating power structure
within the research framework.
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each case study, into a number of parent and child
-up interview with
of these schematics. Experts were also asked
query. Finally, experts were asked to
hey expected to be available for answering each
and personality influences
-support logic
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The FSA Board agree that action should be taken
o Public consultation:
 Does anyone have evidence to oppose the board’s action
o SACN (Salt Team):
 Cost Benefit Analysis:
 Is it appropriate if it is going to drive a whole sector of the food industry
 Is it appropriate if it is only going to save one life
 Is it achievable
 What is the most appropriate mechanism for achieving a reduction in salt intake
 The most appropriate mechanism is through working together with food manufactures to reformulate their food
o SACN (Salt Team):
 Impact assessment (Better Regulation Team)
 Should the food industry reduce the level of salt in their food products
o What would be the cost of trying to achieve 6 grams per day
 The food industry will not transfer the cost of regulation over to the customer
 The food industry could sustainably bear the cost of the required action
o Could the food industry actually achieve target levels
o What impact are industries own attempt to address the issue
 Is the food industry willing to change their behaviour
 Do they see the writing on the wall
 The most appropriate mechanism is through an educational campaign
o SACN (Salt Team)
 Impact assessment (Better Regulation Team)
 Should the general public reduce salt levels used in their eating habits
o Can people actually achieve 6 grams per day
 What is the best way of influencing the food industry to reformulate
- Leaflets are an effective means of communicating with the public
- Food labels are an effective means of communicating with the public
- League tables are an effective means of communicating with the public
 Are they the cause of exposure
 Are individuals willing to change their behaviour
 Is 6 grams per day an appropriate level?
 There is reason to believe salt intake poses a risk (SACN)
 What research is out there (Policy team – horizon scanning)
o Salt is an issue and it needs to be considered
 COMA recommend that average salt intake should be reduced to 6 grams per day
 Others endorse the claim that salt intake should be reduced to 6 grams per day
 Chief Medical Officer for England
 Health Department in Wale
 Dietary action for Scotland and Northern Ireland
 Food industry
Figure 30: illustrating the logic of Case Study 1 mapped out within TESLA™
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Conditions and limitations for reauthorisation are reasonable and the SoS’s do not require a full public enquiry to be carried out
o The operator can ensure sufficient public and environmental protection to justify reauthorisation (Decision Document)
 Public consultation suggests that the conditions and limitations for reauthorisation, set out in the explanatory document.
 The operator can ensure sufficient public and environmental protection to justify reauthorisation
 Sufficient conditions and/or limitations exist to justify reauthorisation (Overview Report)
o The formally submitted PCSC sufficiently addresses all relevant review criteria
 All guidance issues have been resolved during the management type meeting
 All issues are addressed as being satisfactory at the scientific meetings
 Operator has sufficiently addressed risks associated with gas
 Operator has sufficiently addressed risks associated with disruptive events
 Operator has sufficiently addressed risks associated with parameters
 Operator has sufficiently addressed risks associated with cap
 Operator has sufficiently addressed risks associated with assessment
 Operator has sufficiently addressed risks associated with regulatory action
 Operator has sufficiently addressed risks associated with assessment criteria
 Operator has sufficiently addressed risks associated with OES
 Operator has sufficiently addressed risks associated with engineering
 Operator has sufficiently addressed risks associated with near field
 Operator has sufficiently addressed risks associated with geosphere
 Operator has sufficiently addressed risks associated with biosphere
 Operator has understood and addressed all the relevant criteria set out in the GRA
 All guidance issues have been resolved during the management type meeting
 All issues are resolved at the scientific meeting
 Operator has resolved all issues associated with gas.
 Operator has resolved all issues associated with disruptive events
 Operator has resolved all issues associated with parameters
 Operator has resolved all issues associated with cap
 Operator has resolved all issues associated with assessment
 Operator has resolved all issues associated with regulatory action
 Operator has resolved all issues associated with assessment criteria
 Operator has resolved all issues associated with OESC
 Operator has resolved all issues associated with engineering
 Operator has resolved all issues associated with near field
 Operator has resolved all issues associated with geosphere
 Operator has resolved all issues associated with biosphere
Figure 31: illustrating the logic of Case Study 3 mapped out within TESLA™
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The outbreak of Avian Influenza will not pose harm to the environment, human health or animal health
o Evidence/analysis/inspection suggests there is not any cause for concern
 The clean-up and removal will not pose harm to the environment human health and animal health
 The veterinary manifestations of the particular outbreak will not pose harm to the environment, human health and animal health
 The animal carcasses are being disposed of according to plan – they are not stacking up posing harm to the environment, human health and animal health
 The dead animal carcasses are not stacking up
 The disposal of animal carcasses is going according to plan
o The personal protective equipment is efficient and effective
o Regulation suggests there is not any cause for concern
o Premises of facility are still considered suitable after a specific protocol has been drawn up
o Management of the facility is not posing a problem
o No issues are raised by the trade association
o Waste management is being carried out proficiently and according to plan
 Animal carcasses are being transported to the facility
 Dead animal carcasses are assigned to a disposal facility
 Animal carcasses are being transported safely, with leak proof vehicles ADR trained drivers according to transport logistics, without harm to the environment,
human health and animal health
 The disposal of animal carcasses within the selected facility will not pose harm to the environment, human health and animal health
 The facility, suggested by Animal Health, should be used for the disposal of infected animal carcasses
 The facility is considered to be safe and there are no outstanding issues that suggest the facility
 The facility does not pose a bio security risk
o The Health Protection Agency are content that the facility will not pose a bio-security risk
o The Environment Agency are content that the facility will not pose security risk
o Animal Health are content that the facility will not an animal health risk
 Divisional Veterinary Manager agrees to put in place a team to manage, oversee and supervise the disposal
 The operator is content to have the business and are willing to sign a contract
 The facility closest in proximity and/or capacity to the IP of the infected premises is selected
o A number of suitable facilities are selected from the green list
 The facility does not pose an unreasonable risk to public health – there not
 A number of suitable facilities are selected from the green list
o The facility does not pose an unreasonable risk to public health – there not.
 According to the Environment Agency’s regulatory interests.
- The disposal facility is not being sued
- There has not been a breakdown
 According to the Environment Agency science base.
o A PPC permitted category 1 & 2 ABP approved facility is available
 Facility meet with the annual bio security requirements set out
o Most appropriate disposal option is selected
 Disposal hierarchy gives Animal Health and Policy contentment
o Outbreak confirmed and animals need to be culled
Figure 32: illustrating the logic of Case Study 2 mapped out within TESLA™
6.4. Chapter summary and conclusions
This chapter has discussed the potential of deriving a weight to reflect power and
personality within the developed research framework. G
those provided by TESLA™ (e.g. Figure 33), may allow the
their decision-making that could benefit from further attention in order to reduce
decision uncertainty and therefore, enable the relative influence that power structure and
personality has on the resolution of uncertainty.
Figure 33: Ratio plot illustrating the difference when recipient’s receptivity is
accounted for (a) and when it is not accounted for (b).
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raphical outputs, similar to
end user to analyse areas of
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This could enable the relative influence that power structure and personality has on the
resolution of uncertainty.
The next chapter will describe the development of two-agent simulation model that can
generates a measure of receptivity and confidence in the sufficiency of submitted
evidence.
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Chapter 7
MODEL DEVELOPMENT
7.1. Chapter structure
This chapter sets out how the author has incorporated findings identified in Chapter 2, 4
& 6 within an agent-based simulation model. It addresses the third research objective
by investigating the possibility of developing an agent-based simulation model for
representing interacting decision makers. It is explained how dialogue between agents
can influence confidence building and value judgements regarding the sufficiency of
submitted evidence.
Previous chapters of this thesis provide the foundation on which the following agent-
based model has been developed. Unstructured interviews (in Chapter 4) were carried
out with five regulators from the Environment Agency. These interviews described
what influences the brokering process had, especially regarding participant’s receptivity
to scientific evidence presented.
Findings of the unstructured interviews confirmed that the brokering process consisted
of a series of interactions between recipients and providers of evidence; for example,
between a regulator and a leader, a consultant or an operator. These interviews informed
the development of the agent-based model by providing an understanding of the
nuances that characterise the dynamic nature of this brokering process. These interviews
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also explained that people (agents) involved in the brokering process must pass through
a receiving, processing and passing-on stage. A recipient who received information,
dependent on his/her role, would place a value on it regarding its sufficiency before
turning to pass it on to the next person in the brokering process.
The receiving stage consisted of the regulator asking, what information is available?
The answer to this question depended on the context of the decision, their desire to
know more and their position of authority. For example, how political the case was and
how many people got involved. The regulator’s access to internal and external networks
(both formal and informal) determined the number of lines of evidence they were
presented with. Moreover, if the regulator had sufficient legitimate power they had the
discretion to investigate for more.
The processing stage consisted of the regulator processing the information he/she
received. The regulator had to make value judgements regarding how credible or
reliable they believed the submitted evidence to be. The regulator’s perception of
credibility regarding the operator and the scientific evidence influenced this. The
outcome of judgements made regarding the sufficiency of the submitted evidence
determined the belief regulators would attach to evidence before passing it on.
The passing-on stage was dependent on whether the regulator had the power to pass on
the findings from the preceding stages. This depended on how contentious the decision
outcome was and how trusted they were to make the right decision by those they were
passing it on to. It was explained that this could result in the belief (with the supporting
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evidence) being bounced back to the regulator, causing them to revisit the processing
stage (and possibly the receiving stage) to reassess the sufficiency of the submitted
evidence and possibly their belief. Experts explaining this process, stated that
individuals play various roles in the brokering of evidence, similar to the work
described by OXERA (2000).
Three case studies were selected to represent the different conditions in which scientific
evidences was brokered in risk-based regulation. A review of available regulatory
frameworks characterising decisions being made in risk-based regulation was carried
out. Three decisions that represented a broad range of conditions in which evidence was
brokered in risk-based regulation were selected. The three case studies selected were:
 The proposed reduction of dietary salt intake;
 The disposal of avian influenza-infected animal carcases; and
 The development of a post-closure safety case for nuclear waste disposal.
The directional flow of evidence and the roles individuals played in the brokering of
evidence, in each case study, was pooled together and mapped out using a methodology
described by OXERA (2000).
Semi-structured interviews were carried out with one expert from each case study. An
interview schedule was designed based on the findings of the unstructured interviews
and the review of available regulatory frameworks. Experts were asked to refer to the
brokering process as three distinct stages, described in Figures 22, 23 & 24. Decisions
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that had to be made in each stage were identified from narratives in the interview. These
decisions were structured according to the framework set out by evidence-support logic.
Mapping out the brokering process consisted of mapping out the logical sequence of
“child” and “parent” queries that supported the central query characterising each case
study. Chapter 6 also explains how a follow-up interview was carried out with each
expert interviewed in each case study. During these follow-up interviews experts
validated the logical sequence of queries and attributed weights (between 0 and 1) to
reflect how sufficient each “child” query was for answering its corresponding “parent”
query. Experts also gave a proportional value that reflected the amount of belief that
they would normally expect to be available for answering each bottom-level query
(otherwise referred to as a “leaf” hypothesis). All this was mapped out within the
research framework and it was explained how weights could be attributed reflecting the
influence that power and personality might have on recipient’s receptivity, by taking
account of known power and personality influences.
The remainder of this chapter describes how a deterministic two-agent model has been
developed, and how this has been further developed into a dynamic two-agent model of
receptivity that accounts for the confidence recipients will have in the sufficiency of
submitted evidence. It is also suggested how this might be further developed into a
multi-agent system and used to map out the brokering of evidence in risk-based
regulation.
7.2. Presentation of the deterministic model
The previous chapter explains how a research framework was developed. Figure 3
illustrates the main components of the initial agent
model constructed within Microsoft Excel. It consisted of spreadsheet that contained a
user interface. Sixteen spreadsheets drew upon values set within the user interface to
calculate 10,000 runs of recipients’ receptivity for 16 different scenarios. The mean
value (with error bars representing standard deviation) representing recipients’
receptivity calculated, for each scenario, was presented in a final spreadsheet.
Figure 34: Connected account of the logic initial model
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The user interface was intended to act as a means of “playing tunes” on the model, to
allow the user to explore what range of conditions, affecting recipient’s receptivity
within the three case studies, the model was able to represent. The logic used to
calculate recipient’s receptivity is the same as that described in the review of known
power and personality influences (set out in Chapter 2 and recently published in Davies
et al., 2010). The method used to calculate receptivity was the same as that described
within the development of the research framework (see Chapter 4), and as such it used
the same parameters, illustrated here in Table 4.
Code Description of the scenario
R.PPK Recipient’s positive prior knowledge
R.NNPK Recipient’s negative prior knowledge
R.W Recipient’s willingness
R.A Recipient’s agreeableness
R.ES Recipient’s emotional stability
R.E Recipient’s extroversion
R.PT Recipient’s propensity to trust
R.R Recipient’s receptivity
U Uncertainty
R.O Recipient’s openness to experience
R.MtP Recipient’s motivation to process evidence
R.L Recipient’s legitimate power
R.P Receptivity in the processing stage
R.Cs Recipient’s conscientiousness
R.A Recipient’s agreeableness
R.Tw Recipient’s trustworthiness
P.A Provider’s agreeableness
P.ES Provider’s emotional stability
P.E Provider’s extroversion
P.PT Provider’s propensity to trust
P.C Provider’s conscientiousness
P.A Provider’s agreeableness
P.Tw Provider’s trustworthiness
P.O Provider’s openness
A.MtS Agent’s motivation to share
R.C Recipient’s conscientiousness
Overall Overall receptivity
Table 4: List of parameters used to calculate recipient’s receptivity within each
scenario
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Recipient’s receptivity was a product of taking the average influence of subordinate
factors and propagating them up to form an overall receptivity value. This reflected
recipient’s receptivity across all three stages (i.e. the receiving, processing and passing-
on stages).
Figure 35 is a screenshot of the user interface. Each scenario was given a code referring
to the level of intensity that the scenario would reflect. Levels of intensity were
presented as options within dropdown menus within each cell reflecting the relative
intensity of a factor. For example, “H”, “M” and “L” reflected a “high”, “medium” and
“low” intensity for that factor (e.g. representing the level of intensity of a personality
trait, level of uncertainty or level of positive or negative prior knowledge). This was
linked to the pertinent parameter values (using the “IF…THEN…” and
“RANDBETWEEN” function in Excel), set out in the spreadsheet calculating
recipient’s receptivity for that particular scenario.
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Dropdown menus within the user interface took their respective intervals of intensity
from descriptive tables contained within the same spreadsheet. These tables contained
variable levels of intensity to characterise the influence of uncertainty (Figure 36),
positive and prior knowledge (Figure 37) and personality (Figure 39). As an extra
option, at the bottom of each dropdown menu there was the option to choose
“Random”. Selecting this option meant that random values (between 0 and 1) were
assign to the factor being investigated. Options above the “Random” option reflected
increasing level of intensity.
Figure 35: Screenshot of the user interface, illustrating how dropdown menus of
permitted different levels of intensity to characterise each scenario.
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Six levels of intensity were used to characterise the influence of uncertainty. These
permitted the user to constrain the parameters of the model to better represent the three
case studies (salt intake, avian influenza and nuclear waste) that were characterised by a
relatively low, medium and high level of decision uncertainty.
Levels of intensity reflecting the presence of positive and negative prior knowledge
were intended to reflect the context of the brokering process in real-world risk-based
regulation. Specifically, in the unstructured interviews a common theme that was
referred to was the presence of good, bad and ugly operators. The good referred to those
that knew what evidence the regulator wanted, had the resources to provide it and were
willing to do so. The bad operators were referred to as those that were willing to provide
the required evidence but failed to do so for reasons that related to the limited resources
or understanding of what to was required. The ugly operators, on the other hand, were
described as those that knew what to provide, had the resources and understanding but
were unwilling to do so. Experts within the unstructured interviews explained that the
result was the effect this had on their perception of the provider and their willingness to
Figure 36: Levels of intensity available for characterising uncertainty
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engage in a trusting relationship with them affecting their perception of how sufficient
they believed the submission of evidence to be. To capture this, Figure 37 illustrates the
levels of intensity that could be assigned within the user interface. These reflected the
likelihood that positive and negative prior knowledge would be attached to the
submitted evidence, influencing recipient’s receptivity toward the provider.
Psychologists that score personality generally agree that individuals that score 55 or
higher are considered to have a strong dimension in the given factor. Conversely, those
that score 45 or below are considered to have the opposite effect for the same factor.
People that score between 45 and 55, on the other hand, fall within the standard
deviation of the big five personality test. Accordingly, the most defensible option was to
permit the model to generate a random number to reflect whether each personality trait
would have a low (0 to 45), medium (45 to 55) or high (55 to 100) affect (Figure 38).
This was coded as an option within the user interface. However, the option of selecting
more refined levels of influence was also desirable to allow the influence specific values
of personality were having on recipient’s receptivity to be explored in greater detail. To
Figure 37: Levels of intensity available for characterising recipient's positive and
negative prior knowledge.
achieve this, the levels reflecting the intensity that personality traits might have was
further refined into eight levels of intensity (Figure
the three levels of intensity but was considered to b
results to be explored in greater detail.
Aforementioned, each level of intensity reflected within the user interface was linked to
a separate spreadsheet (as illustrated in Figure 34
spreadsheets represented a parameter of the hierarchical model of recipient’s receptivity
Figure 38: Values effect, by generating a random number between 0 and 0.45, 0.45 and
0.55, and 0.55 and 1
Figure 39: Levels of intensity available for characterising each personality trait
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39). This was not as defensible as
e justified to permit the sensitivity of
). Each column within these
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(Figure 40). These are the same parameters presented in the development of the research
framework (Chapter 4). Moving from the left to right in Figure 40, values reflecting
levels of intensity were propagated across to form an average recipient’s receptivity for
the receiving, processing and passing-on stage, and the average receptivity of these
formed the overall recipient’s receptivity ( in the column to the far right of Figure 40).
In total, each spreadsheet contained 10,000 rows. The mean recipient's receptivity of
these 10,000 calculations (and the standard deviation) was then plotted on a graph
illustrated in Figure 41.
Figure 40: Example spreadsheet used within the initial model to characterise the nuclear waste disposal case study. Illustrating how e
column represented a parameter used to calculate recipient’s r
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eceptivity (contained in the last column on the right).
ach
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Figure 41 illustrates an output after running the model under situations that were
structured toward the recipient and the provider either having a positive or negative
impact on recipient’s receptivity. Each bar in Figure 41 represents the mean of 10,000
recipient’s receptivity values, calculated under the different scenarios. These scenarios
were intended to represent the relative influence that the recipient’s and provider’s agent
had on recipient’s receptivity within the three case studies. Moving from the left to the
right, the first bar represents a situation where intensity levels have been randomly set
(between 0 and 1) each time receptivity was calculated. Each cluster (consisting of four
bars) represents low, medium and high levels of uncertainty, reflecting the salt intake,
avian influenza and nuclear waste case study, respectively. Then each bar, within each
cluster, moving from the left to the right, represents recipient’s receptivity being
calculated under the following conditions:
 Both the recipient’s and provider’s agents are set to have a negative impact on
recipient’s receptivity;
 Both the recipient’s and provider’s agents are set to have a positive impact on
recipient’s receptivity;
 Recipient’s and provider’s agent is set to have a negative and positive impact on
recipient’s receptivity, respectively;
 Recipient’s and provider’s agent is set to have a positive and negative impact,
respectively.
It can be seen from Figure 41 that there was a significant difference between the mean
receptivity calculated within each parameter selected randomly between 0 and 1 and the
mean receptivity in the first and second bar of the first and last cluster (representing the
best and worst case for the salt intake and nuclear waste case study, respectively). This
relationship is not seen in the avian influenza case study, in the middle cluster,
of the medium level of uncertainty characterising the avian influenza case study. Hence,
under conditions of high and low uncertainty recipient’s orientation toward being
Figure 41: Mean recipient’s receptivity after being calculated 10,000 times
scenarios, with error bars representing standard deviation.
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receptive was greatest. Beyond this, the difference between the third and fourth bar, in
the middle cluster, illustrate that the provider has a greater potential of impacting
recipient’s receptivity. This is because a provider that is positively positioned to imbue
a recipient with receptivity is also going to be more likely to add toward the recipient’s
positive prior knowledge. Hence, the greater level of recipient’s receptivity can
therefore be explained by the recipient being more willing to engage in dialogue
because they only have positive information about the provider.
This section described how the initial two-agent model was able to model the way
experts described recipient’s receptivity within the unstructured and semi-structured
interviews. It uses known influences of power and personality (described in detail in
Davies et al., 2010) and values reflecting extremes of personality and prior knowledge
influences within the three case studies. The major drawback of this initial model,
however, was its deterministic nature; it did not account for the dynamics of the
brokering process. The following sections explain how this logic has been expanded to
develop a dynamic model of recipient's receptivity and how this has been used to
account for the influence those weights of evidence account, in combination with
recipient's receptivity, for confidence building in risk-based regulation.
7.3. Presentation of the dynamic model of recipient’s receptivity
The previous section explains how a deterministic two-agent model was developed to
account for recipient’s receptivity. This section explains how this was developed into a
dynamic model. The dynamic model uses the same parameters to calculate recipient’s
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receptivity used within the deterministic model (Table 4). However, the dynamic model
improves on the deterministic model by describing the two-way interaction (dialogue)
that exists between the provider and the recipient. Experts in the unstructured and semi-
structured interviews explained how recipients and providers come together to
“negotiate” over the sufficiency of submitted evidence. Therefore, it was important that
the agent-based model went beyond providing a “snap-shot” in time of average
recipient’s receptivity. It needed to account for not only the influence of recipient’s
receptivity, but also the influence of provider’s receptivity.
Figure 42 illustrates the main components of this dynamic two-agent model. This is
constructed within Microsoft Excel’s Visual Basic Editor (see appendix). VBA code
was used to update an “Agent environment” spreadsheet according to changes in agent’s
personal information and contextual issues derived from the “Scenario” spreadsheet
before receptivity was calculated, stored in the “Data log” spreadsheet and used to
generate graphs that illustrated recipient’s receptivity over time.
The obvious difference between the dynamic model of receptivity and the deterministic
model is the account for the interaction between agents. Figure 4
main simulation routine written in VBA. The simulation is initiated by calling the
“initialize_ model” subroutine. This is the point at which the recipient and provider
agent are given values that are used to calculate receptivity. These parameters are the
same as those used to calculate recipient’s receptivity in the deterministic model. The
exception being the addition of referent power.
Figure 42: Connected account of the logical way the dynamic model of recipient’s
receptivity was modelled within Microsoft Excel using VBA code.
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3 is a screenshot of the
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As explained in Chapter 3 referent power takes time to establish and refers to the holder
of referent power being perceived as worthy of respect, admiration, affection causing
other to want to gain their approval. Those it is imposed upon, therefore attribute
referent power. To account for this, the model assumed that agents that have a high
potential to obtain referent power do so at a rate that is quicker than those that have a
low potential.
Figure 43: Main simulation run setting out the logic of the dynamic model of recipient’s
receptivity
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Scholars explain that referent power is positively associated with emotional stability and
agreeableness (e.g. Karkoulian et al., 2009). As such, the model assumed that the
average weight assigned to an agents emotional stability and agreeableness reflected
their full potential of establishing referent power. If this average value was low, medium
or high then the agent was considered to have a low, medium and high potential of
gaining referent power. Because referent power is dependent on others recognition, an
agent’s potential of gaining it in the model was reflected as a short, medium and long
period in which it would take the agents with variable potential to establish their full
potential. This was accounted for by dividing the number of runs that the simulation had
passed through by the short, medium or long period of time that it would take the agent
to reach their full potential. Hence, reflecting that agents with a high potential will
obtain a greater level of referent power in a quicker time compared to agents with a
lower potential to establish referent power who will reach a relatively lower level and
will take longer to obtain it. This was considered to be a reasonable assumption to make
because referent power is dependent on the perceptions of others. Also, in the developed
model this contributes toward receptivity. Therefore, an agent with a lower potential to
establish referent power was less likely to have the attention of significant others,
resulting in a lesser chance that their emotional stability and agreeableness would be
recognised and attributed toward the agent as referent power.
Another addition to the dynamic model was the information contained within dropdown
menus in the “Agent environment” spreadsheet that determined characteristics of the
agent to be set. For example, this included permitting the selection of:
 Agent personality type;
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 Type of operator;
 Regime; and
 Case study.
Agents could be assigned one of four personality types (negotiator, aggressor,
submissive and avoider – following others that also used personality-based agents e.g.
Nassiri-Mofakham et al., 2008/9; Santos et al., 2010). The big five personality traits
(openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness and neuroticism), referred to
earlier in Chapter 3, were used in the model. The trait “emotional stability”, referred to
by scholars as the reverse of “neuroticism” (e.g. Costa and McCrae, 1991; Hills and
Argyle, 2001), was used in the model for ease of modelling. This meant that values
ranging from 0 to 1, assigned to any of the five personality traits would reflect low to
high intensity, respectively. Then building on the existing knowledge of the four
different personality types, each agent was assigned a low, medium or high value (0 –
0.45, 0.45 – 0.55 and 0.55 – 1 respectively). If the intensity of a trait relating to a
personality type was not known then a level of intensity was selected from a uniform
distribution and maintained within this band region for subsequent runs of the
simulation. Table 5 illustrates the relative intensity levels that were assigned to each
trait according to the personality type selected from the dropdown menu in the “Agent
environment” spreadsheet.
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Personality type
Big five personality traits
O C E A N
Negotiator Random Medium High Medium Medium
Aggressor Random High High Medium Medium
Submissive Random Low Low Medium Medium
Avoider Random Low Low Random Low
The option to choose a specific type of operator was also made available in the “Agent
environment”. The type of operator related to the likelihood that submissions of
evidence would come with connotations of positive and/or negative prior knowledge.
The categories that were used to reflect this in the dropdown menu was referred to as a
“good”, “bad” and “ugly” type of operator. These reflected three levels of intensity
(low, medium and high). The three types of operator were those that have been
described in the description of the deterministic model. The “good” reflected a greater
likelihood that submissions of evidence would come with connotation of negative prior
knowledge and a lesser likelihood that submissions would come with negative prior
knowledge. The “bad” reflected an equal chance of the evidence having connotations of
negative and positive prior knowledge. The “ugly”, on the hand, was in contradiction to
the “good” type of operator (Table 6).
Table 5: Relative levels of intensity (low, medium and high) assigned to each
personality type, where “Random” refers to when the level of intensity were selected at
random.
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Type of provider
Recipient’s prior knowledge
Positive Negative
Good High Low
Bad Medium Medium
Ugly Low High
Regime was included to reflect the recipient’s discretion to choose between a number of
lines of evidence. In total, eight regimes were made available to the recipient’s agent.
These included the option to always choose the evidence that was known to be
characterised by high or low uncertainty or positive and negative prior knowledge.
Beyond this, the model gave the option to choose evidence randomly or
deterministically. The latter option permitted the model to explore how different types
of recipients and providers would come to different conclusions regarding the
confidence that they have in the same evidence being submitted in a predetermined
order. This gave the model an extra dimension and the ability to explore the influence a
greater number of scenarios that are known to characterise the brokering process.
The dropdown menu in the “Agent spreadsheet” relating to the column titled Case
Study was equal to that of choosing intensity levels in the deterministic model. The only
difference was the dynamic model incorporated three levels rather than six. Relating
Table 6: Levels of intensity reflecting likelihood that submissions of evidence will imbue
the recipient with positive or negative prior knowledge, based on the type of provider
submitting the evidence.
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these to the case studies being investigated, these were referred to as “SI” (salt intake),
“AI” (avian influenza), “NW” (nuclear waste) and “Random”.
After “initializing” the model, the directional flow of evidence, characterising the
brokering process, was captured in a number of subroutines (Figure 43). These were
called upon in a logical order to mimic the sequence of events that experts described as
characterising the brokering of evidence. This bouncing back and forth of evidence
between the recipient and provider was permitted to continue until the “Do While /
Loop” function in VBA determined that the number of permitted simulation runs had
been carried out. Hence, the model assumed that one submission of evidence is made
per day. The number of days of consultation is set by the value of the recipient’s
legitimate power, which decreases, by a value of one with each run. Each simulation run
represents one day of consultation.
The logic characterising the sequence in which subroutines were called upon (Figure
43) during the consultation period is illustrated in Figure 44. The model dictated that the
brokering process started with the provider making a claim that they have complete
confidence in the sufficiency of the evidence they are submitting (i.e. represented as a
value of one).
After receiving the evidence the agent-based model;
 updated the agent’s personal information;
 populated the story boards with scenarios;
 selected a scenario, abstracted information characterising the new belief and
positive and negative
 logged data relating to each of the values
and the calculated measure of receptivity in the “Data log” spreadsheet.
After the evidence was received, the first task was to update the recipient’s personal
information (Figure 45). This was done to reflect the fact that personality is not a
Figure 44: Process describing the logic supporting the process by which the recipient
and provider engaged in dialog
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prior knowledge, and recalculated agent’s receptivity;
calculated for each of the parameters
ue over the sufficiency of submitted evidence.
constant measure over time, nor w
different decision context (e.g. Costa and Mcrae, 1991).
Updating personal information consisted of generating a new random weight to reflect
the low, medium or high intensity level assigned to each of the agent’s personality trait
in the “initialize_ model” subroutine. Propensity to trust, trustworthiness, motivation to
process evidence, and willingness, were all calculated as they were in the deterministic
model, and the referent power was calculated as it was explained earlier in this section
where it is described how the model was “initialized”. Then to reflect the fact that
agents were now engaged in dialogue, their motivation to share knowledge was also
calculated.
Figure 45: Logic sequence of events explaining how the agent’s personal information
was updated.
170
ill it equally influence human behaviour across
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Motivation to share knowledge is explained as a measure determined by whether agents
are equally motivated to process the evidence (e.g. Whittom and Roy, 2009). Chapter 3
explains how motivation to process information is a function of the agent’s openness to
experience and the level of uncertainty characterising the submission of evidence (e.g.
Hodson and Sorrentino, 1999). High or low values of both result in a high motivation to
process the evidence systematically and carefully. Sorrentino et al. (2003) explained
that those that are uncertainty orientated are fuelled by pride and ambition compelled to
process uncertainty at any cost. Conversely, those that are certainty orientated are said
to have a fear of failure, avoiding uncertainty at all costs. This difference in motivation
toward processing information has been noted elsewhere and demonstrated that
complementary measures of openness are most conducive to knowledge sharing,
suggesting that underconditions of high or low uncertainty, dyads that are both
uncertainty orientated or certainty orientated, respectively, will be more interested in
pursuing their own agenda than sharing knowledge. Hence, agents that both have a high
or low motivation to process evidence are said to be unmotivated to share knowledge.
To reflect this, the model assigns a high value between 0.5 and 1 to agents that are
motivated to share knowledge and a low value between 0 and 0.5 to those that were
unmotivated to share knowledge.
After updating the agent’s personal information, the next logical step in the simulation
was to populate the agent’s storyboard. Each agent had two types of storyboard. One
existed to permit the model to generate the result of 10 lines of evidence for each
submission. Each of these submissions had a random value between 0 and 1
172
representing belief for and against and weights reflecting connotations of positive and
negative prior knowledge, attached to the evidence (Figure 46). The level of the latter
was set by the type of provider for the recipient, or the type of coercion or reward power
the recipient chose to exercise, for the provider. The other storyboard existed to let the
agent address a series of submissions in a predetermined order.
After populating the agent’s storyboard (Figure 46), one source of evidence was
selected (according to the agent’s preset regime, explained earlier in this section). Then
using “Offsets” in VBA the information relating to beliefs (for, against and
uncommitted) and connotations of positive and negative prior knowledge were
Figure 46: Screenshot of an agent’s storyboard, in which values representing belief for,
against and uncommitted and levels of positive and negative knowledge were randomly
generated for ten lines of evidence.
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abstracted and aggregated with the agent’s pre-existing information contained in the
“Agent environment” spreadsheet. This was carried out by using the concept of
dependency (explained in the development of the research framework in Chapter 4).
This was necessary to account for the insight captured in the interviews that explained
that new evidence is rarely 100% new. Also, connotations of positive and negative
knowledge attached to it are rarely told just once to the recipient during the brokering of
evidence.
This permitted the model to ensure that the agent acted in a rational manner (as an
intelligent customer, so to speak), with the capacity to realise when they were being told
something they already knew and therefore avoided double counting the old evidence.
The last thing for the recipient’s agent to do was to calculate how receptive they were
given their updated personal information and their knowledge of the measure of
decision uncertainty and positive and negative knowledge characterising the submission
of evidence.
In the deterministic model (and the development of the research framework set out in
Chapter 4), overall receptivity was calculated by taking the average values of supporting
factors within each stage. The same logic was applied to the dynamic model of
receptivity.
Once recipient’s receptivity was calculated, agent’s updated information contained
within the “Agent environment” spreadsheet was stored in the “Data log” spreadsheet,
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before the evidence was bounced back to the provider with the updated measures of
belief and any connotations of positive or negative knowledge attached to it, reflecting a
recipient’s ability and decision to enforce reward or coercive power. Then the process
explained above for the recipient (regarding the process followed to update personal
information, populating the pertinent storyboard, updating the agent with the details
relating to the appropriate scenario and logging of data) is the same process that the
provider follows to determine their receptivity.
The dynamic model of receptivity was considered successful in the sense that it
modelled how the recipient’s and provider’s receptivity might change over the period of
engaging in dialogue, based on the interplay of known power and personality
influences. However, it was limited in its ability to account for the provider’s ability to
have any sustained influence on the recipient accepting that the evidence being
submitted was actually sufficient for answering their query. To address this, the logic
set out in the dynamic model of recipient’s receptivity was built upon to develop a
dynamic model of confidence building. How this was developed has been explained in
the following section.
7.4. Presentation of the dynamic model of confidence building
Building on the logic set out in the dynamic model of receptivity, this section explains
how measures of confidence were incorporated. Experts in the unstructured and semi-
structured interviews explained that the brokering of evidence was characterised by
providers trying to convince recipients that their submissions of evidence were
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sufficient for answering their query. However, this was not reflected in the dynamic
model of receptivity. The dynamic model of receptivity captured the interactive nature
of the brokering process, characterised by providers making multiple submissions.
However, as it stood, it failed to show how the provider could make any sustained
progress toward imbuing the recipients with a lasting measure of confidence. This
section explains how the confidence building process has been modelled into the
dynamic model of receptivity.
Figure 47 illustrates the logic characterising the processes of confidence building in
risk-based regulation. This is founded on insights provided by experts in the
unstructured and semi-structured interviews. Assuming that the brokering process is
initiated by the provider making a submission of evidence, recipients assessed the
evidence and asked whether it imbued them with confidence. If it did, this measure of
confidence was recorded and accounted for in the recipient’s measure of receptivity
toward the provider. Assuming that the recipient had the legitimate power and the desire
to engage in dialogue, they bounced the evidence back to the provider with their
measure of confidence attached to it.
To account for the two-agent model the reci
and 1) and assigned these to each type of evidence being brokered
“initilize_model” sub routine. Figure 48 presents the six types of evidence that were
used to weight each submission of eviden
used in the semi-structured interviews.
Figure 47: Logic that describes the confidence building exercise. The
asked sequentially in a clockwise order, starting with the provider.
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pient generated random weight
. This occurred in the
ce. These were the same six types of evidence
agent’s questions
s (between 0
At this point, the provider checked to see how transparent the recipient was regarding
the type of evidence they wanted to receive. The recipient’s receptivity was used as
measure of how transparent the recipient was regarding what type evidence they
wanted. This value was then multiplied against the provider’s receptivity. The
provider’s receptivity gave an indication of the likelihood that the provider would grasp
what the recipient was asking them to submit. The resulting value fell between a
maximum and minimum value
minimum value was used as a scale on which to determine the likelihood that recipients
would know what type of evidence the recipient wanted to receive.
A provider with a low, medium or high cha
was reflected by generating a random number for each type of evidence (between 0 &
0.99, 0 & 0.59 and 0 & 0.29 respectively). This constellation of weights was submitted
Figure 48: Method used to calculate the relative weight that the recipient assigned to
each type of evidence being brokered.
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. The number range that fell between this maximum and
nce of knowing what the recipient wanted
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to the recipient with the evidence. Then the recipient, assessing how well the submitted
evidenced addressed their concerns (the type of evidence they were looking for),
multiplied these randomly generated numbers against the weight that they had assigned
to the same type of evidence.
Figure 49 illustrates the table used with the “Agent environment” spreadsheet to
calculate recipient’s confidence. The column to the far left represent a number of lines
of evidence presented to the recipient. To the right of this column are six columns
representing each of the types of evidence used to characterise each line of evidence.
These are the same as those used in the semi-structured interviews and described in
Chapter 6. The last three columns, moving left to right, represent the “original total”,
the “current total” and “current confidence”. At the bottom of the table there is the sum
of the “original overall total”, “current overall total” and the “overall confidence”.
Figure 49: Table used in the “Agent environment” spreadsheet to calculate recipient’s
receptivity.
179
The weights submitted by the provider (relating to each type of evidence) were
multiplied against the weight that the recipient had assigned to that type of evidence for
that particular line of evidence. If the provider generated a value of “0” to any of the
types of evidence then multiplying this against the recipient’s weight resulted in a value
of “0”. Hence, the provider was considered to have fully addressed that particular type
of evidence giving the recipient complete confidence in the sufficiency of that type of
evidence being submitted. Then the total of the recipient’s weights across one line of
evidence was recalculated and referred to as the “current total” in Figure 49. This was
divided by the “original total” and the product was subtracted from the value of one to
reflect how confident the recipients were regarding the sufficiency of the submitted
evidence. Confidence grew as the different types of evidence were addressed, until a
value of 0 was all that was remaining next to each type of evidence. This was the case
because any value greater than “0” being subtracted from the value of “1” results in a
value less than “1” reflecting less than 100% confidence in the sufficiency of the
submitted evidence.
Then to reflect how confidence might build over a period of time this same logic was
applied to the total measure of weights being addressed at the bottom of the table
illustrated in Figure 49. If the provider was not able to generate a value of “0” next to
each type of evidence, through the course of the simulation, this was taken to mean that
the provider was unable to address all of the recipient’s concerns, restricting the
recipient from gaining full confidence in the sufficiency of the submitted evidence.
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7.5. Chapter summary and conclusions
This chapter has outlined the development of a two-agent model for risk-based
regulation. This model encompasses all the factors and element that have been sustained
through the research. It has evolved from being a deterministic model to a dynamic
model of receptivity that can account for an agent’s confidence in the sufficiency of
submitted evidence.
The objective of developing the two-agent model was to compare the influence
participants have on the brokering of evidence in risk-based regulation. Comparing the
impact different entities have on a common phenomenon requires measuring their
influence on a common scale. Experts in the unstructured and semi-structured
interviews each explained that the brokering process consisted of recipients and
providers of evidence that must pass through a receiving, processing and passing-on
stage. Comparing the influence participants have on this process, the two-agent model
incorporated influences of personality and power to form a measure of confidence and
receptivity.
The model assumed that agent receptivity is a function of an agent’s propensity to trust,
trustworthiness, willingness, perceptions of others having referent power, motivation to
process evidence, motivation to share knowledge and confidence in the sufficiency of
the submitted evidence. Chapter 3 and 6 explicitly explain how others support the use of
these parameters for calculating agent’s receptivity.
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The developed model considered receptivity synonymous with transparency to account
for the extent to which agents could be considered transparent. Scholars explain that
receptivity facilitates knowledge sharing (Deng, 2007; Wang et al., 2008; 2009).
Specifically, Kearney (2007) explains that the opposite of receptivity is resistance. In
line with this, the model assumed that a reduced agent's receptivity results in an equal
increase in resistance.
Recipient’s receptivity was used in the model as a measure of transparency, permitting
the model to determine how open the agent would be with regards to the “type” of
evidence that would imbue them with confidence (e.g. social, political, technical, costly,
qualitative and quantitative). In the agent-based model, recipient’s agents ranged from
being transparent to opaque in nature. It assumed that transparent agents openly told
providers the value they placed on different types of information characterising
scientific evidence. Conversely, opaque agents did not disclose these relative values to
the provider. In the extreme case, if a recipient was highly opaque then the provider had
to guess how to frame their evidence to imbue the recipient with confidence. This
approach permitted the model to explore how different agents could cope to fulfil the
different role regulators (acting as recipients) play in each case study.
In the nuclear waste case study, the expert explained that they were not in a position to
“hold the operators’ hand”, so to speak; it was not desirable that they would tell the
operator exactly what type of information they should submit. This was in contrast to
the salt intake and the avian influenza case study. In the latter, it was vital but in some
respects, it was more a question of how transparent the food manufacturers (as the
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operator) were about the types of evidence they value. Getting this right permitted the
food standards agency (as the policy maker) to convince the operator that there was just
cause why they should comply with voluntary standards.
In the developed model, providers of evidence had the task of trying to imbue recipients
with confidence through submissions of evidence to fit with how a recipient valued
different types of evidence. However, synonymous with trading agents in a financial
market, recipients and providers behave differently under different conditions.
Accounting for the influence that provider’s receptivity had was an important milestone
in the development of the two-agent model. It assumed the provider’s receptivity
determined the extent to which the agent was able to grasp what the recipient was
telling them. Conclusively, experts in the unstructured and the semi-structured
interviews explained how providers of evidence played an important role in the
judgements made regarding the sufficiency of submitted evidence. The expert within the
nuclear waste case study gave a prime example. On more than one occasion, the
operator had been told to submit a qualitative account of how risk ranging 100,000
years into the future would be managed. The operator, however, was “unreceptive” and
did not grasp what the regulator (recipient) was asking of them. Hence, providers of
evidence have the chance of missing opportunities to imbue the recipient with greater
confidence (and receptivity) by failing to give them what they asked for. This has been
captured within the model of confidence building by accounting for provider’s
receptivity and the influence this has on their ability to grasp what is being asked of
them.
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Combining knowledge of recipient’s and provider’s receptivity permitted the model to
determine the likelihood that the provider would know what type of evidence would
imbue recipients with confidence. In the model, it was assumed that providers, faced
with an opaque recipient, still had a chance of “guessing” what type of evidence would
imbue the recipient with confidence. Highly receptive recipients permitted the provider
to view specific weights and gave them a greater chance of addressing each type of
evidence; hence, openly divulging how recipients valued evidence. Combining high
levels of recipient’s and provider’s receptivity gave the providing agent the best chance
of knowing what type of evidence would imbue the recipient with confidence.
In the model, the recipient’s agent gains confidence when the correct type of evidence is
submitted. Evidence is checked by the recipient and if it is of the correct type it is
crossed of the shopping list, so to speak, and attributed toward confidence. When each
type of evidence has been addressed in full, the recipient is assumed to have complete
confidence in the sufficiency of the submitted evidence.
The developed two-agent model has shown how it was possible to calculate a weight
reflecting agent’s confidence in the sufficiency of evidence. This two-agent model could
now be used to inform/support the developed research framework. It is possible to
account for the influence power structure and personality may have on the weight of a
particular line of evidence by generating a weight reflecting recipient’s confidence in
the sufficiency of evidence and multiplying this against the sufficiency weight within
the research framework (Chapter 4).
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Having developed the two-agent model that can account for an agent’s confidence in the
sufficiency of submitted evidence, it is now possible to develop this further into a fully-
fledged multi-agent system. Such a model could draw on aspects of existing agent-
based models that model agents as buyers and sellers (e.g. Mizuta and Steiglitz, 2000;
Kim, 2007; Nassiri-Mofakham et al., 2008 & 2009). Agents wishing to sell a
commodity would have to determine whether bids for the commodity are acceptable.
Eventually, when the buyer makes an acceptable bid the seller agent would exchanges
the commodity for a specified currency. This logic where a buyer and seller agents
negotiate/barter over the cost of a commodity is synonymous to the logic explaining
how agents engage in the brokering of scientific evidence and knowledge. Agents
would come together to negotiate over the sufficiency of scientific evidence being
submitted. From this perspective, the recipient’s agent would be the seller and the
commodity they have to sell is sufficiency. The agent providing the scientific evidence
and knowledge, on the other hand, would be the buyer and the currency they want to
exchange for this sufficiency is confidence, in the form of scientific evidence. In this
context, confidence would be multi-factorial and contingent on a recipient’s receptivity
and the quality of evidence being submitted.
The two-agent model presented in this chapter is intended to be used as an exploratory
tool. These assumptions set out in this chapter were believed to be necessary for
modelling the influence power and personality has on the brokering of evidence in risk-
based regulation. The output from the model development has been presented in the
following chapter as a proof of concept.
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Chapter 8
PROOF OF CONCEPT
This thesis has sought to provide a richer description of the brokering of scientific
evidence in risk-based regulation by focusing on social science aspects of decision-
making. This has been addressed through the development of a two-agent model of
receptivity. Chapter 7 set out how this two-agent model was developed from a
deterministic to a dynamic model of receptivity that could inform the confidence
recipients have in the sufficiency of submitted evidence. This chapter sets out a proof of
concept. It demonstrates how decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence are
informed by changes to system parameters. Moreover, it demonstrates the extent to
which the automated decision making system is able to capture the confidence-building
exercise observed in the three real-world case studies.
8.1. Proof of concept study
Scholars stress the importance of demonstrating rigour to give research value (e.g.
Morse et al., 2002). To this end, a deterministic sensitivity analysis was carried out on
the developed two-agent model to demonstrate its ability to account for influences of
power and personality. This has involved measuring the strength of relations between
input and output variables. The remainder of this section provides proof that the
developed two-agent model was able to simulate the influence different personality
types, positive and negative prior knowledge, and decision uncertainty had on agent
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receptivity. Moreover, it is demonstrated how this was used to simulate confidence
building.
Chapter 7 presented the four personality types being investigated. These included the
negotiator, aggressor, submissive and avoider personality type. Intensity levels assigned
to support personality traits had an independent effect on agent’s propensity to trust and
trustworthiness. Figure 50 also illustrates that the avoider type of personality, with a low
measure of extroversion produced the least propensity to trust.
Figure 50: Propensity to trust calculated using the negotiator, aggressor, submissive
and avoider type of personality. “Avoider high” and “Avoider low” refer to the avoider
type personality with high and low measures of extroversion.
Figure 51 illustrates agent’s relative measures of trustworthiness
the four personality types included in the two
7) the personality types did not specify a specific level of intensity for each trait. To
account for this, the avoider personality type is shown
and a low measure of agreeableness. This figure illustrates that the avoider type of
personality with a low measure of agreeableness had the least capacity to establish
trustworthiness.
The intensity level assigned to
personality and the time the agent was permitted to engage in dialogue. High average
Figure 51: Trustworthiness calculated using the negotiator, aggressor, submissive and
avoider type of personality. “Avoider high” and “Avoider low” refer to the avoider
type personality with high and low measures of agreeableness.
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calculated for each of
-agent model. Aforementioned (in Chapter
twice in Figure 51, with a high
an agent’s referent power was dependent on the agent’s
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intensity of agreeableness and emotional stability was used to represent an agent’s high
potential to establish referent power. It can be seen that agent’s with the submissive type
of personality that had a low intensity value of agreeableness and emotional stability
had the lowest potential to establish referent power and took longer to establish it.
High openness to experience and uncertainty or low measures of both, resulted in agents
being highly motivated to process evidence systematically and carefully. All of the
personality types included in the model had a random chance of having a low, medium
or high openness to experience. Figures 53 to 55 illustrate the average intensity
generated over 1000 runs representing the best and worst circumstances e.g. when
agents with low and high openness to experience in the presence of low and high
uncertainty, to show extremes of motivation incorporated in the two-agent model.
Figure 52: Referent power calculated for the four different personality types
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Agent’s motivation to share knowledge was dependent on how each agent was
motivated to process the evidence. Figure 53 illustrated the relative intensity that
represent agents with a low and high motivation to share knowledge. In line with
insights set out in the literature review (in Chapter 3), if the provider and recipient were
unequally motivated to process the evidence then they were considered to be highly
motivated to share knowledge. Conversely, providers and recipients that were equally
motivated to process evidence were considered to have a low motivation to share
knowledge as shown in Figure 54.
Figure 53: Motivation to process evidence calculated for agents with low and high
measures of openness in the presence of low and high uncertainty.
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Willingness to engage in trusting behaviour was encoded within agent’s prior
knowledge being updated with measures of positive and negative knowledge. For the
recipient, this prior knowledge was a result of interacting with a “good”, “bad” and
“ugly” operator. In the preceding chapter, it was explained how and why these
categories were chosen. Figure 55 illustrates the influence good and ugly operators had
on recipient’s willingness, representing the best and worst case respectively.
Figure 54: Motivation to share knowledge calculated for interacting agents that are
equally motivated and those that have an opposite motivation to process the evidence.
Figure 55: Recipient’s willingness to engage in dialogue based on updates to their
positive and negative prior knowledge.
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Provider’s positive and negative prior knowledge was updated as a function of the
recipient using reward or coercive power, respectively. The rate at which this happened
was dependent on whether the recipient’s current receptivity was greater than their
previous recorded receptivity. A change fitting with the recipient’s policy would result
in their excercising reward or coercive power (e.g. in the form of an increased or
reduced annual fee to hold a waste management license, respectively). In the model, the
recipient’s policy was either to exercise power if current recipient’s receptivity was
greater than previous record of recipient’s receptivity, greater than the past two records
of recipient’s receptivity, or greater than the past three records recipient’s receptivity,
representing a high, medium and low rate respectively. Hence, this was dependent on a
multitude of parameters coming together to imbue the recipient with different rates of
receptivity and therefore could not be simulated to illustrate the best and worst
circumstances.
Four factors affect recipient’s receptivity – propensity to trust, trustworthiness, referent
power and willingness. Figures 53 and 54 describe the best and worst case scenarios for
willingness, which is not directly influenced by personality types. Table 7 was
developed from insights from Tables 5 and 6 and identifies the “Best” and “Worst” case
personality types for each factor. This table illustrates that the aggressor has the greatest
potential and the avoider type of personality has the least potential to influence agent
receptivity through the effect they have on agent’s propensity to trust, trustworthiness
and referent power.
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Personality type
Negotiator Aggressor Submissive Avoider
Propensity to trust
Best case √ √
Worst case √
Trustworthiness
Best case √
Worst case √
Referent power
Best case √ √ √
Worst case √
Table 7 illustrates the potential influence that different personality types could have on
agent receptivity in terms of Propensity to trust, Trustworthiness and Referent power.
These factors directly influence agent receptivity.
Confidence building was modelled as explained in Chapter 7. Figure 56 shows the
different rates at which confidence was gained as recipients and providers engaged in
dialogue over the evidence being submitted. At the onset of each submission, recipient’s
confidence initializes at a certain value and then steadily increases as the provider
makes multiple submissions of evidence. This was run for the “Best” and “Worst” case
for agent receptivity and run under low and high levels of uncertainty; willingness,
motivation, propensity to trust, trustworthiness and referent power.
Table 7: “Best” and “Worst” case scenarios for different personality types
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The different rate at which submissions could be made can have a substantial influence
on the overall outcome. Figure 57 shows the corresponding results for the “best case”
where confidence is attained much earlier.
Two factors affected the rate of the confidence building process:
 The initial level of confidence when the evidence was considered
 How quickly the regulator’s confidence increases with time
These two factors would obviously be affected by the different personality types. In the
“Worst case”, the “avoider” regulator would not engage the operator frequently (as
shown in Figure 55) which may result in slower rates of confidence building. From
Figure 56, after confidence was attained for each piece of evidence considered there was
Figure 56: Confidence gained over multiple submissions of evidence in the “Worst
case”
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a substantial period of time before the next piece of evidence was considered. In
addition, the regulator’s confidence initializes at a relatively low level of intensity. As a
result, the confidence building process takes longer.
In Figure 57, on the other hand, in the “best case” the “aggressor” regulator engages the
operator regularly and has a higher probability of considering all the evidence presented
quicker. The regulator’s confidence is relatively higher at the initial stage and as such,
the confidence building process is quickened.
Figure 57: Confidence gained over multiple submissions of evidence in the “Best
case”
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8.2. Chapter summary and conclusions
In summary, this chapter has demonstrated a proof of concept by demonstrating the
model can simulate known influences of personality and power in the context of the
brokering process characterizing risk-based regulation. The simulation can model the
influence participants have on confidence building and the rate at which this might
occur according to changes in system parameters. As a form of validation, the
simulation of a number of scenarios illustrates how the developed model replicate
aspects of real world regulatory, policy development and environmental planning
decisions.
Assessment of the influence that input random variables had on the variability of the
output random variable. Adopting this approach, it was possible to determine those
variables that agent receptivity was especially sensitive to. Making it possible to
concentrate on controlling these variables with the aim of lowering their random
variability.
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Chapter 9
DISCUSSION
9.1 Introduction
This thesis illustrates, in principle, how it is possible to construct decision contexts
using the concept of “automated decision makers” (e.g. Zhang and Zhang, 2007) to
explore the influences of power structures and personality on the brokering of the
scientific evidence that informs decisions on risk. Construction of a virtual decision-
making environment has permitted this research to simulate and explore these factors in
a way that would otherwise be cumbersome by studying real-time human behaviour.
For example, by combining knowledge of individual and strategic choice, this thesis
describes a decision environment that reflects the complex interaction of effects
influencing humans (agents) when making decisions under uncertainty, whilst taking
account of the behaviour of others. Moreover, this has allowed the variation of
components of the decision-making environment, and of the actors themselves to attain
a means of exploring the dynamic influence that power structure and key personalities
might have on the regulator/applicant relationship, characterising the brokering of
evidence in risk-based regulation.
This chapter provides a summary of the intellectual insights offered by this thesis. The
primary focus is on evaluating the extent to which this research has been able to achieve
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its aim: “To provide a richer description of risk-based decision making in risk-based
regulation by focusing on the social science aspects of decision making”.
9.2 The approach
In order to address the research aim it was necessary to devise a means of simulating
insights contained within social science literature. To achieve this, a research
framework was developed that informed the agent-based simulation used to bring
together all these insights under one umbrella. The following sub-sections discuss the
outcome and benefits of this approach.
In UK Government departments and agencies, technocratic processes are required to set
out the decision-making process. An essential element of these frameworks is their
ability to represent the brokering of scientific evidence through decision frameworks
toward a final decision maker. The decision maker must then finalise their decision
based on the relative strength, direction and weight associated with this evidence.
Evidence is presented to decision makers as lines of evidence. These are consecutive
lines of communication that stretch between sources of scientific evidence final decision
makers. The three selected case studies provided a good spread of risk-based regulatory
decision-making. These included a regulatory decision (the regulatory review of a post-
closure safety case for nuclear waste disposal), an environmental planning decision (the
disposal of avian influenza infected animal carcasses) and a policy development
decision (dietary salt intake). Chapter 5 illustrates how these have been mapped out
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using an existing methodology (developed by OXERA, 2000) and how this was
expanded upon to incorporate the influence of power structure and personality.
Aforementioned, in Chapter 3, current risk management frameworks fail to account for
the fact that the people making the decisions often must do so under conditions of
uncertainty, limited resources (Eduljee, 2000) and/or contradictory evidence (Hood et
al., 2004). Scholars have explained how this inherent omnipresence of uncertainty
increases the level of subjectivity required to make decisions and have emphasized the
role most participants play (Mayo and Hollander, 1994; Rothstein, 2006). By drawing
on insights contained in existing literature, the two-agent model can, in principal,
explore some of the complexities and nuances that characterise risk-based regulation.
In the Exploratory stage, it was revealed that the brokering of evidence consisted of
participants either acting as either recipients or providers. Participants involved in this
process engaged in three distinct stages:
 Receiving stage;
 Processing stage; and
 Passing on stage.
From the unstructured interviews, it was learnt that this was not a deterministic process
but a dynamic process with the possibility of feedback. The brokering of scientific
evidence for environmental decision making often has to be considered in parallel to
other types of evidence such as political, social, costly and technical. In addition,
evidence may be qualitative or quantitative in character. The type of individual also
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plays a significant role in the brokering process based on their power and personality
characteristics.
Conceiving the brokering process as existing within these three stages, this thesis
specifically demonstrates how the known influences of power and personality
(presented in Chapter 3) can be simulated in the context that characterises the brokering
of scientific evidence.
Placing the likely influence of the Big Five personality traits have in context of the
decisions has permitted marrying together the intrinsic nature of the decision maker
with the extrinsic nature of power characterising an agent’s world. This is a necessary
step forward for practitioners wanting to account for the influence decision participants
have on decision outcomes. As shown in Section 8.1, if the influence participants have
on the brokering of evidence and confidence attached to a decision outcome is ignored
then risk-based regulation faces a deteriorating transparency. This is especially true
considering the growing number of risks that government must contend with. Moreover,
regulatory resources allocated toward environment decision making have reached a
plateau in some instances and declined in others, increasing the level of uncertainty
characterising risk-based regulation (Hutter, 2005).
Power is both relational and reciprocal; a relationship must exist between participants,
and it must be perceived by those it is exercised upon. This thesis illustrates how the
relationship between intrinsic personality and extrinsic power relates to the dynamics of
the brokering of evidence and knowledge. By simulating insights contained in the
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power and personality literatures, the complexities that characterise a subject world can
be captured (e.g. Mischel, 1968; 1995; 1999). Because of the level of complexity that
this refers to, most scholars have sufficed to describe the existence of component level
rules that seem important for making decisions. Some, however, have gone further to
pinpoint characteristics that are important for specific conditions of a decision.
In the business psychology literature, there has been a growth in the use of
psychometric tests for screening out employees that seem particularly ill-suited for roles
within an organisation. However, these are largely limited in scope because of the
extent to which they rely on the predictive power of personality. This limits their use
because a measure of personality can at best only provide an indication of the types of
behaviour that a particular person is likely to carry out over time. The classic example
scholars often use to explain this is that an extrovert, will not always be outspoken, just
that on most occasions they will be more outspoken than an introvert. The approach to
investigate the influence participants have in the context of the decision is not new ‘per
se’. This thesis has attempted to place known influences of personality within the
context of brokering of evidence. Scholars have used this ‘person x situation’ approach
for a great number of years. However, there is a gap in knowledge regarding the
influence specific traits have in the context of the brokering process in risk-based
regulation. Now that the two-agent model has been developed, it could potentially
explore the influence specific traits have on this brokering process.
One of the key issues to consider when investigating the brokering of scientific
evidence is the relative influence different lines of evidence can have on a decision
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outcome. This has been explicitly addressed in the body of the research presented in this
thesis by drawing upon the logic set out in TESLA, the existing software developed by
risk specialists Quintessa. Evidence-support logic has been used within TESLA and
others to map out the logic of evidence-based decisions (as explained in Chapter 6).
However, also explained in Chapter 6, this logic has not been used to map out the
influence individuals have on decisions regarding the sufficiency of supporting
evidence. This thesis has attempted to address this by developing a two-agent model
that can account for the influence power and personality has on a participant’s
perception of sufficiency. It has also been suggested in Chapter 8 how this could be
further developed and integrated within the evidence-support logic framework. Should
this be achieved, it would be possible to carry out a sensitivity analysis to investigate
which lines of evidence might be susceptible to the effect of participants’ receptivity.
This could reveal under what circumstances within the brokering process that
participants’ power and personality might be permitted to have a far greater impact.
This would have obvious benefits for the disposal of avian influenza infected diseased
animal carcases case study. In this case study, participants were not permitted to engage
in extensive dialogue like in the nuclear waste disposal case study. The implications for
getting it right the first time were therefore imperative. Updates to agents’ negative prior
knowledge, could render the relationship void by causing a significant drop in the
recipient’s confidence.
The development of agent-based models has implications for the selection of regulatory
styles and of experts for expert elicitation panels. Risks must often be assessed and
managed, with expert knowledge being used to fill the gaps in scientific evidence. Often
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this consists of a group of experts that come together to express their opinion regarding
the severity and characterization of risk. A number of techniques have been employed to
facilitate this. The Delphi method, for example, sets out the process whereby experts are
separated into groups to discuss particular aspects of a risk that must be managed. This
is repeated until the researcher believes they have obtained the views and opinions of all
the attending experts. Whilst such methods have merit, they can be labour intensive and
time consuming. Moreover, they offer no guarantee that the make-up of each break-out
group will not be dominated by a single individual or that the facilitator will be able to
ensure all opinions are heard. The two-agent model could be developed to offer
regulators the opportunity to explore the influence that experts will have on a decision
outcome. This is illustrated in the dietary salt intake case study. The final decision
whether to proceed with the recommended 6gm per day target was taken by a group of
twelve experts. Further development of the agent-based model could illustrate the
different impact participants might have on the group decision and the confidence this
imbues them with.
9.3 Results from this study
Chapter 5 reconfirmed the variable influence different types of information can have
throughout the course of a decision. Chapter 6 illustrates how agent’s receptivity can be
accounted for by drawing upon known power structure and personality influences.
Chapter 7 provides a means of explaining the influence recipient’s receptivity can have
on a provider and thereby the likelihood that they will be able to imbue the recipients
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with a greater measure of confidence regarding the sufficiency of the submitted
evidence.
A novel aspect of the developed model is the platform it provides for users to consider
the influence of power and personality that would otherwise be difficult to explore. In
this thesis, agent-based modelling has permitted the simulation of the behaviour of
heterogeneous autonomous agents that behave differently according to the evidence
being submitted. The developed two-agent model was able to portray the “best” and
“worst” personality types for different case studies as shown in Figures 50 to 52. It also
describes how certain factors increase or decrease dynamically. For instance, the
referent power of an “emotionally stable” provider or operator (as shown in Figure 52
for the “submissive” personality type) is shown to increase with time as he/she
addresses all the regulators requests.
The complexity that characterizes the behaviour of participants in the brokering process
is vast. To characterize this, variables’ randomness (or unpredictability) could be
incorporated in the model. Figures 53 to 55 show extreme “best” and “worst” cases with
little spread for motivation to share and process while large spreads and less extremes
for recipient’s willingness. The spread is influenced by the number of possible factors
(both internal and external) that could affect the various traits.
Dynamic simulations of the model have demonstrated the influences of the “best” and
“worst” cases on the attainment of confidence over multiple submissions of evidence.
Each supporting query could be considered as individual submissions of evidence. Once
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the regulator’s confidence is attained, the next piece of evidence is looked at. The “best”
case involving the combination of receptive personality types attained confidence
quicker for each deliberation than the “worst” case as shown in Figure 56.
Two factors that were found to influence confidence building rates were identified as
being:
 The initial level of confidence when the evidence was considered; and
 How quickly the regulator’s confidence increases with time.
The developed model was able to successfully demonstrate the influence of two extreme
personality types on confidence building. “Avoiders” built confidence at a slower rate
than “aggressors” as they did not openly divulge what types of evidence they required
(as recipients) and were less attentive to what was being asked of them (as providers).
Such factors as low initial confidence at the start of the consultation in the Avian
Influenza case study would have a greater impact on the decision outcome than either of
the other cases. This is because the Avian Influenza case was an emergency response
situation where regulatory decisions had to be made in a limited period of time.
Conversely, the Nuclear Waste and Salt Intake case studies had significantly longer
periods of time for decisions.
The rate of confidence building varied within the three case studies. In the Nuclear
waste case, confidence would likely build at a slower rate because of the greater level of
scientific uncertainty characterising the decision. The regulators also tend to be less
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transparent with regards to the type of evidence that would imbue them with confidence
in order to thoroughly assess the operator’s competence in managing the associated
risks. In contrast, in the Avian Influenza case study, confidence building would likely
occur at a quicker rate because of the assessment and management of risk that is carried
out in preparation for a disease outbreak.
Stakeholder consultation could affect both factors determining confidence building
rates. It was important in the Salt Intake case study to attain a measure of influence over
food manufactures. It played a significant role in both the Nuclear Waste and Avian
Influenza case studies because of the levels of public dread associated with the risks
being managed. The periods for stakeholder consultation also varied between the three
case studies. In the Salt intake case study, stakeholder consultation was continuous
throughout the brokering process. In the Avian Influenza case, stakeholder consultation
was carried out early – ahead of the disease outbreak. In contrast, the Nuclear Waste
case study stakeholder consultation was not permitted to occur until the latter end of the
decision. The initial level and the rate at which confidence builds in the three case
studies influences the impact it will have on confidence the regulator will have in the
sufficiency the evidence supporting the final decision.
Stakeholder consultation had the potential to have the greatest impact in the Nuclear
Waste case study. However, this was buffered by a period of informal submissions of
evidence that occurred early in the brokering process. Similarly, in the Avian Influenza
case study stakeholders were consulted early to balance the effect it would have during
a disease outbreak.
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For example, in the case of the post-closure safety case for nuclear waste disposal, the
decision took four years to play out. Not only this, the level of access that would be
required to provide similar insight is unpractical and unlikely ever to be granted.
9.4 General applications
Development of the two-agent model had scope for facilitating the planning and
carrying out of scientific advisory panels. The use of advisory panels is a necessary
component of modern environmental decision-making. They play an important role in
addressing gaps in knowledge that can be time-consuming and costly. Generally, such
reviews have been criticised. Some authors state that they only reveal additional
uncertainties that further research can resolve (Powell, 1999). However, these panels are
important in establishing knowledge concerning trust between internal colleagues,
specifically between decision makers, policy makers and those responsible for carrying
out the analysis of submitted evidence and developing options for appraisal. The two-
agent model could be employed as a tool used in the planning of such panels.
Scholars also advice practitioners to maintain a realistic perspective about individual
biases because independent advice is neither practical nor likely to be available (e.g.
OXERA, 2000). Instead, practitioners of risk-based regulation are advised to manage
such issues that require total independence. The developed two-agent model, at least in
principle, has the scope to address some of these issues. The recipient’s tendency to
trust and the influence this has on their receptivity and confidence can be captured in the
two-agent model.
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As it stands, the two-agent model offers insights into the implications for the design of
regulatory styles and selection/make-up of expert elicitation panels for complex risk
decisions. Hence, development of this model would give regulators the opportunity to
manipulate characteristics of decision makers and the decision context with respect to
uncertainty. This could be used as a platform on which to consider influences that can
be difficult to explore using human participants; hence, providing a valuable interaction
between occupational psychology, agent-based simulation and the science of risk-based
decision making.
Of particular interest to the literature on power and personality is the opportunity it
provides to manipulate characteristics of the decision makers with respect to
uncertainty. The model has clearly demonstrated that it is possible in this respect to vary
the characteristics of decision makers and the decisions. It has achieved this by
simulating insights contained within literature. This goes beyond such insight by
placing them in the very real context of the decision. The two-agent model is structured
to explore the relationship between the process by which specific evidence is actively
brokered and the impact of personality on the receptivity of recipients.This is also of
great interest for scholars investigating the role power and personality play in-group
decision-making; providing a platform on which many otherwise disparate lines of
reasoning could be brought together to give a wider picture of their implications for
getting it right.
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This research illustrates that it is possible to highlight specific aspects of each decision
that are sensitive to the influence of power and personality (e.g., where belief is low and
sufficiency is high). The developed model illustrates how the influence of motivational
factors and general receptivity was substantially increased under greater levels of
uncertainty if agents were uncertainty orientated. For example, this had obvious
implications for the nuclear waste disposal case study that was particularly sensitive to
the implications of the decision maker’s power and personality because of their position
within the hierarchy. Accounting for this, the model had the capacity to show how an
otherwise strong line of evidence can have much less of an impact compared to a weak
line of evidence because an agent’s reduced receptivity.
9.5 Further development of the two-agent model
Further development of the two-agent model would allow it to be established as an
exploratory tool that could facilitate the assessment and management of confidence
building. The logic set out in the developed model could be run consecutively to
represent the transfer of confidence up through lines of evidence and thereby providing
a analysis of how sensitive decision outcomes are to personal and organisational
features.
The two-agent model has demonstrated how it is possible to generate a measure of
receptivity and relate this to how transparent an agent will be regarding their internal
states. This could be developed further. By drawing upon the work set out by Ghasem-
Aghee and Ören (2007) who demonstrated how agents could be modelled with a
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measure of dynamic personality, relating the relative influence of facets to the
characteristics of the situation. Such a development could rationalise the link between a
recipient’s perception and value judments made regarding the suffiency of submitted
evidence.
Developing this into a multi-agent system would allow different strategies for building
and maintaining a sustained level of confidence to be explored. Practitioners of risk-
based regulation can struggle to maintain a sustained measure of confidence. The
mismanagement of a disease outbreak, for example, has been shown to have long
lasting effects that are difficuilt to overcome.
By conceptualizing recipients as sellers and providers as buyers of sufficiency within a
multi agent model it would be possible to further explore the dynamics of the brokering
process. Using the concept of dependency agents could be given the capacity to
recognise novel aspects of submitted evidence and update their belief accordingly. This
concept of giving memory to the agents would build on the work set out by Izquierdo et
al. (2007) who demonstrated the value of giving agent’s the capacity to learn from their
experiences and avoid unsatisfactory outcomes. Moreover, agents could be shown to
react based on their capacity to balance personal and organisational (e.g. following
Kawakami et al., 2006) and thereby could explore the influence social networks have on
the defusion of messages and formation of coalitions and informal networks within a
risk-management framework.
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Chapter 10
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The aim of this work was to provide a richer description of the brokering of scientific
evidence in risk-based regulation. This has been achieved through the development of a
dynamic two-agent model of agent’s receptivity.
Existing risk management frameworks were found to pay little homage to the fact that
decisions made are acted upon by people, and as such, fail to account for the influence
value judgments have in determining whether a risk is perceived to exist, and to what
level.
A research framework capable of mapping out the logic of the brokering process was
developed. This was achieved by exploring the flow of information within three real-
world case studies. The brokering process was found to consists of three stages; the
receiving stage, the processing stage, and the passing-on stage, which were not
deterministic but dynamic with the possibility of feedback between the three stages.
Building upon evidence-support logic the developed research framework is capable of
exploring the influence participants have on the brokering of evidence. This was
achieved by incorporating aspects of power and personality to inform agent’s
receptivity. Receptivity would influence judgements regarding the confidence attained
in submissions of evidence.
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The recipient’s tendency to trust and the influence this has on their receptivity and
confidence can be captured in developed two-agent model. Four factors were used to
determine agent’s receptivity – motivation, propensity to trust, trustworthiness and
referent power. The dynamic two-agent model was able to give agents variable
personalities which had varied influences on these factors. “Best” and “Worst”
personality types towards building confidence were identified as the “aggressor” and
“avoider” type, respectively. Discussions showed how this related to industrial-based
case studies and provided insights into how individuals can in fact influence decision
making in different scenarios.
The two-agent model is a novel development for risk-based regulation. The developed
two-agent model can account for the influence power and personality has on a
participant’s perception of sufficiency. The model improves the transparency in the
brokering process and has clearly demonstrated that it is possible to vary the
characteristics of decision makers and the decisions by simulating insights contained
within literature.
Further work may be carried out to extend the model to a multi-agent model that could
describe the influence of power and personality in group decision making; this may
include coalitions, informal networks.
The developed model is a step toward a fully-fledged multi-agent system Drawing upon
existing multi-agent systems recipients could be conceptulised as buyers and providers
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as sellers of sufficiency. The comodity they would broker would be different types of
evidence, the value recipients place in it would be reflected as variable measure of
confidence. Using the concept of dependency agents could be given memory, permitting
them to update their measure of receptivity, and thereby confidence according to the
novelty aspects of evidence being submitted.
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